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Introduction: Universal Development 
– Research and Practice
Richard Longhurst
Abstract Development policy, practice and research have largely adhered 
to a North–South, geographic and aid-driven view of the world. Over 
the last ten years the approaches of South–South cooperation have also 
come to prominence. However, more attention is being paid to universal 
development based on the assumption that development challenges are 
as relevant for the North as for the South, with many common problems. 
More needs to be known about the nature of learning from South to 
North in order to complete the paradigm of universal development. The 
articles chosen for this Archive Collection are addressed to how South and 
North approaches to development can be interlinked: they show that this 
topic has been debated for many years. With the advent of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, there is now a framework in place with which to 
address a universal approach to development.
Keywords: universal development, universality, Sustainable 
Development Goals, South–North cooperation, development policy, 
development practice, development research. 
1 Introduction1
Models of  development theory and practice are regularly redefined 
and then pursued. The most well-known is the development aid-driven 
model of  North to South exchange of  ideas, resources and skills. But 
there has been growing support for such exchanges to enhance learning 
between countries in the South – that is, South–South development 
– as well as South–North transfers of  patterns of  development. The 
completed paradigm of  interconnected or universal development 
is one where research, practice and learning are fully shared in all 
directions between South and North, as well as within the South and 
within the North. Universal development addresses shared problems 
and challenges. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are an 
embodiment of  this approach.
However, as this IDS Bulletin Archive Collection of  ten articles shows, 
the idea that development should be seen as universal and not just 
the transferring of  ideas and practice from North to South is not new, 
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despite contradicting the view of  development aid prevailing in the 
1970s and thereafter, and before, in the 1950s and 1960s. This Archive 
Collection reviews the research published in previous issues of  the 
IDS Bulletin and other selected research on universal development, 
with examples of  practice, and looks ahead to suggest how these ideas 
could be applied generally to make development studies and practice 
more universal. This is an important part of  the next phase of  global 
development, to evolve into universally shared challenges, ideas and 
practice. The selected articles cover the last 40 years and while the 
importance of  the lessons they provide are generally relevant in the 
present day, obviously context has changed. Where possible, a ‘then’ 
and ‘now’ perspective is addressed. Many of  the former ‘North–South’ 
geographic assumptions are now less valid, given the rapid advance of  
countries such as China and India; income, health and education have 
converged for many countries; there are rising problems of  poverty and 
malnutrition in developed countries; and there are growing South–
North flows of  capital and technology. 
The universal development approach is particularly relevant against 
the backdrop of  shared and interconnected challenges such as climate 
change, resource degradation, migration and trafficking, shared 
technology, and growing inequality, and when the rise of  populism 
and nationalism is undermining attempts to address many of  these 
challenges in both North and South. Approaching these problems 
requires a more universal approach, which is the aim of  the SDGs, 
now agreed and for which workable implementation is being sought. 
Some problems may only be solved by the universal approach, while 
others will benefit from new perspectives. But there are some drawbacks 
such as institutional constraints and transaction costs. For many 
people, the term ‘universal’ would be most commonly applied to the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights of  1948. Universalism has 
been defined as ‘the human development approach of  emphasizing 
the enhancement of  freedoms for every human being and the 2030 
Agenda by concentrating on leaving no one behind’ (UNDP 2016: 45). 
Universal development can be described as ‘where development is a 
matter for everyone everywhere, and comparative experiences and 
mutual learning in all directions are valued’ (Leach 2016: 6), and more 
simply as ‘development for all’. 
The primary objectives of  this article are to provide an overview of  
this IDS Bulletin and to: (1) commentate on the selected articles that 
have addressed universality, (2) link their significance to the present day, 
and (3) add some new material. In laying out the circular nature of  
universality – from North to South, South to South, and South to North 
– it is the third element that is weakest in terms of  understanding. North 
to South has a long history and South to South is gathering momentum. 
The IDS Bulletin articles have focused primarily on seeing every problem 
as relating potentially to all countries in North and South (and East and 
West), whatever that issue may be: constraints and solutions will differ 
across countries, but not necessarily according to geographic divisions. 
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Key conclusions along the lines of  ‘what works or does not work, 
where and why’ cannot be addressed in any detail within the limits of  
this overview. Ideally, this overview will be of  interest to those outside 
the development community, as universal development in concept 
and practice will only make significant progress if  advocated by this 
constituency.
After this introductionary section, this article is organised in three 
further sections. Section 2 reviews ‘reassessments’ of  development and 
of  how universality has been addressed. Section 3 addresses five broad 
thematic areas where universal development was addressed directly, 
namely: (i) policy approaches to current national and global economic 
shocks, (ii) inequality and exclusion, (iii) approaching development 
through greater participation, (iv) democratic governance, and 
(v) global health. Although the sources for these themes are drawn 
mostly from IDS Bulletin articles, the last theme is treated differently. 
The lead is taken from practice – the well-known United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) Lessons without Borders 
programme based on child health programmes applied in the United 
States (US). Some selective research findings are included in the case 
study. Section 4 provides some conclusions, and discussion of  the SDGs.
For the purpose of  choosing articles for this Archive Collection, most 
issues of  the IDS Bulletin since the first was published in January 1968 were 
reviewed to assess approaches to, and examples of  practice of, universal 
development. The archive articles are an eclectic selection: authors were 
writing about various thematic topics and believing that there could be 
lessons shared universally. For additional research literature, some material 
relating to the thematic areas was included. This was not generated 
systematically as it would have been a broad task. What has not been done 
(for now, at least) is a further step: to review IDS Bulletin articles from the 
perspective of  how existing development research, generally conducted in 
and for developing countries, could be more widely applied. 
There are several thematic areas not explored here that have used 
the universal development approach. These include, inter alia, rural 
development (Baviskar et al. 1980; Baviskar 1981; Korf  and Oughton 
2006), microfinance (Rogaly and Roche 1998), smallholder farming 
(Stringer, Twyman and Gibbs 2008), floodplain management and 
irrigation (Monbiot 2014; Lean 2014), malnutrition (IFPRI 2016), 
food policy (Constantine and Santarelli 2017), and education systems 
(Little 1988). It is expected that there are many other areas that would 
be pertinent such as urban development, gender empowerment and 
social welfare programmes. These and others would merit a thematic 
sub-section had space permitted. 
In further thematic areas, there are several initiatives currently in progress 
at IDS to frame development as universal, straddling locations across 
North and South: the World Social Science Report 2016 on inequality and 
social justice included contributions from 107 authors across 40 countries; 
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the Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability 
(STEPS) programme bridge-year projects involve hub linkages across 
countries, carrying out several comparative research projects; a proposal 
on the political economy of  green transformations has been developed, 
including the UK and Germany; participatory action research initiatives, 
with engagement with farmer organisations in the UK, Senegal and 
Nicaragua; and the developmental impact of  interactions between formal 
and informal institutions in Eastern Europe. Further, the International 
Centre for Tax and Development’s research on international corporate 
taxation is relevant across countries. In addition, the Rockefeller project 
Market-based Solutions for the Extreme Poor included examples from the 
developed world context, and there have also been submissions of  evidence 
to parliamentary enquiries on the implications for the UK of  the SDGs, 
and contributions to debates on universality in the area of  youth (Wignall 
2016). Finally, the current work of  the Centre for Rising Powers and 
Global Development focuses on exchanges of  ideas and health and food 
policies between Brazil and the UK, including activities on food policy in 
conjunction with the Food Foundation (Constantine and Santarelli 2017).
2 Debates about universal development
At various times, issues of  the IDS Bulletin have ‘re-assessed’, 
‘re‑imagined’, ‘re‑framed’, or ‘re‑defined’ development, starting with 
debates in the 1970s, with some specific topics in between, and then 
onto the IDS 40th and 50th anniversary conferences, in 2006 and 2016 
respectively. The starting point for reassessments was: (i) the discussions 
over the Duncan Report (Seers 1969), the Pearson Commission (de Kadt 
1969), and later, the Brandt Commission (Jolly and Joekes 1981); (ii) the 
Seers proposals (Seers 1977 and Singer 1989, both this IDS Bulletin; 
Seers 1979, 1983) and work on underdeveloped Europe (Seers, Schaffer 
and Kiljunen 1979; Seers and Vaitsos 1980, 1982); (iii) the ‘states or 
markets’ debate in the 1980s and 1990s (Colclough and Manor 1991), 
acting as an important stepping stone; and then onto (iv) the IDS 40th 
anniversary conference ‘Reinventing Development Research’ (Haddad 
2007, this IDS Bulletin) and to ‘Reimagining Development’ (Haddad et al. 
2011), a global co‑construction where 20–30 groups of  people offered 
their reflections on a common set of  questions, the results of  which were 
published as the IDS Bulletin ‘Time to Reimagine Development?’; and 
most recently, (v) the 50th anniversary (Leach 2016). 
The preoccupation with development as aid, especially of  donor-funded 
research, has largely pre-empted any notions of  universal development. 
As Leach has observed: 
Related to this context of  complex, globally interconnected 
challenges is a fundamental shift away from old aid-related 
paradigms and their framing in North–South terms, towards an 
assumption that development challenges are as relevant for Europe 
and North America as they are in Africa, Asia or Latin America, with 
scope for comparative insights and learning in multiple directions. 
This taken-for-granted sense of  what one can term a ‘universal 
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agenda’… was a striking feature of  the IDS 50th anniversary 
conference. It signals a different set of  discourses from even a decade 
earlier, when the IDS 40th anniversary conference marked out such a 
universal take as an aspiration (Edwards 2007) (Leach 2016: 5). 
Connecting, learning and sharing are key pivots in the universal agenda. 
The global knowledge economy is changing as innovations in all parts 
of  the world are changing old notions, moving towards South–South 
and South–North, leading to a Universalist view (ibid.). 
The first major focus on universal development was promoted by 
Dudley Seers, where he convened debates and discussions at IDS in the 
1970s and early 1980s. As Singer pointed out:
… the insights that Dudley gained about the problems of  developing 
countries could be transferred back to the industrialised countries, 
and would be very helpful in dealing with our own development 
problems (Singer 1989: 5, this IDS Bulletin).
Seers proposed, in a manner that mirrors debates 40 years later (see 
also Singer 1989, this IDS Bulletin; Seers 1979; Seers with IDS M.Phil. 
Faculty and Students 1977; Longhurst 2016):2 
The convention is that development studies cover only the ‘developing’ 
countries of  Africa, Asia and Latin America, a sort of  academic 
counterpart of  OXFAM. But this convention is ceasing to be viable for 
European social scientists, and indeed that is starting to be harmful. 
The assumption that ‘their’ problems are intrinsically different from 
‘ours’ is not merely patronising; it has become a hindrance to the 
transfer of  experience. It is also associated with political commitment 
of  a sort that hinders progress (Seers 1977: 6, this IDS Bulletin).
These insights were extended to Europe (where the artificiality of  the 
distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ was most obvious), 
applying methodologies developed in relation to developing countries, 
especially concepts of  ‘backwash’ (where development in one location 
causes adverse effects in the peripheral areas), and core‑periphery 
relations (Seers et al. 1979), a concept originating in development 
studies. Western Europe had its own core and periphery; there was a 
definite geographical pattern, with the European periphery forming a 
ring around the core. Presciently, Seers proposed that insights acquired 
in the development field threw light on several European policy issues, 
including those raised by the enlargement of  the European Economic 
Community. In the spirit of  universal development and mutual 
learning, the geographical extension of  development studies would both 
contribute to a deeper understanding of  European problems and also 
throw light on the problems of  the countries conventionally covered by 
development studies (Seers 1977: 7, this IDS Bulletin).
Singer’s later analysis of  Seers’ work using a Keynesian lens (Singer 
1989, this IDS Bulletin) noted that John Maynard Keynes himself  
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did not take any interest in development problems or developing 
countries, and made no attempt himself  to apply his framework to 
developing countries. Seers’ work on the ‘special case’ of  local models 
in developed countries (Seers 1963) showed differences from that 
of  developing countries. Seers later tried to develop a model better 
suited to the conditions of  developing countries by treating them as 
part of  an international periphery – the centre/periphery view – and 
emphasised again that insights gained could help in dealing with UK 
problems (including appropriate technology, the informal sector, the 
role of  transnational corporations, dealing with depressed areas and 
economic inequalities). This critique by Singer of  Seers (and by Toye 
1989) provides a good discussion of  the importance of  context in the 
application of  economics from North to South and vice versa. Seers’ 
approach was developed as a result of  field experience, particularly in 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) Employment Missions in 
the 1970s and earlier work in the West Indies. Moving from policy and 
reality to theory was shared with Keynes: this involved moving from 
concentration on growth to employment to basic needs, poverty, and 
income distribution, all influenced by field experience. Keynes then 
turned to revise the models with which he worked.3 
Further discussion was generated by the Brandt Commission 
recommendations (Jolly and Joekes 1981) that proposed strong and 
enlarged support to North–South negotiations, and recommended a 
transfer of  resources from developed to developing countries, giving 
new life to earlier North–South proposals but emphasising a dual 
relationship, called mutual self-interest. 
Reassessment at the IDS 40th anniversary conference raised the question 
of  ‘development for whom?’ (Haddad 2007, this IDS Bulletin). This 
conference summary reported on the anniversary roundtables that took 
place in many countries across the globe, so reflecting the views of  a wide 
range of  professionals, both researchers and practitioners. Development 
had become more global, inequality was rising in many countries, and 
the capacity to use and generate knowledge was increasing outside the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. China’s emergence challenged Western assumptions about 
how development happens. There were new sources of  financial capital 
for development initiatives and sources of  information; civil society was 
forming new transnational alliances; and sustainable development was 
being questioned in terms of  carbon consumption levels. The spheres of  
influence of  the aid donors were shrinking; and the boundaries between 
domestic and international policies were blurred as national identities 
reconfigured and the interdependence of  nations intensified (ibid.).
A rebirth of  development research was approached in the context 
of  three aspects of  global change: convergence, divergence and 
accountability.4 Convergence was seen in the ebb and flow of  identities 
around religion, sexuality, ethnicity and nationhood; climate change 
and energy use; the conflation of  development and security; and the 
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emergence of  China as a global player. Issues such as international 
migration and increasing inequality were of  global concern. Divergence 
implied many pathways to development and it was argued that the 
space to discuss these pathways was opening up, yet there was little 
integration between these pathways (Edwards 2007). The West or North 
were no longer acceptable as the yardstick for success, let alone as the 
target to be aimed for. On accountability, the development industry had 
much to say about the responsibility of  others, but little to say about 
its own performance. Development research also avoided saying much 
about ethics, and routinely avoided the private sector.
Ten years later, in summing up the IDS 50th anniversary conference, 
Melissa Leach (2016) proposed that long-standing but marginalised 
perspectives and debates from the global South offered new values and 
ideas, not being confined to a North–South axis let alone as a view of  
development just as aid. She expressed that emerging alliances and 
alternatives were not led by the concerns of  Northern intellectuals and 
policymakers, and the North–South paradigm did not measure up to 
ever-more complex problems.
3 Thematic areas
3.1 Policy approaches to current national and global economic shocks
The relationship between policy, reality and theory is evident in the 
IDS Bulletin on ‘Britain: A Case for Development?’ (Jolly and Luckham 
1977, this IDS Bulletin) at a time of  economic crisis caused by the 
1973–74 oil price shock (Jolly 1977, this IDS Bulletin). Its editors set off 
with a sense of  hesitation, doubting the direct analogy between Britain 
and the developing countries:
… there are many similarities: structural unemployment, inflation 
and balance of  payments difficulties; the emigration of  professional 
manpower; the visiting expert from the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund]; regional imbalance and the difficulty of  inducing investment 
and expansion… they indicate shared features of  underdevelopment, 
rather than comparable patterns of  development (Jolly and Luckham 
1977: 1, this IDS Bulletin).
There were also shared social and political problems which recession 
had sharpened: addressing Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism; 
racial conflict; political violence; persistent poverty; the erosion 
of  the welfare state; and corruption and decay in police and local 
government bureaucracies. It was argued, however, that there were 
critical differences between North and South with many problems 
of  overdevelopment, or the wrong kind of  development, such as 
a small or overspecialised agricultural sector, disease patterns and 
overconsumption in Britain. Those who argued that rapid growth 
and industrialisation did not necessarily bring benefits to developing 
countries could identify parallels in the over-industrialisation in Britain. 
‘Britain: A Case for Development?’advocated a less growth-oriented, 
more self-reliant strategy of  change for Britain.
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In terms of  connections, Jolly (1977, this IDS Bulletin), echoing a 
common theme at the time of  ‘Redistribution with Sloth [growth]’, 
proposed that some of  the UK’s economic ills could benefit from the 
concepts of  basic needs and national self-reliance – approaches and 
priorities suggested in analyses of  developing country problems. Poverty, 
employment problems, inequality, foreign exchange difficulties and 
heavy international ‘dependence’ arose as much from the structure 
and pattern of  a country’s development as from its growth rate. At 
that time most economic analyses of  Britain’s economic difficulties 
proposed that slow growth was at the heart of  the problem, with an 
acceleration of  growth the obvious cure. Had the lessons of  recent 
employment studies in the developing countries been applied to Britain, 
the emphasis would have been on structural factors as the main causes 
of  unemployment and structural change rather than growth as the 
critical need. A structural approach covered analysis of  the underlying 
trends and problems of  the economy and a disaggregated analysis of  
unemployment itself, pointing to the different factors bearing on the 
unemployment of  different groups. A structural approach to policy 
was absent from the then mainstream debate on employment policy 
in Britain. 
The editors noted (Jolly and Luckham 1977: 3, this IDS Bulletin) that 
it was one thing to advocate a less growth-oriented, more self-reliant 
strategy of  change in Britain, but quite another to put it into effect, 
moving from analysis to implementation. That IDS Bulletin in 1977 
addressed some of  the ‘so what?’ questions, but it is hard to believe that 
economic advisers in better‑off countries would say they were taking 
advice from the experience of  less well‑off countries. Then, that would 
have been reputational suicide. This work is an early reminder that the 
key issue of  poverty and inequality has been running through the work 
of  IDS and its partners for over 40 years. 
Predominant in the debates of  the 1980s was the questioning of  the 
neoliberal agenda of  ‘getting prices right’, decreasing the role of  the 
public sector to reduce expenditure (Colclough and Manor 1991), and 
privatising services. Evidence later emerged that austerity programmes 
in the South in the 1980s that cut back the role of  the state – structural 
adjustment – did not work in terms of  stimulating growth and 
reducing poverty. But this has not stopped austerity programmes being 
implemented in the North. Evidence from Latin America (George 2013) 
provides five lessons from the Latin American debt crises of  1982–89 
and 2001–02 that are applicable to present-day Europe. The most 
important are that fiscal reform alone cannot solve a debt crisis; 
austerity must be an element of  a larger strategy and not the strategy 
itself; and economic growth is important.
The evaluations of  International Monetary Fund (IMF) advice and 
synthesis evidence from Be Outraged, written by Richard Jolly and 
colleagues (2012), argue that countries undergoing austerity in Europe, 
such as Greece and the UK, could also learn much from the African 
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experiences in the 1980s and 1990s. IMF-led structural adjustment 
forced governments to cut spending by eliminating subsidies and 
implementing strict financial retrenchment, which was expected to 
reduce government deficits and make countries economically stable. 
This was disastrous for many African nations. Lay‑offs, privatisations, 
salary cuts and reduced spending made it harder for African countries 
to pursue a long-term development agenda and resulted in more 
indebtedness, which caused more suffering and increased poverty in 
almost every African country where IMF prescriptions were followed. 
This all shows that this universal approach is still valid: austerity and 
rising poverty within many ‘North’ countries (combined with rapid 
advances in many of  the previously poorer countries) make old  
North–South assumptions inappropriate.
3.2 Inequality and exclusion
With the growing emphasis on inequality in the 1990s (and continuing 
to the present day), exchanges of  ideas across different contexts were 
deemed valuable in the IDS Bulletin on ‘Poverty and Social Exclusion 
in South and North’ (de Haan and Maxwell 1998 and Maxwell 1998, 
both this IDS Bulletin) but writing papers about developed countries was 
still regarded as an unusual exercise from an institute specialising in 
developing countries. The justification lay in the rapid growth of  research 
on the new concept of  ‘social exclusion’,5 a concept initially developed 
in and for the North. 
That issue of  the IDS Bulletin in 1998 addressed two sets of  questions. 
First, how does the new thinking on social exclusion relate to the large 
body of  work on poverty and poverty reduction? Is ‘social exclusion’ 
merely a re-labelling or an explanation of  poverty? Second, does the 
new debate in the North offer opportunities for dialogue between North 
and South? Does the debate on social exclusion in the North offer new 
lessons for the South? Conversely, are there insights from the South that 
will enrich debate in the North? The interim conclusion was that social 
exclusion and new poverty thinking overlap almost completely when it 
comes to describing poverty, and also overlap in terms of  explanation.
Attempts to learn between North and South were fruitful, with 
opportunities to compare and contrast. The same issue of  the IDS 
Bulletin highlighted a number of  areas where connections could be 
made, which included the nature of  active labour policies designed 
for people to find work, the nature of  participation in development 
programmes (Gaventa 1998, this IDS Bulletin, see Section 3.3 below), 
alternative routes to reform of  social welfare, and the value of  food 
security analysis. It also extended the debate on poverty through the lens 
of  social exclusion.
Maxwell (1998, this IDS Bulletin) referred to the work of  Seers in the 
context of  social exclusion, also suggesting appropriate structural 
change as one means to reduce inequalities. Elements of  this (in 1998) 
that were relevant to both North and South include structuring 
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the state, poverty reduction and livelihoods, political development 
and governance, gender inequality, social capital, and agency and 
participation, plus social exclusion. Maxwell proposed that it was better 
to avoid direct solutions and to approach learning between different 
contexts in terms of  comparisons, connections and convergences. 
Increasing attention to poverty and social exclusion (PSE) in the North 
opens the possibility of  fertile dialogue between North and South on 
three questions: (1) are there new comparisons or lessons to be drawn 
across geographical boundaries about the characteristics, causes and 
remedies of  PSE? (2) does a rapid increase in PSE in the North signal a 
new convergence between North and South? and (3) are there theories 
which will expose connections between PSE in North and South? Did 
globalisation mean we are now all developing countries?
This work programme was furthered by the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), under the meeting series title, Lessons Without 
Borders: Conversations across the Boundary between Developed and 
Developing Countries. Public events and briefings were organised by 
ODI and the New Policy Institute in 1999–2000 (Kenway and Maxwell 
1999; Maxwell and Kenway 2000) to seek common ground across the 
North–South boundary with a particular focus on poverty, building 
on UK initiatives on the subject (e.g. the UK annual report on poverty 
and social exclusion (UK Department of  Social Security 2000)) as 
well as international initiatives, including Copenhagen Plus Five6 and 
publication of  the World Bank 2001 World Development Report on poverty 
(Kanbur et al. 2000). 
Maxwell’s introduction to the first event pointed out that the human 
development discourse in the South was very similar to the social 
exclusion discourse in the North, with both stressing a multidimensional 
perspective on poverty. The social exclusion paradigm goes far 
in offering a causal model, focusing on PSE in the area of  rights, 
resources and relationships, while the development debate of  the time 
appeared to give greater importance to notions of  participation and 
empowerment than in the UK.7 
3.3 Approaching development through greater participation
In the late 1990s to early 2000s, the work of  Gaventa and colleagues 
on ‘champions of  participation’ (Gaventa 1999, 2004) brought together 
researchers and practitioners to explore the problems and potential 
for strengthening citizen participation in local government. This 
engagement brought forward participatory approaches to budgeting; 
processes of  participatory planning; new forms of  partnerships 
between citizens, the government and other stakeholders; new methods 
of  consultation and inclusion; and opportunities for citizen participation 
in service delivery. There was strong learning between higher- and 
lower-income countries, especially in participatory approaches to 
budgeting, in particular through shared experiences between Brazil and 
the UK. 
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Earlier work by Gaventa with the Highlander Center on South and 
North exchanges was important in developing participatory approaches 
in poor parts of  the US. The Champions of  Participation event was 
set up to show what could be done using participatory methods in local 
government, using funds from the UK international and domestic 
ministries. The role and impact of  participatory approaches developed 
in poor marginalised communities in the South when applied to 
situations in the North has been well documented.8 Approaches to 
increase the participation of  people in poor countries have relevance in 
empowering people in richer countries (Gaventa 1999). This research 
described the links between the concepts of  participation and social 
exclusion and the challenges offered by globalisation, linking and 
learning from common problems in the North and South. 
Gaventa (1999) integrates social exclusion and participation. Lack 
of  participation in itself  is a form of  social exclusion – inclusion is a 
goal to be achieved in itself. Participation is a means of  overcoming 
other problems to enable the excluded to act more effectively. 
The unemployed may be organised to participate in strategies for 
overcoming unemployment or for job creation; youth organisations may 
be encouraged to participate in issues affecting youth, immigrants or 
minorities. There can, of  course, be ‘Souths within the North’ just as 
there may be ‘Norths within the South’ (Gaventa 1998, this IDS Bulletin).
The literature generated at IDS and elsewhere on participation in 
South and North provides much useful information on context; inter alia, 
who should participate locally so that capacity, energy and momentum 
generated at grass roots is continued, often in the face of  resistance 
from traditional powerholders. More than mandating or legislating 
participation is needed, requiring ongoing intervention from the top to 
ensure its implementation, and to help intermediary elites to understand 
or accept new participation. In all contexts, prior social capital and 
organisational capacity matters, with a history of  trust and working 
together being valuable. There must also be institutional capacity with 
flexible mindsets; some form of  participatory monitoring and evaluation 
is needed to measure whether quality participation is occurring. Finally, 
participation may not be enough as promoting participatory approaches 
is also affected by broader forces and must be linked to other policies for 
change (Gaventa 2004). 
Gaventa (1998: 54, this IDS Bulletin) draws some important lessons for 
participation from the US for participation policy in the South: inter alia, 
participation policy, who participates, and the definition of  participation 
all matter; also important are participation and power, prior social 
capital, and organisational, governmental or institutional capacity. 
Participatory budgeting is a well-known example of  a programming 
element introduced in the South, adopted in the North, and used in both 
contexts (see Porto de Oliveira 2017; Sintomer, Herzberg and Allegretti 
2010; Department for Communities and Local Government 2011; 
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Gaventa and Benequista 2009). Originating in Brazil in 1989, it involved 
a series of  local assemblies where residents and elected budget officials 
identified spending priorities and voted on the priorities to implement. 
Participatory budgeting then spread to cities in Latin America, Europe, 
Asia and Africa. This was introduced to the UK by the Labour 
government in 2008, and by 2011 £28m was allocated via participatory 
budgets to 1,500 projects in England and trialled in Newcastle and 
Bradford. The UK government set a target in 2008 of  1 per cent of  all 
local government funds to be allocated in this manner, but the use of  
participatory budgeting then struggled under the coalition government 
of  2010 which severely cut local government budgets. 
3.4 Democratic governance
Research on democratic governance has developed the concept of  
democratic spaces that could be applied across all geographic contexts 
(Cornwall 2004 and Barnes et al. 2004, both this IDS Bulletin; Cornwall 
2008). The Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation 
and Accountability generated a series of  case studies from a variety 
of  political and cultural contexts: Brazil, India, Bangladesh, Mexico, 
South Africa, UK and the US. Contributors to the IDS Bulletin ‘New 
Democratic Spaces’ (Cornwall 2004) explored the interfaces between 
different forms of  public engagement, showing arenas that were neither 
new nor democratic but paradoxically appeared to hold promise for 
deepening democracy in North and South. Their studies addressed 
questions about the political efficacy of  citizen engagement and the 
viability of  these new arenas of  public institutions, involving new 
networks and alliances of  actors, which may be government-provided or 
more transient spaces.
The research questions in that 2004 issue of  the IDS Bulletin were 
based on how new democratic experiments meet and transform older 
forms of  governance, as political space for public engagement in 
governance appeared to be widening. Greater attention was focused 
on the institutions at the interface between the public, providers and 
policymakers. This work drew on examples of  participatory budgeting 
from Brazil, health watch committees in Bangladesh, and panchayats 
in India to demonstrate how things could be done better in the UK in 
terms of  engaging a more democratic approach. The one‑size‑fits‑all 
development rhetoric about governance and institutions played out in 
very different ways across different cultural, social and political settings. 
‘Invited spaces’ offered the potential for reconfiguring relations of  rule, 
extending the practice of  democracy beyond the sporadic use of  the 
ballot box. They were embedded in the particular cultural and political 
configurations making up governance in that context. Such ‘spaces’ had 
to be situated in institutional landscapes as one among other domains 
of  association in and out of  which actors moved, carrying relationships, 
resources, identities and identifications.
In the UK, Barnes et al. (2004, this IDS Bulletin) described a context in 
which there had been considerable innovation in the form of  regular 
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bodies or passing ways of  seeking opinion. There was a tension between 
different ‘opportunity structures for participation’, identifying two forms 
in the UK: one that is open to the general public and another that seeks 
‘representation’ by enlisting representatives from existing groups. In 
practice these two forms often overlapped, leading to further tensions 
and questions about the nature of  representation, with important 
implications for legitimacy. Where authorities set rules for inclusion, 
groups could choose either to comply, create their own structures, or 
create identities when they participated. This analysis resonates with 
many of  the articles in Cornwall (2004) in suggesting that citizens need 
their own spaces in which they can develop alternative approaches, 
at some distance from arenas which bring the public and their 
representatives together with officials.
The observations of  Taylor et al. (2004) focused on some of  the 
difficulties with which the voluntary and community sector in England 
has come to view government-created ‘invited spaces’ – seen as ‘popular 
spaces’ – from which people are able to mobilise, build alliances and 
gain the confidence to. There was a proliferation of  new spaces for 
‘third sector’ involvement in policy processes under the UK Labour 
administration of  1997–2010. 
The research by Barnes et al. and Taylor et al. highlighted some of  the 
complexities of  deliberative governance in two English cities, and of  the 
relations involved. There was a complicated relational picture between 
councillors, members of  the public and officers. The articles in ‘New 
Democratic Spaces’ (Cornwall 2004) show how a cross-sectional group 
of  countries from North and South can provide helpful perspectives 
to address common problems, here addressing direct forms of  citizen 
engagement to meet the ‘democratic deficit’ – by strengthening 
democratic institutions, and urging politicians and bureaucrats to listen 
more to become more responsive to those they serve. The concept of  
space allowed dialogue about participation, highlighting the relations of  
power and nature of  citizenship that permeated public engagement. 
Authors of  articles in ‘New Democratic Spaces’ used the term ‘spaces’, 
and three ingredients appear to be critical: (1) ruling party disposition 
to supporting popular participation, (2) popular mobilisation, and 
(3) a sufficiently resourced, well‑coordinated state bureaucracy. Again 
the nature of  context matters.
At the tail end of  the 1990s, ‘civil society participation’ was on 
everybody’s lips. Today, in 2017, harder questions are being asked 
(Buddery, Parsfield and Shafique 2016). National government austerity 
measures and the increasing demand by UK citizens on the welfare 
staff has introduced a crisis for the public sector. New approaches 
to engaging local participation are needed. Here, the argument for 
learning from both developing and developed countries is that the UK 
needs more creative thinking and that drawing on examples from the 
South might help, going beyond the comfort of  the consultation culture. 
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3.5 Global health
As noted in Section 1, this sub-section addresses universality on a 
different basis from other themes of  this IDS Bulletin overview. Global 
health issues are an important area where lessons can be shared 
between North and South (Crisp 2010). The topic is addressed partially 
here but primarily recounts well-known experiences of  the USAID–
Carnegie Council  Lessons without Borders programme in various cities 
of  the US in the late 1990s (Government Publishing Office 1994; Van 
Dusen 1998). Some additional research is also highlighted here.
In 1994, USAID supported a programme called Lessons without 
Borders, beginning with a conversation about the cost of  health 
care in the US, when officials from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention believed there could be cost savings from using oral 
rehydration salts (ORS) in the US.9 Continued discussions showed that 
other international strategies and practices could be used in the US. 
Immunisation rates in the US were low, but infant mortality rates were 
high. As a result there was follow-up in Seattle, Washington, Baltimore 
and Boston.
In Baltimore, the mayor sent a team to Kenya to observe 
implementation of  the programme; then, between 1994 and 1998, 
immunisation coverage in Baltimore rose from 60 per cent to above 
90 per cent. A team went to Bangladesh to learn how community 
health workers could disseminate practical information throughout 
communities. Other teams looked at how gang violence was addressed 
in the Caribbean and how environmental health information was being 
provided to literate populations. All of  this was done with municipal 
funds. The programme was successful, for various reasons.
At the time, foreign aid was not popular: there was a recession in the early 
1990s. USAID, not being able to spend its funds in the US, wanted to show 
that foreign aid could benefit the domestic population. There was strong 
support for the idea of  using lessons learned in Kenya for immunisation 
campaigns in Baltimore at the local level from the mayor. The approach 
was to be more cost‑effective when measures showed that the US was 
lagging behind some poorer nations in terms of  child mortality.  
At the national level, there was strong support by the USAID 
administrator Brian Atwood, also supported by Al Gore, then Vice 
President of  the US, which provided champions at national and 
local levels. Most importantly, the programme was technically and 
economically sound: progress could be measured to show it was 
working; results were clear and it was low‑cost and cost‑effective.
There were other programmes tried in Washington to use sports as a 
way of  helping young women to gain confidence, not to drop out of  
school, and to resist gang issues; and there were other attempts in the 
area of  microenterprises and agricultural technologies, for example, but 
they had no political champion. These programmes were not continued 
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because when a new administration came in (Bush–Cheney in 2000), 
new ideas were pursued.
There are other approaches proposed to combine the learning from 
rich and poor countries to give new insights to improve health (Crisp 
2010). For example, staff could be trained and deployed in different 
ways, and to bring public health, community social care and clinical 
medicine closer together. New policy, practices and products from 
poorer countries that might have application in richer countries are 
the use of  conditional cash transfers to incentivise healthy behaviour, 
changing drug-giving protocols where patients rarely attend outpatient 
clinics, new forms of  treating cataracts, and better long-term outcomes 
for schizophrenia through inclusion and community involvement (Crisp 
2010: 116). Other possibilities include learning from treating mental 
health (Patel and Cohen 2003). 
However, although common lessons involve the use of  medical 
technology (in this case, vaccines) and appear as a universal and neutral 
good, they are deeply bound up with politics (Poltorak et al. 2005; Leach 
and Fairhead 2007). An agenda of  mutual North–South self-interest has 
played a role in pushing immunisation up international public agendas. 
This research showed understanding of  what causes parents to have their 
children vaccinated (or not) in different settings. Parental anxieties played 
a role, and this research compared and contrasted local understandings 
of  health issues with anxieties of  parents bringing up young children in 
southern England at the time of  the controversy over the measles, mumps 
and rubella (MMR) vaccine with routine immunisation in four countries 
in West Africa. It was also an exploration of  what institutions involved 
with vaccination and public health policy assume is going on. Medical 
technologies are introduced into a context with immediate and wider 
political dimensions. Context matters and juxtapositions are needed to 
broaden the debate to more global and universal contexts. There are 
hidden commonalities as well as differences in the ways that parents in 
European and African settings are dealing with their children’s wellbeing, 
each other, and state and global institutions in today’s world.
4 Conclusions: Learning and practice
Has universal development come of  age? This review shows that the 
foundations were built a long time ago and have been periodically 
strengthened. Some building of  walls was started as development 
professionals tried to put the ideas and approaches into practice, but to 
continue the buildings analogy, planning permission from the powerful to 
continue was never given in terms of  research funding and professional 
accreditation of  those promoting universal development ideas. 
Reputational risk was at stake. Bureaucracies, the media and the general 
public were all sceptical about the architecture and whether these 
buildings would be viable and stand up. Learning has often faltered. But 
now greater acceptance of, and support for, these approaches is evident. 
The time has come for all who believe in universal development to build, 
to provide concrete justifications and experience of  what things would 
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look like. This is not only because of  the existence of  the SDGs and the 
related opportunities, but because the greater global interconnectivity 
that will be brought to bear has never been more needed. However, new 
ideas and approaches are never value-free nor introduced into neutral 
situations: there are contestations, with difficulties in learning and in 
‘unlearning’ of  current ideas, and the baggage of  the politics of  change. 
There are also transaction costs. Conventional joint efforts to address 
shared problems such as programming partnerships and negotiating 
joint agreements and conventions – the normal apparatus of  global 
governance – cannot easily address these challenges because there are 
still dominant partners.10 The articles reviewed here say much about this, 
and provide some good signposts for the way forward.
Universal development cannot be applied to every issue: it should not 
become a new development fad, just to wither after a while. What 
works (and does not work) now needs to be addressed, and some points 
relating to its enabling environment are mentioned below. It is better 
to say that certain overall preconditions should be met, rather than 
say it works in one sector or another. Also, this should not be seen as a 
geographical binary divide. Different groupings of  countries may be 
relevant, not the developed/developing divide. The objective of  this 
introduction is to ‘set out the table’ with key issues; the next stage is to 
start to cook and eat the meals. There are some exciting opportunities 
ahead for research and practice, but the topic needs to be addressed by 
those both inside and outside the development community.
4.1 Poverty, inequality and powerlessness as a key theme
Poverty, whether in North or South, was identified throughout from the 
1970s onwards and in the key themes. Reassessments of  development 
have held poverty in its various facets as pivotal, inter alia including 
unemployment, lack of  voice, exclusion from governance processes, 
marginalisation and lack of  reach of  state services. Many people in 
developed and developing countries suffer from the same problems, and 
sharing ways of  dealing with these problems is likely to improve policies. 
Discrimination, exclusion and intolerance occur everywhere and run 
counter to universalism (UNDP 2016).
4.2 Professional and funding barriers
There is a practical barrier of  funding boundaries and professional 
expertise in agencies that provide research and programme funds. 
Funds and people are either ‘for’ the North or ‘for’ the South and the 
choice is mostly a binary one.11 Budgets are set up for ‘overseas’ or for 
‘domestic’, not for both, and the same applies to professional skills. 
There is a lack of  willingness to take reputational risks using something 
that has worked in a different context, together with organisational 
set-ups along departmental lines, and time taken to learn across 
boundaries. There are a variety of  institutional contexts that show 
some promise today – small non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
that focus on a specific topic, larger NGOs and governments that have 
domestic and international departments working in the same building 
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learning from each other, parliamentary visits, insightful journalists, 
volunteer programmes, and others. All have potential and could have a 
vision that such essentially experimental work can be started. 
4.3 Perceptions, the media, and public opinion
Although some biases are deeply held, the reaction of  the media and 
public opinion can change rapidly, more so in these febrile times. The 
media may try to convince people that their communities could not 
benefit from ideas from unrelated parts of  the world. There are the 
perceptions of  the UK public that development means ‘aid’ (and then 
only ‘disaster relief ’) and the strong criticisms that come with it. The 
‘labelling’ of  this topic needs to be addressed. But there can also be a 
positive media aspect, especially since social media is universal across 
locations and can be effective. Many of  the innovations and research 
studies have focused on participation and the creation of  ‘space’. This 
has involved bringing people into decision-making, using participatory 
action methods, finding out what communities want and need, and then 
ensuring they are brought into decision-making and building voice. 
This can trigger public acceptance. Areas (in the North) such as social 
care, treating mental health, addressing youth violence and violence on 
women, are crying out for solutions. 
4.4 Learning and unlearning
There are the ever-present issues of  learning and the context in which it 
is applied. Organisations find it hard to learn: as well as separate budgets 
for different programmes, there are different shades of  professional skills, 
with the pressure to deliver, and the structure of  bureaucracies.12 In 
terms of  what works in these circumstances, the IDS Centre for Rising 
Powers and Global Development proposed a three-part framework: 
(1) technical aspect, in terms of  exchange of  know-how; (2) process, 
in terms of  how knowledge is exchanged – the cultural element; and 
(3) politics, the advocacy that both legitimises some mutual learning and 
the disabling of  previous mindsets (IDS 2016). 
More attention could be devoted to see how the private sector addresses 
issues of  innovation and cross-cultural exchanges. If  an idea works and 
the innovation is effective then the origin does not matter that much 
to the private sector. There also need to be well-resourced institutions 
in the South with sufficient capacity to harvest ideas and programmes, 
assess their potential and promote their scaling up. There is potential for 
cities to link up across this false binary divide: cities can do things that 
national governments and countries cannot do.
4.5 Context is everything
Researchers say ‘context is everything’ and ‘situations are always 
complex’. What is needed is to pick out those elements of  a situation 
which overlap between different locations, suggest that preconditions exist 
for take-up, and convince practitioners. Researchers need to take risks. 
Some structuring is needed, and there has to be careful analysis of  what 
lessons can be transferred. Analysis and policy for one country cannot be 
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read off directly from another, even within the broad groupings of  North 
and South; opportunities should not be missed to compare and contrast. 
A common framework may not work as multiple realities would need 
multiple theories, and new efforts need to be made to explore common 
problems brought on by convergence and develop new theory together 
(de Haan and Maxwell 1998, this IDS Bulletin). Researchers’ objectives 
should be to identify differences, if  any, and not assume them. 
4.6 The coming of the SDGs
The coming of  the SDGs is significant. This is a universal agenda 
because for the first time all countries from North and South (and East 
and West) have agreed a common agenda and shared accountability. 
The most recent United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) 
(UNDP 2016) states the need for new development paradigms to ensure 
nobody is left behind. From the foreword of  the report: 
Barriers to universalism include, among others, deprivations and 
inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, social norms and values, 
and prejudice and intolerance… also… mutually reinforcing gender 
barriers that deny many women the opportunities and empowerment 
necessary to realise the full potential of  their lives (UNDP 2016: iii).
The HDR argues, among other things, that those left behind can benefit 
from universal policies. What might happen now? First, the media 
and global interest concerning the SDGs will help in developing and 
promoting a universal agenda, and the SDGs will definitely be a hook for 
this, supported by the United Nations. Second, a universal agenda will 
address genuine problems of  context, complexity, scale and acceptability, 
and common problems and phenomena such as trafficking, climate 
change, migration and terrorism. But richer countries still have to buy 
into the SDGs: there is still much to do in terms of  implementation, and 
progress assessed across all countries, and the lessons and evidence as part 
of  the universal agenda can contribute significantly to this. The HDR 
emphasises the need to translate universalism into practice by identifying 
and breaking down barriers that exclude certain groups, narrowing gaps 
in life chances among people, proposing policy options that fit contexts 
and levels of  development, and identifying institutional shortcomings. All 
people in all circumstances are not equally disadvantaged. 
4.7 Where do we go now on ‘what works’?
There are several suggestions from the articles in this IDS Bulletin, 
including the use of  public works, conditional cash transfers and 
promotion of  social protection more broadly, building up social 
institutions for family welfare, microfinance and small‑scale credit, and 
others. It should now be possible to craft better policies and solutions 
to problems by drawing on a wider range of  perspectives other than 
what works in our own backyard, addressing questions such as: How 
can the UK social security system learn from the experiences of  social 
protection programmes in South America and Africa, as well as vice 
versa? How can the system of  social and mental care learn from systems 
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of  care in the communities worldwide… and so on? Researchers now 
have the capacity to address this. 
4.8 Back to the future?
Finally, how would Dudley Seers as the originator of  many of  these ideas 
have reacted if  he looked back? In terms of  his work, much has been 
aimed at the vulnerable and disadvantaged in society, and the focuses 
on exclusion and income distribution have been underlying themes for 
some of  this work. He would have welcomed the focus on participation 
which allowed people to fashion their own views and ‘definitions’ of  
development. He would have been pleased that employment levels 
are being taken much more seriously as an indicator of  the level of  
development of  nations. He would have been positive about the role of  
exchange of  technology, such as mobile phones, where a poor farmer in 
Haiti and a financial trader in the city of  London put the same item to 
good use. But overall, he might have been disappointed that we still work 
mainly in silos, some on developed countries and others on developing, 
and that applying findings on development to problems in the UK and 
Europe has not received more support nor been translated into real 
action to help reduce poverty, while no institution has been set up to 
connect these insights and actions. Are our own teaching and research 
institutions designed to promote these ideas and actions?
Notes
1 I would like to acknowledge the help I have received from 
Alison Norwood and Gary Edwards in managing the publication 
of  this IDS Bulletin. I also appreciate the support from IDS Director 
Melissa Leach and Research Director John Gaventa. Thanks also 
to Richard Jolly and Frances Stewart for very helpful reviews, and 
to Peter Bailey, Lawrence Haddad, Kerrie Howard, Bonnie Koenig, 
Simon Maxwell, Sarah Mistry and Ann Van Dusen for earlier 
conversations. However, I am solely responsible for the views 
expressed. All of  the archive articles are reprinted as published at 
the time without change. Authors’ views may have changed since the 
time of  publication.
2 See Toye (1987) for a similar review of  the internationalisation of  
development studies.
3 Debate also revolved around Dudley Seers as the director of  the 
two-year MPhil course. In 1975–77, the students challenged the 
preoccupation in the syllabus on issues in ‘developing countries’, 
asking why there was hardly any consideration of  development 
policy and experience in Britain itself. In response, Seers adapted 
the syllabus to include a major case study of  a new concern for 
British policy: the discovery of  North Sea oil and its implications for 
development policy in Scotland and the rest of  the UK in general. 
The paper can be found as Chapter 3 in Jolly (2012). The definition 
was not clear-cut. Many ‘developing countries’ have higher per 
capita incomes than some of  the ‘developed’ countries. Also, typical 
problems of  ‘developing countries’ – foreign exchange shortage, 
persistent unemployment and unremitting inflation – can be found in 
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Southern Europe too (Seers with IDS M.Phil. Faculty and Students 
1977; IDS M.Phil. Faculty and Students 1977). The role of  the state 
was a key element then and has ever since been a source of  debate. 
4 Compare these with Maxwell’s three aspects of  comparisons, 
convergence and connections as features of  development studies in 
North and South (Maxwell 1998, this IDS Bulletin), and Lipton’s three 
suggestions of  analogues, interactions and conceptual transfers (Lipton 
1987, in Drabek 1987) and ‘juxtapositions’ (Leach and Fairhead 2007). 
5 Defined as ‘the process through which individuals or groups are 
wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in 
which they live’ (de Haan and Maxwell 1998: 2, this IDS Bulletin).
6 In 2000, the UN General Assembly called a special session five years on 
from the adoption of  the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of  
Action at the World Summit on Social Development held in March 1995.
7 After these meetings in 1999–2000, held jointly between ODI and 
the New Policy Institute, ODI convened a meeting in 2007 with the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development (APGOOD) 
to address the question of  whether policymakers and practitioners can 
learn lessons about poverty reduction strategies across the boundary 
between developed and developing countries. The speaker was the 
Rt Hon. Hilary Benn MP, then Secretary of  State for International 
Development at the Department for International Development. 
Mr Benn cited a number of  areas where learning could be shared 
between South and North; he also stated that successful development 
was going to depend on sharing expertise and knowledge and that 
this should not be one‑way traffic (Benn 2007). The possibilities for 
shared learning included education and training, microfinance and 
participatory budgeting, and democratic processes. 
8 For example, the IDS Participation Resource Centre has over 
25 studies of  participation methods carried out in the UK.
9 It should be noted that this was 12 years after the United Nations 
Children’s Fund had started promoting ORS in developing countries 
in 1982, often with USAID support.
10 Seers had challenged the United Nations in 1977 (Seers 1977: 7, 
this IDS Bulletin): ‘If  certain countries of  Europe, including Britain, 
and the Third World share problems with common causes, then 
is there not a basis for much greater cooperation in international 
fora, such as UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development], on many issues for example monitoring the TNCs 
[transnational corporations]? And might not European governments 
benefit from technical assistance from agencies with international 
experience in problems like structural unemployment (e.g. the ILO)?’
11 The situation can be summed up (from Colin McFarlane of  the 
Open University): ‘These categories are active imaginative barriers 
that militate against the possibility of  different countries to learn 
from one another’ (McFarlane 2006).
12 Richard Rose of  the University of  Strathclyde: ‘Elected officials 
searching for lessons prefer to turn to those whose overall political 
values are consistent with their own…’ (Rose 1991: 17).
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Editorial
Britain's predicament
For the past four years the major industrial
OECD countries have been in the throes of a
crisis brought to a head by the oil price rises of
1973-74, but arising from longer-run difficulties
which had already begun to appear by the late
1960s. The crisis is by no means over. The
situation of the economically stronger countries
such as the USA, Japan and West Germany
seems to be on the upturn but the recovery of
others including Britain is still very much in
doubt. With increasing oil output, Britain's
balance of payments is rapidly improvingbut
this is far from a sufficient condition for dealing
with unemployment, stagnation in key sectors,
regional imbalance, low productivity and decline
or collapse in the social services. And in any
case the issues for Britain are not simply economic,
but involve also social and political problems
which recession has sharpened: the difficulties of
coming to terms with Scottish, Welsh and Irish
nationalism; racial conflict; political violence;
persistent poverty; the erosion of the welfare
state; and corruption and decay in our police and
local government bureaucracies.
A time of crisis presents both dangers and
opportunities, bringing into sharp relief difficulties
which previously escaped notice, but possibly
also creating conditions in which to seek for
more fundamental solutions. The dangers are, of
course, increased if British economic policy
ignores the deeper problems (as several of our
contributors argue) and concentrates on short-run
symptoms rather than long-run causes; seeks
solutions primarily by aiming at rates of GNP
growth (the 5 per cent endorsed both by the
NEDC and the OECD) which are unrealistic in
present circumstances, beyond anything Britain
has achieved in the past and which fail to deal
with the structural causes underlying our current
difficulties (Richard Jolly); is unable to look
beyond the problems and instruments of short-run
demand management (B. S. Minhas); believes
that if only we could control the money supply or
(alternatively) if only we could make incomes
policy stick our difficulties would be over; or
places too much faith in the ability of legislation
to settle difficult problems such as race relations
or regional devolution; or succumbs to the almost
millenarian faith that our troubles will be calmed
by North Sea oil.
The danger is equally one of responding too
narrowly to our international predicament. The
conventional debate between policies of free
trade with deflation or import control with
expansion poses the issues far too starkly for
either analysis or prescription. This debate largely
ignores the real costs of metsures aimed at
solving our difficulties in the short-run but in
ways which in the long-run would tend to
maintain inappropriate patterns of international
specialisation or damage the fragile economies of
our Third World neighbours: such as allowing
technological advance to proceed without any
sense of long-run world industrial balance, let
alone the employment or other human costs; or
restricting imports of cheap manufactures from
the poorer countries without adequate considera-
tion of the opportunities for mutual adjustment;
or promoting our arms exports to developing
countries (Mary Kaldor); or imposing and
administering immigration restrictions in such a
way as to harm race relations in our own country
and damage relations with (and exports to) several
important countries in the Third World.
The relevance of development studies
It is with some trepidation that we undertake in
this issue of the Bulletin to analyse some of these
dangers and to call attention to some of the
opportunities which lie beyond them. Most of us1
lack direct experience, except in our capacity as
citizens and residents, in dealing with British
problems. Further, the direct analogy between
Britain and the developing countries is, as most
of our contributors point out, rather suspect.
To be sure, there are many similarities: structural
unemployment, inflation and balance of payments
difficulties; the emigration of professional man-
power; the visiting experts from the IMF; regional
imbalance and the difficulty of inducing invest-
ment and expansion. But even if we hold these
in common they indicate shared features
of underdevelopment, rather than comparable
patterns of development.
And the differences are critical. We are, after all,
an industrial country and many of our problems
are those of over-development or the wrong kind
of development, for instance: an agricultural
sector that is too small and overspecialised
i From this caveat we should excejst some of our distinguished
contributors from outside the IDS: Stuart Holland, Barbara
Ward, Mary Kaldor, Brian Johnson and Michael Allaby.
(Brian Johnson); wasteful methods of energy
production and use (Barbara Ward); disease
patterns created by stress, lack of exercise and
overconsumption (Michael Lipton); and over-
specialisation in highly complex defence and
aerospace technology (Mary Kaldor). We are still
(though decreasingly so) an exporter of technology
and culture, including, as Richard Batley and
Alan Rew point out, our new town housing
policy. We still have large investments abroad
(Stuart Holland) and remain the home base of
several of the larger multi-national corporations,
including some operating in the Third World.2
Nevertheless we believe that the analytical
approaches of 'development studies' can suggest
new ways of studying Britain's admittedly
different problems. For a variety of reasons-
cogently explained by Osvaldo Sunkel in a
previous issue of the IDS Bulletin (vol. 8, no. 3,
March, 1977)planners and social scientists
working in developing countries became aware of
the inadequacy of policies based on the conven-
tional methods of analysis well before the present
crisis raised doubts about them in the major
industrial countries. As both B. S. Minhas and
Stuart Holland point out below, monetary policy
and Keynesian demand management are simply
not workable in most developing countries; and
the prime emphasis of economic policy has
always been on the structure of production or
supply. The inadequacy of growth in GNP as
the prime objective of development policy with
little regard for distribution, employment, welfare
and structural change became ever clearer during
the period of relatively high growth rates in the
developing countries in the 1960s. (Paradoxically,
at about the same time Britain was beginning to
give more emphasis to growth in her economic
policy and somewhat less than before to welfare
and full employment.) Moreover those in
development studies have long become used to
the idea that significant improvements may come
only through major structural change, often
accompanied by acute social conflict. And finally,
the vulnerability of Third World countries to
external economic and political pressures has
made us increasingly aware of the consequences
of international dependence and of the need for
self-reliant strategies of development.
In none of these respects is a 'development
approach' completely new, nor is it narrowly
confined to 'developing countries'. Indeed, as
2 The implications of Britain as a base for multinational
operations were explained in a paper by Paul Kesterton and
Paul Spray prepared for a Workshop on Britain andDevelopment at which several of the papers in this Bulletin
were discussed.
Dudley Seers argues so persuasively, the intel-
lectual division of labour between development
studies and othei social sciences becomes
increasingly difficult to define. But we believe
that the issues have been posed earlier and
somewhat more sharply in countries at the
periphery than in the industrialised centres of
Europe and North America.
Further, those of us who argue that rapid growth
and industrialisation do not necessarily bring
development in the Third World can readily
identify parallels in the over-industrialisation of
Britain, a convergence which is brought out most
clearly in the sectoral papers by Michael Lipton,
Alan Rew and Richard Batley, Brian Johnson and
Michael Allaby, and Barbara Ward. Redistribu-
tion, alternative cultures and lifestyles, small units
of production and consumption rather than large,
decentralisation and self-reliance; these are all
themes which emerge both in the development
literature and in blueprints for change in Britain.
One of the most troublesome aspects of developing
a conservationist, self-reliant strategy of change
in Britain is dealing with its possible implications
for trade and other transactions with the Third
World. This is considered carefully in the paper
by Brian Johnson and Michael Allaby who
contend that the altered (and increased) agri-
cultural production they advocate in the UK
would not require as much adjustment in our
trade with the developing countries as with our
European Common Market partners. It is less
certain whether the same can be said of the case
for energy conservation persuasively explored by
Barbara Ward, which would surely have major
consequences for oil production and prices, at
least if put into effect by other industrial
consumers as well as Britain. Even developing
countries which would otherwise stand to gain
by lower oil prices might view with concern, for
example, any consequent loss in OPEC's
bargaining power vis-a-vis the industrial countries.
This is not to say, however, that adjustment would
be impossible or that the long-run interests of
both energy consuming and energy producing
countries may not be fairly close as Posner
argues in his review of an IDS communications
paper on North Sea Oil. Oil producers the world
over (including Britain) are increasingly worried
about the depletion of their reserves and what
happens to them 'after oil'; for both producers
and consumers have long-run interests in
conservation, however important the differences
between them on timing and short-run adjustment.
Neither Britain's own development, nor that of
the developing countries can be discussed, there-
fore, without taking account of Britain's changing
place in the world economy. This is partly a
matter of history. Britain's emergence as
the major industrial and imperial power and
her subsequent decline have had momentous
consequences for the patterns of development
and underdevelopment established both in the
Third World and in Britain herself. Such
historic links continue to shape events even
when, as Michael Lipton argues itt his book
The Erosion of a Relationship: India and Britain
since 1960 (Lipton & Firm, OUP, 1975)they
are explicitly rejected by both former colony
and former metropolis.3 Ray Crotty forcefully
argues that Ireland's present problems descend
directly from her relationships with Britain in
the past; and that they can only be dealt
with by major changes in the structure of
Irish society, changes which would also require
the restructuring of Ireland's relationships with
Britain. Mary Kaldor suggests that Britain has
specialised excessively in defence and aerospace
technology both in order to maintain her status
as a major military power and to solve, by arms
production and exports, short-run difficulties in
employment and the balance of payments. This
has serious costs in terms of the diversion of
resources and technological innovation from
alternative uses, in terms of our relations with
other arms producing countries and our partici-
pation in the arms race, and in terms of the flow
of arms to the developing countries.
To a large extent historic connections between
Britain and the Third World are being trans-
formed by new international influences including
the expansion and transformation of the world
economic system, the growing power and resources
of the multinational corporations, the emergence
of the socialist bloc and the cold war and the
increasing integration of certain leading Third
World exporters into the manufacturing structure
of world production. The problems posed in
Britain are not dissimilar to those affecting
the developing countries; the decline in our
international economic bargaining power due
to our lack of competitiveness and recurrent
balance of payments difficulties, and the
problem of making the activities of multi-
national corporations compatible with national
economic strategies (Stuart Holland). In some
ways, however, we are less vulnerable than the
developing countries. Foreign multinational
corporations invest heavily in the UK, Britain
3 Lipton's argument is that India overreacted by cutting links
with Britain even more than self-interest alone would
dictate; parallels in Britain's reactions to its former Empire
are not hard to find.
herself is the home base of several multinational
corporations with extensive investments abroad
(though this may not be as much of an advantage
as it looks, given that even 'British' multinational
corporations would not find it difficult to relocate
if things became difficult for them in the UK).
We export more arms than we import. We rely
on doctors from Sri Lanka, India and other
developing countries as well as exporting them
to the USA, Canada or Australia. In other
respects, however, (especially militarily as Mary
Kaldor observes) we may depend more heavily
upon our NATO and EEC partners than
developing countries like Iran or India do upon,
say, the USA or the USSR. Although the precise
nature of our international predicament and the
way we cope with it differs from that of countries
in the Third World, we have as much to learn
from them as they do from us.
From theory to practice
It is one thing to advocatelike most of the
papers in this Bulletina less growth-oriented,
more self-reliant strategy of change in Britain.
It is quite another to put it into effect. Several
of our contributors begin by looking at the
changes necessary in one sector, but end up with
a far broader set of prescriptions cutting across
a number of different areas. Alan Rew and
Richard Batley, for example, criticise "welfare
monism" and argue that housing and welfare
policy cannot be considered separately from its
interrelation with urban growth, industrial pro-
duction and employment. Barbara Ward's pro-
posals for the conservation of energy would
involve changes in transport policy, methods of
agricultural production, housing, employment and
probably defence. Michael Lipton suggests that
a comprehensive strategy of health care would
include alterations in education, patterns of work
and leisure, sport, transport and habits of con-
sumption such as smoking and the fiscal policies
affecting them. All in all our contributors make
a persuasive case for comprehensive rather than
piecemeal approaches to our problems. Neverthe-
less they differ in that some of them (in particular
Michael Lipton) seem to envisage changes in one
sector setting off a wave of 'spread effects' else-
where; while others (like Stuart Holland) offer
more broadly based strategies for national
recovery.
Anyone who has worked in development studies
or for that matter any other policy science-
is aware of the difficulty of moving between the
analysis of problems, prescriptions for déaling with
them and back again to assessment of the con-
ditions under which they can (or cannot) be
implemented. The difficulties posed can be seen
3
most sharply in relation to the imaginary speech
by a Minister of Health which Michael Lipton
uses as the vehicle for his arguments. Under what
circumstances might a British Minister of Health
actually deliver such a speech and what response
(derision or delight?) would it get from his
colleagues? How easy would it be to buy off the
vested interests he talks about? How would one
deal with the vested interests of the medical pro-
fession? Would the combination of incentives and
alterations in legislation really bring major
changes in the structure of health care? How
might British politicians hoping to bring about
such radical changes win support for their views
from those whom Lipton regards as being at the
unimaginative centre of the British political spec-
trum? Would a "non-partisan" approach to health
or any other major issue of social concern-
necessarily be the best way of bringing this about?
Under what circumstances could politicians
develop the vision, leadership and support to intro-
duce such fundamental changes in the approach
to health or to any other sector, which an alterna-
tive development strategy involves? And what are
the conditions for such changes to be followed
through in other sectors as well? Does the present
crisis create the conditions under which the
necessary political support could be mobilised
for change? How much dissatisfaction with
existing conditionsunemployment, declining real
incomes, deterioration in social servicesis
needed? How could this dissatisfaction be mobil-
ised and what are the main political obstacles that
would be encountered?
Such questions are all the more necessary because
even our practising politicians tend to discuss
their policies mainly in terms of economic
desirability without assessing (or perhaps
deliberately preferring to ignore) their possible
political repercussions. As a former economic
adviser to the government recently put it in The
Times:
All economic analysis in this field has to assume
that the Government is in a position to enforce
the policy recommendede.g. that a monetarist
Government will remain in power however
much unemployment turns out to be needed to
pre'zent wage and price escalation, or that an
incomes-policy Government will be willing to
face and win a confrontation with a powerful
union determined to break the rules. Only a
visionary optimist would claim today, as you
seem to be doing about monetary policy, or as
advocates of income policy such as myself have
done in the past, that there is any likelihood of
either of the main parties being willing to face
enough unemployment, or enough confron-
tation, to make it credible to the trade unions
that they can and will carry out their policy.4
Nor is it always easy to circumvent the adminis-
trative obstacles to change. In their article on
urban housing, Alan Rew and Richard Batley
suggest that planning and bureaucratic decisions
have tended to 'redistribute' social problemsto
other people, to other agencies or to other sectors
instead of solving them. This is typical of a
situation in which changes are mainly seen as
being introduced from the top by politicians,
planners and civil servants.5 Although most of
us advocate more participatory styles of develop-
ment, there is not enough discussion in this
Bulletin of the way participation itself can gen-
erate the momentum for balanced change; ex-
cept by Stuart Holland who also comes closest to
spelling out the particular British groups he thinks
are most likely to press for reform. Yet even he
gives too little attention to the conflicts from which
changes are most likely to arise, to the necessary
process of mobilising political support and to the
methods by which genuine control over the
national economy might in practice be secured.
Any strategy for major change in British society
would also have to consider how the necessary
international adjustments could be ensured: for
example the modifications in our links with
NATO implied in Mary Kaldor's proposals for
cutting back our arms production and military
spending; or the revisions of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy of the European Common Market
which would permit the kind of decentralisation
and diversification of agricultural production
proposed by Brian Johnson; or the international
trade adjustments both with the industrial coun-
tries of the OECD and with the developing
countries that would be made necessary by struc-
tural changes in our own economy. The adverse
international pressures might be considerable-
the more so given the recent reinforcement of
international economic dependence. Yet we need
not assume that the room for international
manoeuvre is completely blocked.6 Enough dis-
satisfaction with the workings of the world
economy has been expressed in recent yearsto
show that other countries, too, not merely in the
Third World, have recognised the need for reform
in its operations. A new assessment is badly
needed in order to distinguish the real inter-
4 Letter from Lord Roberthall to The Times, September 16,
1977.
S It may sometimes, however, also be typical of a decentralised
approach, in which local groups take initiatives in solving
local problems as they see them.
6 See, for example, the discussion in IDS Bulletin, Vol 7,
No. 4, on UNCTAD IV.
national constraints from those which are merely
manipulated to protect vested interests in our
own society from necessary change.
Such an assessment would also enable us to
identify possible international sources of support
for our new position, some of these, perhaps,
from outside the inner circle' of the industrial
OECD countries, in the countries of the Third
World whose interests on some issues we share.
All this is to say that both social scientists and
practical planners need to give much more thought
to how fundamental changes in strategy can be
made politically and administratively feasible, in
the rich countries as much as in the Third World.
Making realistic proposals for structural change
is a difficult task in any societynot least our
own. But in many areas it is the starting point for
the international changes in which much of the
advance in the poorer countries of the Third
World will depend.
ARI and RL.
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Back to the Ivory Tower? The Professionalisation
of Development Studies and their Extension
to Europe
Dudley Seers
The convention is that development studies cover
only the 'developing' countries of Africa, Asia and
Latin America, a sort of academic counterpart
of OXFAM. But this convention is ceasing to be
viable for European social scientists, and indeed
it is starting to be harmful. The assumption that
'their' problems are intrinsically different from
'ours' is not merely patronising; it has become a
hindrance to the transfer of experience. It is also
associated with political commitment of a sort
that hinders professional progress.
The extension of development studies to Europe
The artificiality of the distinction between 'devel-
oped' and 'developing' is perhaps most obvious
in Europe. Portugal, for example, has been a
member of OECD's Development Assistance
Committee, as well as the group of 'developed
market economies' at UNCTAD. Yet anyone
familiar with 'developing' countries, especially
in Latin America, finds the Portuguese scene
instantly recognisable (Bienefeld and Seers, 1976).
A similar structural dualism, with much lower
incomes, worse social conditions and higher
fertility in the (relatively large) population of the
rural areas. A similar concentration in the owner-
ship of property, especially land. A similar pattern
of trade, with tourist services, primary products
and textiles exchanged for arms, equipment, inter-
mediate products and sophisticated consumer
goods. A similar prevalence of transnational
corporations (TNCs) in secondary industry and
the services (especially big hotels). Similar
inappropriate technologies and associated chronic
unemployment, relieved (as in many 'developing'
countries especially in Central America and the
Caribbean) by large-scale migration abroad. A
not very different cultural dependence on foreign
styles of consumption and on imported ideologies,
fed by foreign firms, television programmes, etc.
The same sort of bureaucracy with a striking
combination of complacency and inefficiency.
Similar organised terrorism of both Right and
Left and similar political manipulation by domi-
nant powers.
Two basic politico-economic patterns characterise
'developing' countries. In one, a military dictator-
ship maintains a strong and stable currency by
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creating a favourable climate for foreign capital,
which implies suppressing trade union activity
and political opposition; in the other, a 'soft'
government is unable to resolve internal class
conflicts, the symptoms of its failure being chronic
inflation and foreign exchange difficulties, relieved
only by periodic devaluation.' Portugal has
demonstrated both patterns recentlythe former
before the 1974 coup, the latter after it. Such a
sudden and complete political somersault is also
itself characteristic.
Roughly similar socio-economic features and pat-
terns, including heavy dependence on labour
migration and tourism, can be seen in many coun-
tries of Southern EuropeSpain, Malta, Yugosla-
via, Greece, Cyprus and Turkeyand also in the
Irish Republic and Finland. So 'Third World'
experiencefor example in dealing with the
TNCsis likely to be relevant to their problems
too. Their social sciences would also gain from
an injection of the work of Latin American
theoristsas has indeed started to occur
(Guzman, 1976); this is likely to be more appro-
priate to such countries than neo-classical econo-
mics, or other theories imported from culturally
dominant countries.2
But if 'development studies' are to cover these
countries, why not Italy too? It shows many of
the same characteristics, notably a big economic
and social gap between the cities of the North
and the rural areas of the South (including Sicily
and Sardinia). It displays economic, cultural and
political dependence (including reliance on foreign
tourism and labour migration), though less than
in Portugal. Successive Italian governments have
also faced typical 'Latin American' problems of
chronic foreign exchange deficits and inflation,
especially since the 1973 rise in the price of oil.
And if Italy, why not Britain, the other econo-
mically 'weak' member of the EEC? It is true
that Britain isin contrast to most 'developing'
I There are of course hybrids, especially where (as in Argentins
and Chile) the structural causes of inflation are too deep-
seated to be eradicated by even ruthless military regimes.
2 IDS, in collaboration with CLACSO, is about to issue a
select bibliography of key Latin American writings on
deveolpmerit (with references to English and French trans-
lations where available).
countrieshighly industrialised and urbanised.
Although Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
are in some senses less developed than South-East
and Central England, regional economic inequali-
ties are mitigated by a powerful fiscal machine.
Poverty, even in the Highlands of Scotland,
is not comparable with what can be found in
Latin America or Portugal. Moreover, much of
industry is still British-owned. The country con-
tinues to be a generator as well as an importer
of capital, technology, arms, equipment and
cultural artefacts (such as television programmes).
It continues to absorb immigrant manpower of
various types (especially from the Irish Republic),
even if the net inflow is now negligible; and many
Britih tourists continue to visit the Continent,
although there is now a strong flow in the opposite
direction. Britain is, moreover, a country which
has been falling behind rather than failing to
catch up.
But the question is not the trivial quasi-joke
about whether Britain is a 'developing' country.
It is whether the insights gained in development
studies would be helpful to those working on
British problems, in view of its dependence on
foreign-based TNCs, and the difficulty its govern-
ment finds in reducing the pace of inflation, the
foreign exchange deficit and the level of unemploy-
ment (despite exceptional trade union cooperation
and mounting revenues from North Sea gas and
oil) (M Phil faculty and students, 1977).
Typical symptoms of dependence are the tendency
to await an acceleration of economic growth
in the United States as the solution to national
economic problems, a reliance on TNCs for new
investment bringing modern technologyas in
the North Sea oilfieldsand the publicity given
to arrivals of IMF missions. (It is rather curious,
even dispiriting, to hear in Britain now the same
old arguments for and against 'monetarist' policies
which have dominated Latin American economic
controversy for the last quarter-century. British
politicians are apparently, like British economists,
too parochial even to be aware of them.)
Development studies have made us familiar with
the core-periphery concept: Western Europe seems
to have its own core and periphery. What is more,
there is a definite geographical pattern to it, with
the European periphery3 forming a ring around
the core, whether defined in terms of countries
or of regions cutting across national boundaries
3 This concept will be explored more fully in later work.
(including in the core, for example, Northern
Italy and most of England).
This raises a number of intriguing questions. How
is this European pattern related to the dependence
of the whole of Western Europe on the United
States? To what extent can we see a similar
pattern in Eastern Europe? If so, is the core East
Germany? In that case, can we speak of a con-
tinental dependence system (a 'new order'?) in
Europe based on Germany, West and East? Does
this suggest an eventual integration of Eastern
and Western Europe? Or is the whole of Eastern
Europe too heavily dependent on the Soviet
Union?
Insights acquired from work in the development
field would throw light on several European
policy issues, including those raised by the en-
largement of the EEC. For example, anyone who
has worked on industrial or agricultural policy
overseas will know that a simplistic cost-benefit
analysis based on internal rates of return for
individual projects such as EEC financial agencies
use (Bienefeld and Seers, 1976), will be far from
suitable for evaluating sectoral or local pro-
grammes with objectives that include reducing
unemployment and inequality. (Aid agencies such
as 0DM might well turn their attention and at
least a small part of their resources to such
problems: they should certainly be involved in
negotiations on enlargement.)
This extension of development studies also has
interesting implications for 'North-South' negotia-
tions, if certain countries of Europe, includiig
Britain, and the Third World share problems
with common causes, then is there not a basis
for much greater cooperation in international
fora, such as UNCTAD, on many issues for
example monitoring the TNCs? And might not
European governments benefit from technical
assistance from agencies with international ex-
perience in problems like structural unemployment
(e.g. the ILO)?
This geographical extension of development
studies would not merely contribute to a deeper
understanding of European problems, but also
conversely throw light on the problems of the
countries conventionally covered by development
studies. The ring-like periphery of Europe prompts
us to reflect on the wider significance of spatial
analysis, and to look for similar patterns in other
areas: the Northern half of the Western Hemi-
sphere, Southern Africa and the South Pacific
spring to mind. This would be a refinement on the
somewhat global core-periphery analysis current
in development studies.
7
Political expedience and development studies
What stops the inclusion of the European peri-
phery in development studies? It is the conven-
tion under which the field deals with aided coun-
tries. The origins of its current definitions lie in
political expendiency allied to commercialism,
humanitarianism and academic territorialism----a
powerful and somewhat unholy alliance.
As the Cold War intensified in the l950s and
former colonies became independent, political
attention in the metropolitan countries focused on
problems of 'underdevelopment', which were seen
as potential breeding grounds for communism.
When three groupings emerged in the politics of
international organisationsthe 'developed' coun-
tries with high per ca pita incomes, the 'centrally
planned', and the large residual category of the
'developing'the last was treated as qualitatively
different and alone in need of support from aid
agencies and development economists.
This tripartite division of the world was of course
both novel and highly artificial. But, as I have
pointed out earlier (Seers, 1976), it did have some
basis in reality. It recognised the common prob-
lems and interests of the governments of 'devel-
oping' countries vis à vis the companies and
governments of richer countries) and their com-
mon historic resentments. The governments in
the 'developed' countries were prepared to institute
aid programmes designed, inter alia, to keep those
outside the communist bloc still 'developing'. Yet
it allowed the bureaucratic class in the communist
countries to consider governments of various
political complexions as anti-imperialist, and to
lend them diplomatic support while leaving to the
imperial powers themselves the responsibility
for financial and technical aid.
Soon the three world classification acquired a life
of its own. Typically, the governing councils of
international agencies have balanced representa-
tion between 'centrally-planned', 'developed' and
'developing' countries, and so have their commit-
tees, expert groups, missions, etc. Many govern-
ments of 'developing' countries have come to
consider 'Third World unity' a major source of
strength. All sorts of institutions have grown up
to facilitate 'South-South' and 'North-South'
discussions and negotiations.
Academic work in 'developed' countries on the
problems of the 'developing' countries was also
influenced; though it had started much earlier,
especially in the fields of anthropolgy and colonial
economies. When aid departments and the United
Nations agencies and regional commissions were
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established, in response to the various political
interests mentioned above, much greater oppor-
tunities were provided for both field and desk
research on 'developing' countries. Special devel-
opment institutions such as IDS were also set up.
Those engaged in research in this field have
accepted the geographical definition used by its
sponsors.4 Moreover, one is bound to say that
some of it has not been as objective as is perhaps
customary in the social sciences. There has been
an implicit assumption that the ultimate goals
would be European-style political institutions and
levels of living within a capitalist systembasically
the same goals as those of colonial governments.
Many researchers in colonial times and subse-
quently have also assumed (usually tacitly) that
those with political power were sufficiently moti-
vated and efficient to achieve these ends, and that
they could and would make good use of technical
and financial assistance. This has amounted to a
new (though very different) 'trahaison des clercs'.
Elaborate models were worked out to help policy-
makers accelerate economic growth and (when
political concerns changed) to deal with problems
such as high-level manpower shortages, unem-
ployment, inequality and poverty. Development
research in all these areas has been marked by
conceptual imprecision and a very casual use of
statisticsas was inevitable if 'results' were to be
provided for policy-makers, but primary data
were meagre or non-existent.
Several development courses were established in
Europe. These were more or less explicitly
designed to 'train' people how to run their own
countries (often being succesors to colonial service
courses), though they sometimes also had places
for those from 'developed' countries who were
primarily interested in the problems of the 'Third
World'.
Many European academics have also been heavily
involved in advisory work on 'development'.
These have often done little or no similar work
on the problems of their own countries. The very
understandable desire to do something about the
4 The idea of treating European countries as cases for develop-
ment is not, however, really at all novel. Development
studies were born in Europe. I am not referring to the
work of Adam Smith or Karl Marx or even the industrial-
isation debate in the Soviet Union in the 1920s: the first
two development studies in the modern sense were written
by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Martin, né Mandelbaum(1947). They dealt with the post-war development needs of
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. These were followed
by werk on the Italian South by Rosenstein-Rodan, Chenery
and others. This work on Europe was, however, submerged
in the swelling torrent of research on Africa, Asia and
Latin America.
poverty of the rural masses in the tropics has
been reinforced by rather flattering invitations to
propose solutions to their problems.
Inevitably, much of this work has been super-
ficial. We economists in particular have often
offered advice without much knowledge of the
history or the political context of the country con-
cerned and therefore with little basis for framing
the questions to be studied, let alone predicting
the results of our advice. In fact, we have rarely
known or even enquired what political interests
our visits have served (and often the real motive
of an invitation has been to obtain our signatures
rather than our opinions). The actual outcome of
such well-meaning intervention has sometimes
been inadvertently to strengthen regimes obstruct-
ing the very changes we have advocatedwhich
may of course sometimes have been the intention
all along of the donor agencies sponsoring our
travels. Indeed, there is now a fairly widespread
disillusion about the effectiveness of high-level
technical assistance in the face of powerful
hostility to social change or indifference.
Events in recent years, especially the 'oil crisis'
and the subsequent recession, have made the
three-world classification much less realistic. As
explained above, some European countries have
developed 'Latin American' symptoms: indeed,
few of them are acceptable any longer as models
to the rest of the world nor do their governments
have the resourcesgiven their domestic prob-
lemsto sustain big aid programmes or paternal-
istic roles. Communist countries have also devel-
oped unevenly and no longer form such a homo-
geneous group with respect to either institutions
or policy. The growing detente between their
governments and those of capitalist countries
raises basic questions about the rationale of a
world classification that originated in the Cold
War. Enormous differences in politico-economic
power have also appeared within the Third World.
The per capita incomes of most oil exporters and
of some other countriesto take the common
yardstick on the conventional approachnow
exceed those of some European countries (indeed
Kuwait has the highest per capita income in the
world), and what is more to the point, their
governments have essential products to sell and
capital to invest.
One can perhaps see parallels with the blurring of
class divisions inside European countries, where
sections of the working class have achieved a
bargaining strength and income levels higher than
many of those conventionally considered 'middle
class' (and labour studies have been extended
beyond their traditional field, the manual
workers).
The oil crisis not merely undermined the
old three-world classification, and demonstrated
that there were other ways of obtaining capital
than waiting for aid, it threw doubt on the
basically optimictic assumptions that underlay
much of the research and advice in this field.
Limits to oil and other non-renewable resources
have raised serious doubts whether all the
countries of the world will become 'developed'
even in the remote future, and their populations
as a whole able to afford cars and other elements
in the level of living of the European working
class. While we are not entering a 'zero sum'
game, the sum no longer seems infinite.
International relations are characterised by a
new ruthlessness, and the position of many
'developed' countries, especially those dependent
on imported oil, has become precarious. As
happened inside the industrial countries them-
selves, the representatives of the poor are not wait-
ing any more for charitable concessions, but
starting to organise to extract what they can.
The quandary of the European academic
What is the European social scientist to do?
Certainly some will continue to carry out research,
training and consultancy exclusively on behalf of
'developing' countries and much of this has no
doubt a certain value. Often the underlying
assumption is that it is desirable to redistribute
income towards these countries, however, the
idea of a European devoting his energies to shift-
ing resources to foreign governments now seems
rather anomalous, especially if they go to support
and strengthen the bureaucracy. Yet advocacy of
redistribution inside other countries raises un-
comfortable questions about paternalism and the
propriety of urging sacrifices on other bourgeois,
quite apart from the very doubtful effectiveness
of such advice. Analogous questions are raised
even more sharply for those whose work implies
the need for others to carry out revolutions.
This complex of intellectual and moral uncer-
tainties recalls the doubts that troubled the Euro-
pean intelligentsia in the Reformation. The reality
is that there is very little we can do as either
officials or academics to improve social conditions
in other continentsalthough we can perhaps
make them worse! It is not surprising that some
European social scientists who had specialised in
development have been leaving the field. For
those who remain, the first step in changing our
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role is to acknowledge the obvious social and
political problems in our own country; the second
is to accept the validity and utility of nationalism
as a shield against dependence; and the third to
re&lise that transfers of resources to countries
which are poorer may well, given the extent of
our own problems and the difficulties of reaching
those in real need, not increase net welfare.
For some, the next step after this is to search for
interface policies that will reconcile the needs of
those in developed and developing countries.
Others see their task as exploringin alliance
with the ecologistswhat changes in lifestyles
in developed countries would relieve the pressure
on oil and other scarce resources, thus creating
greater economic space for satisfying basic needs
in poorer countries. I will not go into detail here
on the pros and cons of these new approaches.
They are certainly much healthier than the old
concern with the policies of foreign governments.
But they raise big questions of political feasibility
and do not entirely avoid the invidious task of
defining other people's needs.
Perhaps some European social scientists need to
draw more far-reaching conclusions. The kernel
of development studies will surely become the
concentration of economic and political power,
and the consequent creation of poverty, both
absolute and relative, wherever this occurs, notjust in the so-called Third World, but also in
Europe. This process of marginalisation is not
purely economic: it includes threats to national,
regional or ethnic identity. Its study involves
analysis of the institutions, especially international
which in various ways transmit the techniques,
tastes, theories and ideologies that generate in-
equalityincluding inequalities between and
within European countries.
Explaining its causal dynamics leads into deeper
historical, as well as broader geographical, analy-
sis than has been customary in our field so far.
lt means investigating the origins of the present
world structure, especially the creation and dis-
olution of the colonial system, which was of
course based in Europe, and drawing on all parts
of the world for case studies in teaching as well
as research.
The professionalisation of development studies
will be helped by their extension to European
countries and vice versa. Besides providing fresh
insights into iiational and regional problems in
Europe, the application of development analysis
there will make obsolete, at least in academic
work, the professionally dubious distinction
between 'developed' and 'developing' countries,
lo
the models and the emulators.5 Conversely, it is
difficult to extend development studies to Europe
until we have discarded a classification of coun-
tries which originated primarily in political
expediency.
That there are strongly entrenched vested interests
against this change of emphasis is implicit in the
foregoing analysis. To abandon the 'Third World'
as a category, and give up using the phrase itself,
would dilute the political cement holding together
a coalition which has become even more useful to
the governments of the countries concerned.
'North-South' negotiations would lose their
rationale:6 indeed both 'North' and 'South' would
disappear as concepts (though of course the basic
issues of commodity and energy policy and so
forth would still need to be discussed).
The new approach threatens the political con-
stituency of the bilateral aid administrator, based
on transnational corporations and voluntary
agencies, and seems heartless to those whose
main concern is humanitarian. Some on the West
European Left would find it hard to accept the
validity of their own country's interests. Officials
in Communist countries would be very suspicious
of their own internal problems being put in this
framework. Any European government (West or
East) would find it hard to cooperate politically
with governments of 'developing' countries or to
apply for technical assistance, in part because of
the residues of paternalism. Fundamental changes
would be needed in the structures and procedures
of international agencies and national administra-
tions.
A heavy cost would also be borne by academics
themselves: research covering exclusively 'devel-
oping' (or, for that matter, exclusively 'developed')
countries would quickly become obsolete, lecture
I am sometimes asked how I reconcile my present position
with my criticisms in the early l960s of the naive transfer
of economic theories developed in Europe and North
America to countries in other continents with quite different
institutions_e.g. in my 'The Limitations of the Special Case'(originally published in Bulletin, Oxford Institute of Econ-
omics and Statistics, 1962). In the first place, that battlehas partly been won: social science syllabuses of universities
in other continents are no longer modelled so closely on
those of Eurpe and North America. But, in addition, the
changes outlined above in the international scene have
created conditions in which it is more constructive now to
emphasise the common elements of problems. Besides, I
was then arguing against transferring theories devised for
the 'developed' countries to the Third World. I am now
advocating a transfer in the reverse direction: it seems that
the theories devised for the 'developed' countries (such as
Keynesian and other forms of nro-classical economics) are
ceasing to be appropriate even in the countries where they
originated.
6 The North-South 'dialogue' reflects the seating arrangements
in the British House of Commons, where the parties con-
front each other: one might view the world political structure
as more like the continuous arc of the French Chamber.
notes in the field of development studies might
have to be torn up, reading lists substantially
revised and inventories of textbooks written off.
Libraries would need to be reorganised and their
purchasing policies broadened. Training courses
(if 'training' is the right word in this field) would
have to include European material, and to aim
at the enrolment of students from Europe who
are working on European problems and of
teachers from other continents. Offers of con-
sultancies would be treated much more warily.
Development studies as redefined above would
no doubt remain a separate field characterised
by interdisciplinarity, an historical approach, an
emphasis on international determinants and a
focus on institutional issues. lt would still be
marked by greater concern for social problems,
particularly poverty, than is customary among
academic social scientists, and greater need for
the first-hand acquaintance with these 'problems
that can only be provided by fieldwork (though
of a less paternalistic kind). But the boundaries
dividing it from the conventional social sciences
would be hazier and easier to violate. Those in
development institutes would have to familiarise
themselves with work on their own country and
also face the 'rigorous' standards of their col-
leagues in disciplinary departments. The latter
on the other hand would hardly feel comfortable
in closer contact with the messy and largely
unquantifiable problems of the real world.
lt will therefore take quite some time for devel-
opment studies to escape from their traditional
boundaries. From the viewpoint of the European
academic, however, there would be major benefits
to offset against the short-term costs of its re-
definition. Awkward moral tensions would be
eased. Challenging possibilities would be opened
up for more objective and fundamental research,
based (to the extent that quantitative analysis is
possible) on proper statistics. We would be less
at the mercy of changes in political winds. Our
own social science syllabuses could be made more
relevant to our own continental, national and
regional problems. In addition, European social
scientists could become genuine colleagues of
those in other continentssomething hardly
possible so long as development studies exclude
Europe.
We are brought back therefore to the old-
fashioned conclusion that academics had best use
long spoons when supping with politicians. Their
immunity from political pressures has been de-
fended on the ground that it was necessary for
innovative professional work. In development
studies, this defence has been imparied. I am not,
however, suggesting that the subject's social
relevance should be reduced; rather that those
inside government or outside should be left to
draw whatever conclusions are relevant to their
own occupation, nationality and ideology. The
study of the constraints on national policy is
potentially significant for people of many types,
inside or outside government. Politicians and
officials may well take more notice of the con-
tributions of academics who are less partisan,
and therefore more readily reconsider the assump-
tions on which their aproaches are based.
But that would be so-to-speak a by-product. A
mofe important result of some degree of detach-
ment of development studies from the aid lobby is
that this would facilitate the coverage of
European problems. While it can be argued
plausibly (if perhaps mistakenly) that development
theory and experience, as conventionally defined,
can contribute little to the analysis of the prob-
lems of countries such as the United States and
the Soviet Union, this is obviously untrue of
Portugal and other countries in the European
periphery. They provide the bridge for the ex-
tension and thus professionalisation of develop-
ment studies.
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Redistribution with Sloth-Britain's problem?
Richard Jolly
Many if not most economic analyses of Britain's
economic difficulties suggest that slow growth is
at the heart of the problem-and an acceleration
of growth the obvious cure. Past experience in
Britain and in the Third World casts doubts on
this. Except for the last three or four years, per
capita growth rates in Britain since the war have
been almost as fast or faster than at any time
since the start of the industrial revolution. In
terms of unemployment, income distribution and
export-import balance Britain's post-war per-
formance has also been better than for most of
the last century.
Recent work on developing countries has shown
that poverty, employment problems, inequality,
foreign exchange difficulties and heavy inter-
national 'dependence' arise as much from the
structure and pattern of a country's development
as from its growth rate. Similarly, the eradiction
of these problems depends as much on structural
change as on growth. If this is true for poor
countties why not also for a country like Britain,
very much richer and mush more industrialised?
Instead of our somewhat naive faith in growth
and our short run monetarist or neo-Keynesian
preoccupations-should we not direct economic
policy much more explicity towards what is
needed to restructure the British economy in the
short and over the longer run? Such restructuring
would need to focus on a number of issues, but
the concepts of basic needs and national self-
reliance, approaches and priorities suggested in
analyses of Third World problems, interpreted
within the context of a still relatively rich, in-
dustrialised country, might provide helpful guide-
lines. It is not even clear that aggregate growth
has more than a minor part to play in the pro-
cess.
Britain's past economic performance
Since the industrial revolution began about two
centuries ago, the long-run pattern of British
economic development has been of very slow
but relatively steady growth. There was little or
no redistribution, except for the major and very
important reduction in inequality between the
slump of the 1930s and the establishment of the
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welfare state by the mid 1950s.1 The distinctive
tong run characteristic of the British pattern has
been creeping growth rather than creeping social-
ism.
The long-run trends in British growth can be
judged by the rates of increase of real GNP over
the 30 years periods, shown in Table 1. The trend
growth rate was just under 3 per cent per annum
over the first part of the 19th century, dipped to
just under 2+ per cent per annum in the middle
and ended at just over 3 per cent. The average
growth rate over the whole century was virtually
identical to the 2.7 per cent per annum achieved
over the period of nearly three decades following
the second world war (1946-73). (Taking account
of the last three or four years stagnation, the
1946-76 rate would be somewhat lower, probably
2.3 per cent per anum).
Table 1
until 1901-Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British
Economic Growth
20th century--calculated from British Econo,ny-Key
Statistics 1900-1966 and recent N1ESR reports.
In contrast with this slow, long haul of growth,
redistribution of personal incomes has been
quantitatively signficant only in this century.
Although there appear to have been minor im-
provements in the distribution of income in the
quarter-century or so before 1914, when the basis
I Over the last few years, rapid inflation and various controls
in incomes and profits appear to have brought other changes
in distribution-though it is too early to assess reliably the
extent of these or how permanent they will be.
British Economic Growth-long term
(average annual percentage increase)
Year Real GNP
growth rates
Real GNP
per capita
1700-1745 0.3 0.3
1745-1785 0.9 0.3
1780-1800 1.8 0.3
1801/1 1-1831/41 2.9 1.5
181 1/21-1841/51 2.9 1.4
1821/31-1851/61 2.3 0.4
1831/41-1861/71 2.2 0.4
1841/51-1871/71 2.5 1.4
1851/61-1881/91 3.2 2.0
1861/71-1891/1901 3.3 2.2
1901-1913 0.9 0.1
1921 -1937 2.1 1.7
1938-1946 1.5 1.7
1946-1956 2.4 1.5
1956- 1966 2.8 2.1
1966-1973 2.8 2.4
19th century average 2.7 1.4
1946-1973 2.7 2.0
Source:
for further changes was laid, the one major
improvement in the last two centuries occurred in
the two decades between the mid-1930s and the
early I 950s. Over this period both pre-tax and post-
tax income distribution improved substantially-
the result of a marked reduction in unemployment
and the introduction of a range of welfare state
measures following the Second World War.2
Britain's comparative standing with other devel-
oped countries in respect to post war income
distribution can be judged from Table 2.
Table 2
Distribution of Post-Tax Income in OECD Countries
(percentage share of personal incomes by quintile groups)
Because only limited changes in the distribution
of personal incomes occurred before the second
world war, one must not assume that distribution
in other respects has not changed. Income by
factor shares has shifted markedly over the last
two centuries. From the beginning of the 19th
century to post second world war, the share of
national income from all forms of rent declined
dramatically. Rents were some 20 per cent of
2 Soltow, (1968) summarises the statistical evidence on ncome
inequality in Britain, inevitably based on partial and occasion-
ally fairly reliable data. The estimates show that the Gins
coefficient of income distribution remained between 0.56
and 0.50 for the two centuries up to 1913 compared with
0.34 in 1962/3. Soltow's judgement on the changes between
the periods for which data are available are as follows:
1688-1801/3 no change in inequality.
1801/3-1867/80 probably no change, just possibly
some reduction.
1867/80-1911/13 certainly no increase, possibly 10
per cent reduction.
1911/13-1962/3 substantial decrease in inequality.
Besides these changes in overall inequality, upper tail income
tax data show evidence of continuous decline in inequality
between 1801, 1911/12 and 1962/3.
The more recent evidence is summarised in the report of the
Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth,
in R. J. Nicholson (1967), and B. Abel-Smith, and Townsend,(1965). Note that within the limitaticns of the data, most
analysts agree that poverty and inequality were both signi-
ficantly reduced over the decade or two until the early1950s-but that it is much more doubtful whether the pro-
cess has continued thereafter.
national income in 1801 hut had fallen to 4 per
cent by 1948/57. Moreover, the share of profits,
interest and mixed incomes halved from about
40 per cent to about 24 per cent over the same
period (21 per cent by 1966, even lower in the
last few years), though all of the latter decline
took place during this century. In contrast em-
ployment incomes have increased-from some 44
per cent of national income in 1801 to some 73
per cent in 1966.
In terms of the living standards and styles of
Source: OECD. Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programmes, OECD, Paris, July, 1976, p.109
both the rich and the really poor, these have
meant significant changes. From the beginning
of the 20th century, for example, the share of
home-rents had fallen from about 9 per cent of
national income to about 3 per cent, largely
reflecting rent controls and subsidised council
housing. The gradual build up of unemployment
relief and state pensions beginning with the
Liberal reforms of 1906-14 were tremendously
significant.3 On the other side, so to speak,
domestic service which formed 5 to 6 per cent of
recorded output at the end of the 19th century
has virtually disappeared in recent years (though
it has been partly replaced by household equip-
ment and non-household services). There is
certainly no cause for complacency in the present
crisis, with the threats it holds for the social
services and the capacity or willingness of govern-
ment to restore high rates of employment and
effective welfare state policies, the two pillars
on which the positive post war gains in income
distribution rested. Nevertheless, the dramatic
improvements over the extremes of poverty and
inequality in earlier times should be recognised.
3 A good summary is available in Hay, 1975.
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Year Bottom
20%
Middle
60%
Top
2Ø%
Total Rollo rop to
bol/orn 20
Australia 66/7 6.6 54.6 38.8 100.0 5.9
Canada 69 5.0 54.0 41.0 100.0 8.2
France 70 4.3 48.8 46.9 100.0 10.9
Germany 73 6.5 47.4 46.1 100.0 7.1
Italy 69 5.1 48.4 46.5 100.0 9.1
Japan 69 7.9 51. 1 41.0 100.0 5.2
Netherlands 67 6.5 50.6 42.9 100.0 6.6
Norway 70 6.3 56.4 37.3 100.0 5.9
Spain 73/4 6.0 51.7 42.3 100.0 7.1
Sweden 72 6.6 56.4 37.0 100.0 5.6
United Kingdom 73 6.3 55.0 38.7 100,0 6.1
United States 72 4.5 52.6 42.9 100.0 9.5
Average 5.9 52.3 41.8 100.0 7.1
International changes
Internationally, too, the recorded changes in net
inflows of income and outflows of investment
represent a very considerable contrast with the
earlier position. Net inflows of income from
abroad rose from about 1 per cent of GNP in
the early 19th century to 7 or 8 per cent at the
end and during the decade or so before the first
world war. Thereafter net inflows of income from
abroad have declined-to about 6 per cent of
GNP in the 1920s, 5 per cent in the 1930s, 3
per cent immediately after the second world
war and just over 1 per cent in the last two
decades. More or less in parallel with this rise and
fall, (but with considerable fluctuations) net
foreign investment rose from 3 per cent of GNP
in 1861 to nearly 7 per cent in 1911, thereafter
declining sharply, at times to the extent of net
dis-investment or net capital inflows into Britain
in the l930s and afterwards.4 Over the whole
period, net outflows of foreign investment have
always been somewhat lower than inflows of net
income from abroad although in recent years
Britain has begun to pay its own way to a degree
not seen for 100 years, if then.
The real signficance of these changing inter-
national relationships is indicated, however, less
by the statistical 'shift' in income or investment
flows than by the broader changes of political
and economic institutions and structures which
have influenced the pattern and terms on which
international trade and investment takes place.
The existence of the Empire and colonies meant
that an important part of British trade and com-
mercial involvement abroad was built up in
secure and protected markets-protected through
language, contacts and political influence, as well
as by direct imperial preferences. The end of this
structure and the earlier loss of Britain's tech-
nological lead removed many, though by no
means all, of these important advantages. Part
of Britain's post war difficulties have been the
result of a forced adjustment to an international
context in which Britain has had to compete
economically as never before.
The future implications-for unemployment
How important is it to change these patterns for
the future? Or put another way, how important
4 One can never be entirely sure of the meaningfulness of
long term changes in recorded foreign exchange flows, since
the prices and components on which they depend reflect
structures and institutions which themselves may be chang-
ing. Britain's position as both a base for and host to the
operations of international firms is especially significant in
the area of investment and income flows, some of which
may be unrecorded.
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are growth and redistribution for tackling
Britain's current economic difficulties and achiev-
ing her long run objectives?
In order to keep the discussion to a reasonable
length, I will consider the question in relation to
unemployment, which, together with inflation, is
the most critical problem of the British economy
today.
In Britain, as in several OECD countries, the
rate of unemployment in 1976 was almost double
the average of 1962-73g (Table 3).
Table 3-Unemployment ratesa in OECD countries
Average
a Standardised to international definitions
b Representing about 90% of OECD, including Australia.
Finland, Norway, Spain and Sweden as well as
countries listed above.
Source: National Institute Economic Review, 80, May
1977, p.29
At first sight-and still conventionally accepted
by most analyses in Britain today-growth is
the critical ingredient for expanding employment.
For example, the NIESR analysis published in
February, 1977, estimated that to reduce unem-
ployment from 1.4 mn. to a full employment
level of about 0.5 mn. "would need an increase
of some 9 per cent in GDP-this it must be
stressed, in addition to the increase of approach-
ing 3 per cent per annum (reflecting the growth
of output per head, together with the rather rapid
increase in the labour force expected over the
next five years) required merely to halt the rise
in unemployment. Thus to return to full employ-
ment in five years, for example, would require an
annual growth rate over the period of nearly
5 per cent". (National Institute Economic Review,
1977: 51).
The fact that even 5 per cent might be very diffi-
cult to attain-it is nearly double the rate of
growth achieved over any significant period in
Britain over the last two centuries-should itself
be sufficient to suggest that to rely primarily
5 Appalling as the current level of unemployment in Britain
may be, it is worth noting that in no less than 25 years of
the present century, the rate of unemployment has beenhigher than the current rate, and in two-thirds of them,double the 1976 rate.
1962-73 1974 1975 1976
United States 4,6 5.4 8.3 7.5
Canada 5.1 5.4 7.0 7.1
Japan 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.1
France 2.2 2.7 4.1 4.0
West Gertiiany 0.6 1.5 3.6 4.0
Italy 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.9
United Kingdom 3.1 2.9 4.5 6,0
Totalb 2.8 3.3 5.1 5.2
upon growth to solve the unemployment problem
is, to say the least, unsatisfactory.
Yet the same conclusion can be readand in fact
has now become the 'conventional wisdom'-
from the experience of many developing coun-
tries, where even growth at rates of 5 or 6 per
cent per annum has usually proved inadequate
to ensure more than marginal increases in wage
earning employment, let alone decreases in unem-
ployment.6
If we applied to Britain the lesson of recent em-
ployment studies in the Third World, we would
emphasise structural factors among the main
causes of unemployment, and structural change
rather than growth as the critical need. A struc-
tural approach in this context would need to
cover two sets of issuesl. analysis of the under-
lying trends and problems of the economy, em-
phasing structural factors in the pattern and com-
ponents of production, technological change, con-
sumption, external linkages, etc, not simply
relationships between the aggregates of total
demand; investment, consumption, etc. and 2. a
disaggregated analysis of unemployment itself,
emphasising the different factors bearing on the
unemployment problems of youth, women, older
persons, etc. Both elements have been recognised
as essential for the effective understanding of
employment problems in Third World countries
and of policies to tackle them,
A structural approach to policy would take one
into a wide range of issues, many absent from the
mainstream debate on employment policy in
Britain: the pattern of technological advance and
the need for a major shift of policy towards the
small producers; integrated local development
schemes with more central support for local
planning; a more selective approach to foreign
investment; a radical change of policy towards
informal sector services and methods of produc-
tion; changes in education; incomes policy; a
restructuring of government revenue and expendi-
ture with employment objectives in mind. Each
of these and some other areas of policy would,
of course, need to be expanded and analysed at
length as, for instance, was done in the ILO
report on Increasing Productive Employment in
Kenya (from the summary chapter of which the
above headings were taken). One would also
need to consider the influences on labour force
6 See, for example, the ILO employment missions to Colombia(1970) Sri Lanka (1971) and Kenya (1972), in which mem-bers of the IDS were heavily involved. Several years ago
it was suggested that the ILO might send an employment
mission to Britain. Unfortunately little official interest wa
shown in this interesting idea.
supply: population growth, changing participation
rates particularly of women (which have been
rising), retirement policy and the whole set of
factors determining the composition of the labour
force.
The key point is that an employment policy built
up from such a structural analysis would differ
fundamentally from one emphasising GNP ex-
pansion. Growth would probably still be involved
but it would be growth implied by the specifics
of strategy to reach and maintain full employ-
ment and meet other social and economic objec-
tives, rather than an aggregate goal from which
the resources required to meet other economic
objectives might hopefully be financed. And the
specifics of these other social and economic
objectives and of how to attain them would need
to be made a central part of the debate on econo-
mic and employment policy, not left peripheral
to it.
Slructural change and the problem of poverty
Such an approach would raise immediately the
problem of poverty, clearly related to the prob-
lem of unemployment but conceptually distinct.
(Indeed Third World analyses have emphasised
that the two problems ought generally to be con-
sidered together, both foranalytical and policy
making purposes.) Some 7 to 13 per cent of the
British population are estimated to fall below
'the poverty line' (as variously defined), less than
in several other OECD countries but still un-
reasonably high (Table 4). Yet the amount by
which their incomes in total fall short of the
poverty line is only small, barely I per cent of
GNP. The same is true, according to recent
OECD reports, for a number of OECD countries
(OECD, 1976). Long run growth is hardly a
necessary and certainly not a sufficient condition
to fill a gap of this size.
More significant, it is not clear that growth alone
will even assist with the matter. According to
the OECD study, for instance, expenditure on
income maintenance programmes over the decade
until 1972 rose nearly three times as fast as per
capita income in Britain, yet poverty remained.
In large part, this was because of widespread
'leakages' which meant that most of the resources
provided for income maintenance went to per-
sons other than the poor or, if they did reach
the poor, were offset by other reductions in their
incomes. Some 8 per cent of GNP was spent on
income maintenance but only a fraction helped
the poor. Again, the eradication of poverty in
Britain, as in most of the other industrialised
countries, is a matter of structural changes which
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will deal with the causes of this poverty, not just
more money: the issue is not really one of GNP.
Table 4Percentages of population below 'poverty line' in
various OECD countries and expenditure on income
maintenance programmes, in early 1970s
Per cent of national
Source: OECD op. cit. Table 27 and 1.
Employment patternsthe wider issues
The increasing need in Britain, as in most of the
richer OECD countries, is to provide an environ-
ment for a richer and' fuller life for all groups
and classes within the country, not just in material
terms, but in respect of a range of activities, self
fulfilment, family life and social interaction, of
freedom of choice and active participation
whether at work or in leisure.
Each of us probably has our own pet hobby
horses in respect of the new elements we would
like to see in this remodelled world. With regard
to employment, mine include complete flexibility
after the age of 15 with respect to education,
work and retirement patterns, with the ability to
shift periodically between all three (including in
and out of temporary periods of 'retirement' for
men and women over one's lifetimeand tapering
rather than complete retirement for older per-
sons); more flexible housing patterns freeing
people to move and change jobs more easily; and
a better balanced and more conscious integration
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of small scale and informal employment oppor-
tunities for providing everyday goods and services
with large scale production and provision only
where really essential.
This is not the place to expand further on these
points, let alone to suggest that these ideas are
the most important of the many that would
need to be drawn upon and worked out politi-
cally, socially and economically into a new pattern
of development. The critical point is simply that
such changes, if set in motion, would put the
emphasis on structural change, rather than
growth. Growth, as conventionally measured,
might or might not increase. This would almost
be beside the point. The ability of people to
choose, to participate, to lead fuller lives, to do
more of the things which prove really satisfying
would have increased. Against achievements of
this sort, 5 per cent growth seems totally
inadequate as a goal, and almost irrelevant as the
means to achieve such change.
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income maintenance
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rank himself were often not very congenial to him -
the so-called economic underworld ofHobson, Gesell,
Major Douglas et al., against his natural world, the
academic mainstream economists. In the same way
Dudley Seers, towards the end of his life, argued
against the Brandt Report, against the principle of aid,
against charity in international relations. In one of his
last articles he proposed a new aid target of 0.1 per cent
of donors' GNP to which aid should be reduced; that,
of course, brought him acclaim from some very
unaccustomed and uncongenial allies from both right
and left about which he felt very unhappy. But he kept
saying this is what I believe in and I must say it.
Shared Perceptions of Nationalism
Perhaps a more substantive similarity lies in their
leaning towards a nationally-oriented policy of de-
linking or partial de-linking from the world economy.
Dudley's last book (which appeared posthumously)
was called The Political Economy of Nationalism; an
element of 'nationalism' is also a key characteristic of
Keynes' General Theory. This was the product of the
1930s, an era of heavy unemployment when
international relations had broken down in a wild
scramble of each-for-himself and beggar-my-neighbour
deflation. The World Economic Conference in
London in 1933, the last attempt to try to right the
Depression by means of international cooperation,
had collapsed. Keynes in his famous article in The New
Statesman in 1933, immediately following the collapse
of the London Conference, said that the time had
come when Great Britain as a nation must try to act on
her own to restore full employment at home, if
necessary by means of national self-sufficiency:
I sympathise, therefore, with those who would
minimise, rather than with those who would
maximise, economic entanglement between nations.
Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel - these
are things which should of their nature be
international. But let goods be home-spun
whenever it is reasonably and conveniently
possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily
national. Yet, at the same time, those who seek to
disembarrass a country of its entanglements should
be very slow and wary. It should not be a matter of
tearing up roots, but of slowly training a plant to
grow in a different direction.
3
Seers and Keynes: Some Personal Analogies
There is no need to repeat here what was said at the
time of Dudley Seers' death about the great loss of a
friend and source of inspiration. Now the time has
come to take a little distance and try to appraise his
contribution to thinking about development. Perhaps
the best way I can think of trying to do this is by
relating his work and thinking to that of John
Maynard Keynes. To begin with, there are a number of
personal analogies and similarities between Dudley
Seers and Keynes, starting with the coincidental fact
that both of them died at almost exactly the same age,
almost to the day, both much too early, at the age of
62. Moreover, both of them died more or less on the
job, having had ample warning that their life was in
danger and knowing that they could probably have
prolonged it by withdrawing from strenuous work.
For both of them their sense of commitment and
fulfilment in what they had set themselves to do was so
great that they made their choice without much
hesitation; the consideration of extending their life
counted for very little in the scale against the
contribution to human progress they felt it in them to
make.
Both of them were at their best against the background
of the institutions with which they were associated.
They were both what you might call great collegial
men. Keynes was the heart and soul of his college:
when he was away one always knew it; when he was
there everything revolved around him. At some
periods in the ItS one had the same feeling about
Dudley Seers. Dudley was the soul and spirit of the
IDS, and much of his best work and best thinking was
done in the collegiate framework of teamwork within
the IDS. I am thinking here particularly of the ILO
Employment Missions, with which his name is
associated. I think also both men shared the
experience, for both of them a sad experience, of
having to challenge established views and to quarrel
with their natural allies and teachers. In the case of
Keynes,! am thinking here of the Keynes of the 1930s,
the author of the General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money. The General Theory for Keynes
was a break with his venerated teachers, with the
classics, with Marshall, with Pigou. He had to
challenge orthodoxies. The allies with which he had to
This is also the key theme of Dudley's last book. Like
the General Theory, it was 'a struggle of escape from
habitual modes of thought and expression'. Both of
them were accused of being unduly nationalist. In the
case of Keynes, during the Keynes centenary year
(1983), (this by the way is another link between the two
- that Dudley died in Keynes' centenary year) in the
contributions which The Economist published on that
occasion, Hayek was predictably very critical of
Keynes for being a nationalist. The other com-
mentators, Hicks, Samuelson, etc., also commented
on this fact, some approvingly and some critically.
Keynes of course, had the opportunity oftranscending
his nationalist phase of the 1930s. At Bretton Woods,
the Keynes of the 1940s had the chance to help to build
an international system which, if it had been
implemented in the way Keynes visualised it, would
have been of great benefit to world development. It
would probably have given us more than the 25 golden
years which we enjoyed under the Keynesian
consensus, even under the imperfect Bretton Woods
system which was finally created.
But both Dudley Seers and John Maynard Keynes
knew, or felt, that nationalism is not enough; both felt
the need for what Dudley called in his book 'extended
nationalism'. In the case of Keynes, there was not
much need to emphasise this: let us remind ourselves
that when Keynes said in the l930s that 'England can
go it alone', and restore full employment at home by
changing our policies, by changing our view of the way
the economy works and by acting according to this
new view - the 'England' that he was speaking of was
an economic superpower - it had half the world still
associated with it, including the whole Indian sub-
continent. Keynes took this for granted, and hence did
not worry too much about the balance of payments
effect which expansionist policies in the UK would
have; he took it for granted that he was really speaking
of half the world expanding together. Therefore, when
we call Keynes a nationalist, or when Keynes thought
he was acting and talking as a nationalist, in the
current meaning of the term, that is a statement that
one must considerably qualify. Similarly, Dudley
Seers felt the need, particularly in his last book, to say
that the UK cannot go it alone. We must dc-link from
the world economy to some extent; above all, we must
not be paternalistic, we must not believe that we have
the secret of telling other countries how to develop.
We can only look after ourselves but we must not do
this alone; we must do this as part of Europe. Hence
Dudley's last book presented a picture of the
possibility of a European regional bloc looking after
its own depressed areas. Just as Keynes wanted us to
look after the depressed areas ofEngland in the 1930s,
so Dudley Seers had the vision of a Europe that was
looking after its own periphery, and would then deal
as a regional bloc with countries outside Europe.
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I am struck by another analogy between Dudley Seers
and Keynes. Keynes says repeatedly in the General
Theory that he was looking for what he called a middle
way between capitalism and socialism. The macro-
economic management by the government of an
essentially capitalist economy, with full employment
as the top priority, was to him the essence of the
middle way. Such a 'guiding influence' of the state
could combine the advantages, or virtues, of
capitalism and socialism. This phrase, the middle way.
was then picked up by Keynes' good friend and
publisher, and future Prime Minister, Harold
Macmillan, in his book entitled The Middle Way, a
popular exposition of the Keynesian view that through
enlightened macroeconomic management and expan-
sionist policies you could gain the benefits of socialism
even in a capitalist economy. I remember vividly when
Keynes in the mid-1930s visited Russia and Sweden
and startled all of us on his return by saying that
during his visit he had found the country of true
socialism - Sweden. Sweden to him represented at
that time a good approximation of the middle way that
he was advocating. It is interesting to note that Dudley
Seers, in his last book, kept using the phrase 'the third
way': they both struggled to escape from sterile
debates and look for a promising synthesis.
Shared Interest in Quantification
Let me now turn to another shared interest of the two:
both were particularly concerned with what we may
call the quantification possibilities and data require-
ments for economic policies - the need for national
accounting systems of some kind, a framework that
would lend itself to quantification. In the case of
Keynes, of course, this led in the first place to his
collaboration with Colin Clark, who took the
Keynesian concepts and incorporated them in his
national accounting framework, a work then carried
on by Richard Stone.
Dudley Seers, as we know, was very active in
extending Richard Stone's analysis further in
directions in which he felt the Keynesian analysis, or
the conventional Keynesian analysis was deficient.
The Keynesian analysis led Harrod and Domar, as
well as Colin Clark, to put great emphasis in their
accounting system on physical capital accumulation,
which was subsequently transferred as policy models
and policy advice to developing countries. Like others,
Dudley Seers became very doubtful whether such an
identification of development with GNP growth and
of GNP growth with physical capital accumulation
was the most relevant or the most important thing
about economic development. Therefore, towards the
end of his life, he extended Richard Stone's framework
of national accounting through his publications on the
life cycle, relating it more directly to poverty, to
standards of living, to what we now call human
capital, to the human condition. It is quite in the spirit
of this major contribution that towards the end of his
life, he helped to lay the foundations for UNICEF to
move to a more humane - and at the same time more
productive - approach to the new adjustment
problems of the 1980s.
Here we have an unbroken intellectual chain which
leads from Keynes to Colin Clark, Richard Stone and
Dudley Seers. But at the same time, in his last book
Dudley Seers emphasises his differences from, rather
than his links with, Keynes. He stresses that the
conventional national accounting framework - and
by that he means Keynes, Harrod, Domar and Colin
Clark (but not Stone) - which now dominates the
statistical and planning systems ofso many developing
countries, as well as industrial countries, is a case of
the politicians and statesmen of today being the
unknowing victims of some defunct economist. This is
a way of turning the tables on Keynes - it refers to
Keynes' famous statement made in the concluding
sentences of the General Theoui in trying to explain
why the idea of the laissez-faire market automatically
providing full employment was still so widely accepted
in the minds of statesmen and the general public when
he started writing the book. In that famous passage
Keynes also spoke of 'madmen in authority', who
believe they hear voices in the air but are really only
repeating the ideas and writings ofa defunct academic
scribbler. Without mentioning him by name, Dudley
Seers hoists Keynes on his own petard by saying that
when thinking about national accounting we are still
the victims of a defunct economist, i.e. Keynes.
Keynes' Ideas and Developing Countries
In a number of ways Dudley Seers complemented
Keynes' work. Keynes himself was not particularly
interested in the application of his General Theory to
developing countries, about which he was not greatly
concerned. As far as I know he never visited a
developing country: indeed, even though his early
career before the war was in the India Office, he never
visited India. He was rather contemptuous about
Third World participation at Bretton Woods, and
there is no great evidence, apart from the problems of
colonial finance, that he took any interest in what we
now call development problems or developing
countries. Keynes himself is therefore innocent of any
attempt to apply his framework, directly or in adjusted
form, to developing countries. That was a matter for
his followers, particularly Harrod and Domar in their
successful attempt to extend Keynesianism beyond
short-term statics, and to convert it into a long-term
and dynamic view, to show what happens to an
economy after it has achieved full employment in the
process of its subsequent growth. So it was those who
followed Keynes, particularly in the 1950s, who tried
to apply Keynesianism as such to conditions of
developing countries.
The moment this was done, immediate doubts arose
whether this was a proper approach. Dudley Seers was
among those who argued from the very beginning that
this was not a proper approach - that the England of
1936 was 'a special case', different from that of the
developing countries. He tried to develop a better
model, which would suit the conditions of developing
countries, by treating them as part of an international
periphery - the centre/periphery view. Rather
interestingly Dudley Seers then went a step further. In
several quotations from his last book it is clear that his
mind was moving in the direction of thinking that the
insights that he or others had gained, in different ways,
about the problems of developing countries, could be
transferred back to the industrial countries, and would
be very helpful in dealing with our own development
problems. Such reverse transfers would include ideas
of appropriate technology, the informal sector, the
role of transnational corporations, dealing with
depressed areas and economic inequalities, etc.
Indeed, if Dudley had lived longer. I think he would
have expanded this line of thought, applying the
insights gained by studying development problems to
the problems of industrial countries.
Let me now come back to something I said before
about Keynes, i.e. that he was not interested in
developing countries. It is true that his ideas as he put
them forward in 1936 taken superficially were not
relevant for developing countries. For instance,
V. K. R. V. Rao, his favourite Indian student in
Cambridge, on his return to India published a famous
article in the Indian EconomicRevieii' in which he gave
us all the reasons why, in spite of being a great admirer
and loyal student of Keynes, he thought Keynes' views
were not applicable to India. Rao gave four main
reasons which are still important today, although they
have since been added to, and in some cases
questioned and amended. These four reasons were as
follows:
First, the type of unemployment that is found in
developing countries is so different from that in
industrial countries that the problem is not job
creation. Of course, it should be remembered that Rao
wrote this in 1950, with India in mind, when India was
still largely an agricultural country, and most
developing countries were strongly identified with
agriculture. So naturally he said that the prevailing
type of employment is self-employment, either in
agriculture or in what we now call the urban informal
sector; hence the idea of job creation governing the
approach to improved employment or full employment
which Keynes put before us in 1936, is not applicable.
Secondly, Rao maintained that the problem in
developing countries is not, as Keynes described it, a
problem of effective demand, of demand deficiency. It
is essentially a problem of supply inelasticity. The
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problems are on the supply side. If you just try to inject
additional demand you immediately come up against
what we would call vertical supply curves, reflecting
structural rigidities in supply, particularly in food
production, the most important wage good. This
makes it impossible to carry out Keynesian policies,
which, Rao thought, would in India only lead to wild
inflation without resulting in much increase in
production.
The third (and clearly related) reason which Rao gave
was that Keynes had argued his case in the midst of the
world recession for an economy like England which
had not only unemployed labour, but also ample
underutilised capital and underutilised capacity in all
industries. Therefore, the job of bringing unemployed
labour and unused capacity together was much easier
than the quite different task presented in developing
countries. To put it in terms of the criticism
subsequently made by Kalecki and Joan Robinson,
Keynes thought he could solve the problems by purely
financial tricks: 'turning stones into bread'. In
developing countries, however, there may also be
latent capacity underutilisation. Rao would probably
be criticised today for denying the existence of such
latent capacity. At the same time as Rao was writing in
India, Ragnar Nurkse, in America, was showing
perhaps more insight on this point. While he agreed
with Rao that there may be no open unutilised capacity
or unused capital of the type found in an industrial
economy in recession (at least under normal
conditions and in the absence of balance of payments
constraint), there is nevertheless a lot of latent
capacity, e.g. agricultural surplus population, which
can be mobilised by the right policies, albeit not
necessarily simply by a financial trick. Schumpeter
thought that the development of entrepreneurship
could do it. Other people thought improved
technological capacity in developing countries could
do it. Nurkse thought (Rosenstein-Rodan having
blazed the trail here) that the big push or balanced
growth could do it, perhaps by mobilising the latent
power of reciprocal demand and external economics.
But at any rate, Rao, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse and
all the others who followed them would all agree that
the situation is different in developing countries; what
is needed is a more complex and difficult policy than
the largely monetary and financial policies which
Keynes suggested. Budget deficits, cheap money -
these things would not by themselves do the trick in
developing countries, as they might well do in
industrial countries with unemployment.
Finally, the fourth point which Rao made very
strongly, a point subsequently also modified in the
development discussion, was that Keynes assumed
that there was an ample supply of working capital to
support an increase in production; this again was not
the case in developing countries.
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So at this superficial level (using the word not in a
derogatory sense), one might say that Keynes was not
very relevant to developing countries and that the
critics, including Dudley Seers, of a transfer of simple
Keynesianism to developing countries, were absolutely
justified. But having said that, one or two important
qualifications have to be made.
The Relevance of Keynes
The first qualification is that so far we have been
talking only of the Keynes of 1936, the Keynes of the
General Theory. When I said Keynes was not directly
concerned with the problems of developing countries,
there was one major exception to this. He was, since
the 1930s, an ardent supporter of commodity price
stabilisation, through intervention in international
commodity markets. He followed up the General
Theory with a 1938 article in the Economic Journal,
advocating a policy of government storage of raw
materials. In the middle of the war in 1942 when the
war situation was very grim, he found the time to write
a memorandum for the War Cabinet in which he said
that the most important measure for the post-war
world was the creation of an international commodity
stabilisation agency. Then at Bretton Woods, he
proposed the International Trade Organisation (ITO),
as the third pillar of the Bretton Woods system, in
addition to the World Bank and IMF. He had set his
heart on this. Unfortunately the ITO was never
ratified.
Keynes went a lot further: he wanted an IMF which
would put pressure not on balance of payments deficit
countries but on balance of payments surplus
countries. This fitted in perfectly with his views
developed for the domestic economy in the General
Theory. He wanted a world currency that would be
based on 30 primary commodities rather than on gold
alone (gold would have been one of the 30) - not on
sterling, not on the dollar, not on SDRs, but on 30
primary commodities, so that commodity stabili-
sation would be built into the world monetary system.
In his vision of the world the balance of payments
limitation for economic development, for economic
expansion in developing countries, would be either
eliminated or very much reduced, opening the way for
his preferred inward-looking domestic expansion. So
if you define Keynesianism by adding to the 1936
General Theory the 1938 article on commodity
stabilisation and particularly Bretton Woods, then its
relevance and applicability to economic development
immediately becomes a lot more plausible.
But let me add that at an even more important
methodological level, in spite of apparent or
superficial reasons why Keynes was not particularly
relevant or directly suitable for developing countries,
the way of thinking which Keynes introduced into
economic analysis was also the foundation of
development economics. Albert Hirschman, in his
article 'The rise and decline of development
economics', wisely credits Keynes with taking the
decisive methodological step towards development
economics by replacing classical mono-economics by
duo-economics. Keynes was the creator of duo-
economics. His duo-economic model was based on the
proposition that when you have unemployment in an
industrial economic system, the economic interactions
and economic relations are fundamentally different
from those of an economy in full employment. Hence
the economic policies that are applicable to reduce
unemployment and restore full employment are
fundamentally different from those of running an
economy at full employment level. All subsequent
schools of development economics, even though they
may not have accepted the precise Keynesian model
and found (usually valid) reasons why it should not be
directly applicable to developing countries derive
from this decisive departure by Keynes that economics
is not a doctrine of universal validity, as the classical
economists more or less assume, but that there are
different economic laws or principles leading to
different economic policies for countries in different
conditions. The present neo-classical counter-
revolution is in essence a counter-revolution not
against planning, protectionism etc., but against the
principle of duo-economics and of a separate
discipline of development economics - although it is,
of course, perfectly possible for a genuine development
economist to be in favour of liberalisation, against
centralised planning etc.
A good example of this principle of duo-economics is
Keynes' advocacy, already discussed, of stabilisation
of primary commodity prices. For implicit in this
view, fervently held by Keynes, is the idea that
countries which depend on the production and export
of primary commodities are subject to different laws
and different trends and therefore require different
treatment and different policies from countries which
rely on the production and export of manufactured
goods. As we kndw, this idea was readily taken up by
Prebisch and others. Dudley Seers was, of course, one
of 'the others', and during his work with Prebisch at
ECLA the idea of duo-economics, in its sharp form of
centre/periphery analysis, became firmly embedded in
his thinking. His last writings, in fact, extended the
duo-economic centre/periphery model to the industrial
world and even to domestic problems within industrial
countries, providing a link between development
economics and the old concern about 'depressed
areas'. Rather ironically, though, his thinking led him
back to some new form of synthesis of mono-
economics and duo-economics, with the industrial
countries constituting a 'special case'.
Thus, although unemployment in developing countries
is of a different kind, and requires different
approaches from Keynesian policies as prescribed in
the General Theory, the idea of latent or disguised
unemployment, not only of labour but of other
resources, including capital, became a common
element in early thinking about development
problems and is still widespread today. Rather
interestingly, both the adherents of the school of
balanced economic growth and those of unbalanced
growth can claim descent from Keynes. The policy of
balanced growth is based on the idea that you cannot
rely on the market because it does not take account of
externalities, reciprocal demand and interaction
between sectors. What is not possible on an individual
enterprise or even sectoral basis becomes possjble on
an economy-wide or even better, global basis, through
macroeconomic synchronisation. This provided the
foundation for the tremendous popularity of
development planning in the 1950s, derived directly
from Keynes' General Theory. In this sense, he has
been incredibly influential in developing countries.
With the benefit of hindsight, many of us are now
more sceptical of the unqualified belief in planning,
and more specifically of the centralised planning
which the ideas of big push and balanced development
imply. But the more general idea that development to
an important extent is a matter of good macroeconomic
management, and that specifically the government of
a developing country has a great deal to contribute by
adopting the right policies, by taking account of
factors which individuals or individual enterprises
cannot take account of, still commands mainstream
support.
Similarly, and perhaps surprisingly, the opposite
theory of unbalanced growth, which was also very
influential in the formative period of development
economics, can also claim links with Keynes. Keynes
also tried to identify for the Britain of 1936 the key
points where public policy could, through multipliers
and interactions, have a maximum impact in pulling
the whole economic system along with it. This idea of
finding a leading element or leading sector, or
bottleneck sector, releasing some latent resources
which would otherwise lie idle has become a common
endeavour of many development practitioners and
economists. Some of the biggest success stories in
economic development may be due to the correct
identification of leading sectors, and effective action
based on such identification. On the other hand,
obsession with certain lead sectors, e.g. heavy
industry, to the neglect of others, e.g. agriculture, is
also held responsible for some of the failure. But our
point here is that this also is a direct part of the
Keynesian inheritance.
Seers' Criticisms of Keynes
There is one sense in which Dudley Seers took the
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Keynesian analysis a good deal further. He was not
alone in this, but he played a leading part. Let me come
back to a criticism, of Keynes' work, which was
already made in the 1930s, and even more so after the
war when ideas of the Welfare State and income
redistribution had become widespread, not only in the
industrial countries, but also in the developing
countries. That criticism alleges that Keynes was not
particularly interested in human welfare, that he
wanted economic growth mainly through the revival
of physical investment; that he did not care enough
what kind of investment ('digging holes and filling
them up again'); or who would benefit from the
investment; what would be the effect on income
distribution; what would be the impact on poverty, on
human welfare. There is some substance in such
criticism; in the General Theory we do not find much
explicit discussion of this. Against this, however, it can
be argued that the very fact that Keynes picked out
unemployment, which after all was the main cause of
poverty in the 1930s, as the chief objective to be
eliminated or reduced, shows a concern with poverty;
and also that full employment in itself will contribute
to more equal income distribution. But it is certainly
true that other elements of Keynesian policy might
increase inequalities of income distribution. He was
quite ready to accept, or even advocate, a reduction in
real wages of those in work as a necessary
precondition for the reduction of unemployment.
Certainly under his recipe for restoration of full
employment the share of profits in national income
would increase (as it does in related development
strategies based on the absorption of 'surplus labour').
So, to the extent that Keynes was not directly
concerned with welfare and income redistribution,
Dudley Seers' emphasis on life cycles and social
indicators represents an essential further development
and correction of the Keynesian approach. In a way
that was typical of him, Dudley developed his views
not theoretically, but as a result of field experience in
developing countries, particularly in the ¡LO
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Employment Missions. This choice of moving from
policy and reality to theory rather than the other way
is, I think, also shared with Keynes, who, in spite of
appearances to the contrary in the General Theory,
essentially did not believe in the primacy of theory. His
starting point was that the conventional classical view
clearly conflicted with reality. He looked at reality,
saw that it conflicted with theory, and then set about
revising theory. Dudley Seers, in his move from
concentration on growth and then employment in the
era of the ILO Employment Missions, to basic needs,
to poverty, to income distribution, was also influenced
not so much by theoretical thinking but by his life
experience, by what he observed. He then turned to
revise the models with which he worked.
In this article I have certainly not exhausted Keynes'
contribution to development thinking, nor Dudley's
role, even in relation to Keynes, but I hope that at least
some things which it contains will help to bring home
to us again the loss we have suffered in his death.
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1 Introduction1
This IDS Bulletin is an oddity: a publication by an
institute specialising in developing countries, which
consists almost entirely of papers about developed
countries. There is a justification, however. It lies in
the rapid growth in writing about a new concept,
'social exclusion'. Despite some pioneering work
by the International Institute of Labour Studies on
social exclusion in the South2, most writing on
social exclusion has been in and about the North,
originally in France, but now more widely3. The
new writing represents new thinking on a new
problem, namely the rapid growth of poverty in
rich countries. Poverty has been driven rapidly up
the policy and research agendas of the European
welfare states, of the USA, and also of Eastern
Europe's transitional countries. Increasingly, it is
discussed in the vocabulary of social exclusion.
Our purpose is to draw attention to the new
debate; and beyond that to address two sets of
questions:
First, how does the new thinking on social
exclusion relate to the large body of work on
poverty and poverty reduction? Is 'social exclu-
sion' merely a re-labelling of poverty? Is it an
explanation of poverty? Or does it offer some-
thing entirely new?
Second, does the new debate in the North offer
opportunities for dialogue between North and
The articles in this Bulletin were first presented as
papers at a workshop on 'Poverty and Social Exclusion
in North and South', jointly sponsored by IDS and the
Poverty Research Unit at the University of Sussex, and
held at IDS on 28-29 April 1997. The workshop was
supported financially by the International Institute for
Labour Studies and by the British Overseas Development
Administration (flow Department for International
Development). A report on the workshop has been
published as O'Brien et al. (1997).
This is briefly discussed in de Haan contribution; for
an overview of the work of IlLS, see Gore and
Figueiredo, (eds) (1997), and IlLS (1996).
Cannan provided an overview on social exclusion and
French social integration policies in the April 1997 IDS
Bulletin (Cannan 1997); recent work on Britain
includes Walker and Walker (eds) (1997), London
Research Centre (1996), and Jordan (1996). Research on
social exclusion has been summarised in the annotated
bibliography prepared for our project (O'Brien and de
Haan 1997).
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South? Does the debate on social exclusion in
the North offer new lessons for the South?
Conversely, are there insights from the South
that will enrich debate in the North?
In brief, our answers to these questions are that the
concept of social exclusion does offer something
new to those of us who work on developing coun-
tries, particularly in its focus on the institutional
processes which lead to deprivation; and also that
the new debate in the North will make it both eas-
ier and more necessary for colleagues working on
either side of the geographical divide to share find-
ings and collaborate. There are qualifications to
these conclusions, but in general we are optimistic
about the potential.
2 What is 'Social Exclusion'?
We obviously need to start with the term social
exclusion'. De Haan (in this volume) provides us
with a guide to the genealogy of the concept, and to
the bewildering diversity of ways in which it is cur-
rently used. One definition is that social exclusion
is
the process through which individuals or
groups are wholly or partially excluded from
full participation in the society in which they
live (European Foundation 1995: 4).
This definition focuses on the process of social
exclusion. Others lay greater emphasis on multiple
deprivation as a defining feature of social exclusion:
low income, an insecure job, poor housing, family
stress, and social alienation (Paugam 1995). In
either case, social exclusion may take the form of,
or result in, an income markedly lower than that
customary in the society, failure or inability to par-
ticipate in social and political activities, or other-
wise a life on the margins. The poor are excluded,
but so are the old, the homeless, the disenfran-
chised, the mentally ill, and the culturally alienated.
The social exclusion debate originated ïn France
and draws specifically on the French tradition of
national integration and social solidarity The oppo-
site of social exclusion is then 'social inclusion',
with the idea of the social bond at its heart.
Exclusion, in the French discourse, is associated
with the rupture of the social bond (Lenoir 1974).
2
There are competing paradigms of inclusion and
exclusion, however, and Silver (1994) has identified
three: the solidarity paradigm, founded in French
ideas about social solidarity; a specialisation para-
digin, dominant in the US and perhaps the UK,
where exclusion is tied to notions of discrimination;
and a monopoly paradigm, dominant in Western
Europe, in which exclusion is associated with group
monopoly formation.
Different interpretations reflect different national
traditions and debates, but also, as Evans makes
clear in this volume, different fiscal systems and
institutional frameworks. For example, in France,
the term was popularised by Lenoir (1974), to
describe groups who fell through the insurance-
based social safety-net: as the title of his book, 'Les
Exclus: Un Français sur Dix' makes clear, as many
as one French person in ten fell through the net. In
Britain, social assistance is differently structured,
with less dependence on formal insurance, and few
are 'excluded' from help in the French sense; never-
theless, social exclusion is frequently identified as a
phenomenon linked to multiple deprivation
(Walker and Walker 1997).
In principle, it is right that national debates should
evolve in ways which reflect local realities. We
should note Harwin and Fajth's point (in this vol-
ume), however, that different definitions lead to dif-
ferent policies, and that adjudicating between the
paradigms may circumscribe policy choices. For
example, policy drawn from the solidarity paradigm
is likely to emphasise the integrative role of the
state; whereas that drawn from a monopoly para-
digm will emphasise policies which help individu-
als to access markets. In the end, it is important to
remember that Silver's paradigms are heuristic
devices: ways of looking at reality, rather than real-
ity itself.
More seriously perhaps, there are risks in using one
term, 'social exclusion', to cover a wide diversity of
ideas. The IlLS project on social exclusion in devel-
oping countries exemplifies the problem. Is social
inclusion an end in itself or a means to poverty
reduction? And is it a state (of multiple deprivation)
or a process (by which deprivation occurs)? In the
studies summarised by de Haan, the term is used in
all these ways. In the articles here, many authors
struggle with the same problem. Is participation an
end or a means (Gaventa)? Is a job an end or a
means (Robinson)? Is health an end or a means
(Wilkinson)? And does it matter if it is both?
Evans argues forcibly for clarity in the use of
definitions:
it is wrong to extrapolate ... to a position where
[social exclusion[ can mean anything to any-
one. Social exclusion' must include a definition
of at least the group and the reason for or the
process of their exclusion. In the wider sense, it
must refer to a group of people with different
profiles of exclusion, which must be made
explicit.
Quite so, but as yet there is no consensus around a
single definition. Perhaps the most we can ask is
that definitions be made explicit. For us, the defin-
ition at the beginning of this section will stand, giv-
ing particular emphasis to process issues. Beyond
that, we believe that we need to be eclectic and
include the various dimensions and processes of
exclusion: for practical purposes, Silver's three par-
adigms are not mutually exclusive.
To be specific, the key arenas for exclusion will be
those referred to by Evans (citing Commins 1993):
democratic and legal systems; markets, particularly
Table 1: Arenas and elements of social exclusion
Source: de Haan
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the labour market; welfare state provision; and
family and community In Table 1, we present these
under the headings of rights, resources, and rela-
tionships. The main dimensions of social exclusion
will be different in each society For example, one of
the central issues in former communist countries, as
well as welfare states, is exclusion from state provi-
sion. In India, by contrast, exclusion from markets
for labour, land or credit is a much more important
dimension of social exclusion. In fast-growing
economies of East Asia, exclusion from civic and
democratic rights - including trade union organisa-
tions as in South Korea - may be more salient
aspects.
In practice, of course, exclusion in different arenas
will overlap. Thus, the poor in India are likely to be
denied essential rights, such as access to courts;
they will have less access to labour and product
markets; and they will also suffer from lack of fam-
ily support and wider networks. All these aspects of
multiple deprivation are bound up with the actions
of élites, such as dominant landlords that control
voting, or class justice in courts. Exclusion from
markets is often related to geographical location,
but also to discrimination on grounds of gender,
caste and/or ethnicity Similarly, gendered values
may determine the exclusion of poor women from
family support.
Key arenas Elements
Rights human
lega]Icivic
democratic
Resources human and social capital
labour markets
product markets
state provision
common property resources
Relationships family networks
wider support networks
voluntary organisations
3 Is There Value-Added?4
An important question for students of poverty in
developing countries remains whether 'social exclu-
sion' adds anything to the debate? The answer to
this question is not straightforward, because
'poverty' itself is a contested term, subject to many
different definitions and interpretations. As Baulch
noted, in an earlier IDS Bulletin on the subject,
poverty is 'a portmanteau term which has different
meanings to different people' (Baulch 1996: 2).
For some, 'poverty' is simply about levels of
income; to others, it is about much wider concepts,
like security, autonomy and self-esteem (Baulch
1996, Shaffer 1996). The term 'well-being' is often
used by those in the latter camp (Chambers 1997).
The different possible components of 'poverty' have
been summarised in the pyramid in Figure 1, which
enlarges the definition in successive stages from pri-
vate consumption (PC) at one extreme, to a multi-
component definition at the other, which includes
private consumption, but also access to common
property resources (CPR), state-provided commodi-
ties (SPC), the ownership of assets to protect against
destitution, dignity, and autonomy Some would
want to add participation to this list.
A caricature would be to say that the World Bank
has adopted a definition of poverty which is close to
the top of the pyramid, and that UNDP, particularly
through its work on human development (e.g.
UNDP 1997), has adopted a definition close to the
bottom. 'Poverty' versus 'human development' is a
Figure 1: Dimensions of Poverty
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3
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6
Source:Baulch (1996): 2
This section draws largely from Maxwell (1997).
PC + CPR
PC + CPR + SPC
PC + CPR + SPC + Assets
PC + CPR + SPC + Assets + Dignity
PC + CPR + SPC + Assets + Dignity + Autonomy
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nice polemic and provides a good basis for product
differentiation (Askwith 1994). However, it is an
over-simplification. Certainly, even economists pri-
marily concerned with income and consumption
would recognise the importance of consumption
derived from common property resources or pro-
vided by the state (line 3 in the pyramid). Most
would also acknowledge the contribution of the
other factors listed.
In any case, the World Bank does not consist only
of economists. A recent review of World Bank
poverty assessments in Africa (Hanmer et aI. 1996:
2.4ff) makes the point that a narrow income defin-
ition is provided in the World Bank operational
directive on poverty but goes on to identify the
many poverty assessments in which the multi-
dimensional nature of poverty is emphasised. In
the poverty assessment for Benin, for example,
poverty is described as 'a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon which cannot easily be reduced to a few
quantitative indicators' (ibid). Similarcomments are
made in the poverty assessments for Mali, Uganda,
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Cameroon. As suggested by
de Haan in this volume, the 'poverty profiles' or
analysis of 'correlates of poverty' found in World
Bank poverty assessments are different only in
emphasis from a human development or social
exclusion approach.
There is thus close to an intellectual consensus that
narrow income and consumption measures of
poverty are inadequate, and that a wider vision is
needed. For example, the DAC statement on
'Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of
Development Cooperation' states that 'we agree
with the 1995 G7 Summit at Halifax that a higher
quality of life for all people is the goal of sustainable
development. A higher quality of life means that
people will attain increased power over their own
future' (DAC 1996: 8, emphasis added).
The new consensus has taken hold thanks to the
wide dissemination of documents like UNDP's
Human Development Report, and of the work on
human capabilities (Sen 1985) on which it is partly
based. The new consensus also draws on participa-
tory research with poor people themselves, who
forcefully express their own desires for security,
social participation and autonomy (Chambers
1997). The fact that the poor themselves think and
act in this way provides the strongest justification
for adopting the new poverty thinking.
On this evidence, social exclusion and the new
poverty thinking overlap almost completely when it
comes to describing poverty A different question is
whether they overlap in terms of explanation.
As Maxwell remarks in his article, the theoretical
space which deals with this question in develop-
ment studies is 'already full, and getting fuller', with
theories ranging across history; from the classical
political economy of Smith and Ricardo, to the
recent concern with the development 'impasse' and
a post-impasse development theory (Schuurman
1993). In this rich brew, we can find explanations
of poverty which include the psychological, envi-
ronmental, social, economic and political. Many
would argue that the central processes of social and
institutional exclusion are already present in exist-
ing development theory Maxwell argues as much in
making the case for a development studies that
crosses NorthSouth boundaries. It would be brave
indeed to argue that development studies has not been
centrally concerned with market access, social capital,
and the other exclusion processes listed in Table 1.
So why, then, do we need the concept of social
exclusion? Our existing concepts of poverty are
broad enough to encompass the multi-dimensional
concerns of the social exclusion school; and our
explanations of poverty certainly cover much of the
same territory. Where is the value-added? We have
three answers to the question.
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First, some weight must be given to the argument of
IlLS (1996), that social exclusion paradigms offer
an integrating framework, which puts institutional
processes at the heart of the poverty debate. As
argued by Rodgers, the initiator of work on social
exclusion at IlLS (in Gore and Figueiredo 1997),
the framework helps to focus on the institutions
and actors involved in the processes that cause
deprivation. It thus has immediate implications for
policy
Second, the 're-discovery' of poverty in the North
offers new opportunities to put traditional concerns
onto the international agenda. Thus, at a recent
meeting at ILO, it was argued that a social exclusion
notion that embodies social justice could be a very
useful instrument for rejuvenating the Organisa-
tion's central concerns (Figueiredo and de Haan
(eds) forthcoming).
Third, and most important, we see enormous
potential in the opportunity for a new dialogue
between North and South. The 'discovery' of social
exclusion in the North opens new opportunities for
analysis of what Maxwell describes as 'comparisons,
convergence and connections' between North and
South.
4 Social Exclusion in the North
Many researchers on the South are reluctant to
make comparisons with the North, and for good
reason. Despite growing heterogeneity among
developing countries and some signs of conver-
gence between the North and parts of the South
(Maxwell), the particularities of place and history
remain important, so that lessons can rarely be
transferred directly Nevertheless, it would be fool-
ish to deny the possibility of learning across geo-
graphical boundaries, and the articles here show
just how fruitful and stimulating the exercise can
be. We have brought together papers from the
North on poverty, participation and social assis-
tance, and on food, and health and labour markets;
as well as work on poverty, especially child poverty;
in the former Soviet Union. There are some remark-
able findings, in five main areas.
First, the articles provide convincing evidence that
poverty, in its wider sense, is a serious and growing
problem in OECD countries. Maxwell provides
summary data, showing that relative poverty
increased in eight out of ten countries in the
European Union in the 1980s, and that in 1991-92,
child poverty in the United Kingdom affected one
child in three. Jarvis and Jenkins provide much
more detailed data on the UK, showing that 31 per
cent of the population experienced at least one spell
of poverty between 1990 and 1994. Lest any should
think that relative poverty is somehow unimpor-
tant, Dowler provides evidence for the UK of nutri-
ent deficiencies among low income households,
those with more than three children, or headed by
a lone parent. She concludes that those living on
income support are seriously at risk: claimants can-
not live adequately, healthily, on state benefits for
long periods, and neither can their children.
Outside Europe, similar findings are cited. Por the
former Soviet Union, Harwin and Fajth find that
mortality rates had increased in 15 out of 18 coun-
tries, and that child poverty rates had increased at
one and a half times the aggregate rate. Perhaps this
was not surprising during a period of decline. Even
for the United States, however, Gaventa talks of the
'South within the North': 'areas within inner cities and
vast rural areas where levels of poverty, unemployment,
relatively poor education, illiteracy, lack of health care,
provide similarities to certain parts of the South'.
A second set of findings is that income poverty in
the North is associated strongly with multiple
deprivation and, particularly, with lack of participa-
tion. Dowler makes the point about social disad-
vantage especially strongly:
Those who cannot afford to eat in ways accept-
able to society; who find food shopping a stress-
ful or potentially humiliating experience
because they might have insufficient money;
whose children cannot have a packed lunch
similar to their friends'; who do not call on oth-
ers to avoid having to accommodate return calls
- these are people excluded from the 'minimum
acceptable way of life'. Food is an expression of
who a person is and what they are worth, and
of their ability to provide their family basic
needs; it is also a focus for social exchange.
Food is, of course, a major contributor to health
and well-being. But it is not just health that is
compromised in food-poor households: social
behaviour is also at risk.
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Gaventa is on a similar track. He makes the point
that participation is an 'essential vehicle to enable
the excluded to act more effectively to address the
problems which they face - yet finds that, in the
USA, the level of participation is strongly and nega-
tively correlated with socio-economic status.
Growing inequality in the USA has undermined
political participation, and raised doubts about the
health of civil society (Putnam 1995).
Third, there is evidence in these papers which
closely mirrors the findings of development studies
about the importance of transient poverty The
French discussion has discovered précarité
(Paugam 1995), a concept closely allied to the con-
cept of vulnerability much used in development
studies (Chambers 1989). In the UK, Jarvis and
Jenkins, in particular, have careful statistical analy-
sis to show that large numbers of people move in
and out of poverty Over four waves of a national
household panel survey only 4 per cent of people
were persistently poor, but nearly a third of the
sample was touched by low income at least once. In
fact, the figures underestimate the extent of tran-
sient poverty, since interviews were annual and
there could be periods of poverty for some house-
holds between interviews. In the UK context,
unemployment is a key determinant of poverty
Jarvis and Jenkins conclude that policies to increase
the tenure and quality of labour market attachment
are necessary to secure permanent escape from
poverty - where quality presumably means both
length of job and wage level.
A fourth point, and among the most surprising, is
that, independent of the level of income, inequality
is important. It prejudices participation as we have
seen. It has a major negative impact on health; and
it also appears to militate against growth. Wilkinson
summarises the evidence and shows that a sharp
mortality gradient between rich and poor
arises less from the direct effects of differences
in people's material circumstances than it does
from the psychosocial effects of those differ-
ences ... having control over one's work and
domestic circumstances, job security ... the
absence of long-term difficulties and threaten-
ing life events, the quality of parenting and lack
of family conflict early in life.
Wilkinson argues that chronic stress is probably the
key to understanding the psychosocial causality
between inequality and poor health, and finds sup-
port for this in animal studies. He goes on to
demonstrate that inequality in industrial societies is
also bad for growth, citing evidence that egalitarian
societies have faster growth, and claiming to iden-
tify a new economic orthodoxy which says that
equity is good for growth.
Finally, the policy implications of these findings res-
onate often, though not always, with debates in
developing countries. In some areas, we are entitled
to be sceptical. For example, Wilkinson himself
admits that his findings cannot be transferred
directly to developing countries, where infectious
diseases are the main cause of death and the epi-
demiological transition has yet to take place -
though this does not mean that chronic stress is not
a problem for the poor in the South. Similarly, the
preoccupation with formal sector jobs that runs
through several of the articles would not fit well in
countries with large informal and subsistence sec-
tors. Nevertheless, in other areas, there are impor-
tant connections to make. Robinson, for example,
draws our attention to the potentials and pitfalls of
'active labour market policies', designed to help
people find work. Gaventa discusses the value of
local economic initiatives, emphasising the role of
participation. Evans illustrates alternative routes to
reform of social welfare. Dowler shows the value of
food security analysis applied to an industrial country
In all these cases, there are stimulating comparisons
to be made with developing countries. This is not to
say that the lessons can be transferred directly,
because circumstances vary For example, Maxwell
argues for public works as a form of relief in devel-
oping countries, whereas Robinson rather scoffs at
the idea in the North. It turns out that their differ-
ence lies in whether or not relief works are 'useful',
in terms of creating assets and jobs for the future:
Maxwell, in the South, says they are, Robinson, in
the North, says riot. Both could be right, but the
comparison is fruitful. In the end, there has to be a
careful analysis of what lessons can be transferred.
Gaventa is one who attempts this, drawing eight
important lessons from the US experience for par-
ticipation policy in the South. Outside this volume,
IlLS have also explored policy issues, focusing on
rights, markets and civil society (IlLS 1996).
7
It should also be noted that lessons can be trans-
ferred both ways. Traditionally, exchanges were
mainly in the NorthSouth direction: for example,
India's social policies were framed along British tra-
ditions. But we now also witness attempts to repli-
cate policies and programmes from the South to the
North, most notably with attempts to introduce
Grameen-type credit programmes for the poor in
Europe and the USA. We believe that much more of
this should be attempted. What, for example, can
we learn in the North from the successes with
employment guarantee schemes in India or
Botswana? Or what can we learn from the East
Asian experience with its 'social question: the way
it prepared the whole population, including the
poor, for an internationally competitive market?
There is obviously more to learn about the social
exclusion debate. In particular, our contributions
do little to explore processes of exclusion. Many
contributions focus on one aspect of exclusion,
without exploring causality, for example: Dowler on
food, and Jarvis and Jenkins on income. Evans,
however, concentrates on welfare state entitlements,
and helps us to begin to understand how different
states - in France and in Britain - include and
exclude people.
Harwin and Fajth focus on the different welfare out-
comes following restructuring of education, health
and social security in former communist states, and
again illuminate exclusion processes. The
Caucasian economies have experienced the worst
economic decline, but indicators of 'social cohesion'
(including rates of divorce and suicide) have not
followed. On the other hand, the Western
Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic
regions did not experience a similar crisis, but the
incidence of divorce, suicide, sexually transmitted
diseases, and child abandonment increased much
more rapidly Poverty, in their view, cannot fully
explain the different responses in transition, and the
responses have been mediated by social norms such
as the greater importance of family networks and
distrust of the state in the Caucasian economies.
This framework could very well be extended with
empirical research on how communities in these
different countries respond to, for example, the cut-
ting of welfare entitlements.
There is also more work to do on the connections
between North and South, perhaps particularly in
the context of globalisation: Maxwell does no more
than scratch the surface here.
A final issue is the operationalisation of social exclu-
sion concepts. This responds to Evans's plea for
unambiguous profiles as well as Lipton's (1997) call
for more concrete measurement. If social exclusion
is defined in terms of multiple deprivation, then
measurement clearly has to cover health, housing,
family status, and all the other components of
human development. Indicators have to be speci-
fied, and, more difficult, procedures have to be
specified for aggregation. UNDP have struggled
with the problem in preparing various forms of the
human development and human deprivation index,
using data available internationally (UNDP 1997);
others (e.g. London Research Centre 1996, CESIS
1997) have developed locally-specific indicators,
especially of a non-monetary kind.
When social exclusion is defined in terms of
process, the factors listed in Table 1 come into play
De Haan (forthcoming) is one who has worked on
this, turning a taxonomy of processes into a check-
list of indicators. The indicators are likely to be loca-
tion-specific, but there is no reason in principle why
the concept of social exclusion cannot be made
operational.
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5 What Next?
Concepts travel quickly. A good example is the
notion of social capital that was popularised by
Putnam (1993) in his work on differences between
Northern and Southern Italy. Only a few years later,
it was introduced in the study of poverty in
Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett 1997) and subse-
quently in the 1997 World Development Report.
Something similar is happening with the concept of
social exclusion.
A question follows about unifying frameworks.
There is discussion in the articles of the scope for
'mono-economics', about whether a single frame of
analysis can be applied to North and South, and
about whether 'social exclusion' is a strong enough
vehicle to drive across the NorthSouth boundary
For now, we think this is not the issue. There is
great scope for collaboration, but these are still early
days. Poverty and social exclusion debates each
have distinguished pedigrees in North and South,
and each deal with tremendously important
particularities of history, culture, politics and insti-
tutions. Collaboration cannot be imposed, but must
be built, inductively, from the bottom up.
But this is an exciting agenda. There need to be
joint projects, we think, on specific themes: small-
scale credit, participation and participatory meth-
ods, social policy food policy and public works;
and, indeed, on the meaning and measurement of
poverty and social exclusion. Perhaps we do not
need IDS Bulletins with an entirely Northern
focus; but nor should we expect to find many in the
future which focus entirely on the South.
References
Askwith, M., 1994, Poverty reduction and sustainable
human development: semantics or substance?'
Discussion Paper No 345, Brighton: IDS
Baulch, B., 1996, 'The new poverty agenda: a disputed
consensus', editorial in IDS Bulletin Vol 27 No 1:
1-lo
Cannan, C., 1997, 'The struggle against social exclu-
sion: urban social development in France', IDS
Bulletin Vol 28 No 2: 77-85
CESIS, Centro de Estudos para la Intervençäo Social,
1997, 'Non-monetary indicators of poverty and
social exclusion', working paper presented at a sem-
inar in Lisbon, March 1997
Chambers, R., 1989, 'Vulnerability: how the poor
cope', editorial in IDS Bulletin Vol 20 No 2
Chambers, R., 1997, Whose Reality Counts?:
Putting the First Last, London: Intermediate
Technology Publications
DAC, 1996, Shaping the 21st Centrury: The
Contribution of Development Cooperation, Paris:
Development Assistance Committee, OECD, May
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions, 1995, Public Welfare
Services and Social Exclusion: The Development
of Consumer Oriented Initiatives in the
European Union, Dublin: The Foundation
Evans, M., Paugam, S., Prelis, JA., 1995, 'Chunnel
vision: poverty, social exclusion and the debate on
social welfare in France and Britain', London
School of Economics, Welfare State Programme,
Discussion Paper WSP 115
Figueiredo, J.B., and de Haan, A., (eds), forthcoming,
Sodal Exclusion: An ILO Perspective, Geneva: IlLS
Gore, C., and Figueiredo, J., (eds), 1997, Social
Exclusion and Anti-Poverty Policy: A Debate,
Geneva: IlLS
de Haan, A., forthcoming, 'Social exclusion in policy
and research: operationalising the concept' in J.B.
Figueiredo and A. de Haan, (eds), 1997, Social
Exclusion: An ILO Perspective, Geneva: IlLS
Hanmer, L., et al., 1996, Poverty in Sub-Saharan
Africa: What Can We Learn From the World
Bank's Poverty Assessments? The Hague:
Institute of Social Studies
IlLS, 1996, Social Exclusion and Anti-Poverty
Strategies: Research Project on the Patterns and
Causes of Social Exclusion and the Design of
Policies to Promote Integration: A Synthesis of
Findings, Geneva: IlLS
9
Jordan, B., 1996, A Theory of Poverty and Social
Exclusion, Oxford: Blackwell
Lenoir, R., 1974, Les Exclus: Un Français sur Dix,
Paris: Editions de Seuil
Lipton, M., 1997, 'Editorial: Poverty - are there holes
in the consensus', World Development Vol 25 No
7: 1003-7.
London Research Centre, 1996, The Capital Divided:
Mapping Poverty and Social Exclusion in
London, London: London Research Centre
Maxwell, 5., 1997, 'Poverty and human development:
what next?' Paper prepared for the 'Special Event on
Poverty Eradication' at the 1997 Annual Session of
the Executive Board, UNDP, New York, 19 May
Narayan, D., and Pritchett, L., 1997, 'Cents and socia-
bility: household income and social capital in
Tanzania', mimeo, Washington DC: World Bank
O'Brien, D,, Wilkes, J., de Haan, A. and Maxwell, S.,
1997, 'Poverty and social exclusion in North and
South, Working Paper No 55, Brighton: IDS
O'Brien, D., and de Haan, A., 1997, 'Deprivation in the
North and South: an annotated bibliography on
poverty and social exclusion', Development
Bibliography 15: Brighton: IDS
Paugam, S., 1995, 'The spiral of precariousness', in: G.
Room, (ed.) Beyond the Threshold: The
Measurement and Analysis of Social Exclusion,
University of Bristol: The Policy Press
Putnam, D., 1993, Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy, Chichester: Princeton
University Press
Putnam, D., 1995, 'Bowling alone: America declining
social capital' in Journal of Democracy Vol 6 No.1
Shaffer, P., 1996, 'Beneath the poverty debate: some
issues', IDS Bulletin Vol 27 No 1
Schuurman, E J., 1993, Beyond the Impasse: New
Directions in Development Theory, London and
New York: Zed Books
Sen, A., 1985, Commodities and Capabilities, The
Netherlands: Elsevier
Silver, H., 1994, 'Social exclusion and social solidarity:
three paradigms', Geneva: IlLS Discussion Paper No 69
UNDI 1997, Human Development Report 1997,
New York: UNDP
Walker, A., and Walker, C., 1997, Britain Divided:
The Growth of Social Exclusion in the 1980s and
1990s, London: Child Poverty Action Group
World Bank, 1997, World Development Report
1997, Washington DC: World Bank
Volume 48 | Number 1A | October 2017
Transforming Development Knowledge
HAS UNIVERSAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
COME OF AGE?
Editor Richard Longhurst
Vol. 48 No. 1A October 2017: ‘Has Universal Development Come of Age?’
Contents
Introduction: Universal Development – Research and Practice
Richard Longhurst  Article first published October 2017, IDSB48.1A
Editorial: Britain: A Case for Development?
Richard Jolly and Robin Luckham Article first published December 1977, IDSB9.2
Back to the Ivory Tower? The Professionalisation of Development Studies and their 
Extension to Europe
Dudley Seers Article first published December 1977, IDSB9.2
Redistribution with Sloth – Britain’s Problem?
Richard Jolly Article first published December 1977, IDSB9.2
Keynes, Seers and Economic Development 
H.W. Singer Article first published July 1989, IDSB20.3
Poverty and Social Exclusion in North and South
Arjan de Haan and Simon Maxwell Article first published January 1998, IDSB29.1
Comparisons, Convergence and Connections: Development Studies in North and South
Simon Maxwell Article first published January 1998, IDSB29.1
Poverty, Participation and Social Exclusion in North and South
John Gaventa Article first published January 1998, IDSB29.1
Introduction: New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics of Institutionalised 
Participation
Andrea Cornwall Article first published April 2004, IDSB35.2
Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Issues from a Study of Public 
Participation in Two English Cities
Marian Barnes, Helen Sullivan, Andrew Knops and Janet Newman 
 Article first published April 2004, IDSB35.2
Development Research: Globalised, Connected and Accountable
Lawrence Haddad  Article first published March 2007, IDSB38.2
Maxwell Comparisons, Convergence and Connections: Development Studies in North and South 
DOI: 10.19088/1968-2017.142 bulletin.ids.ac.uk
o a'
onver ence
an
onnectio
Development Sudies
in North and South
Simon Maxwell
IDS Bulletin Vol 29 No 1 1998
20
1. Introduction1
My mission is to explore the issues of poverty and
social exclusion across the boundary between
developed and developing countries. Put briskly,
the thesis is that increasing attention to poverty and
social exclusion (PSE) in the North opens the pos-
sibility of fertile dialogue between North and
South, on three questions of successively greater
depth. First, are there new comparisons, or lessons
to be drawn across geographical boundaries, about
the characteristics, causes and remedies of PSE?
Second, does the rapid increase in PSE in the North
signal a new convergence between North and
South? And third, are there theories to hand which
will expose connections between PSE in North and
South? The thesis is that the answer to each of
these questions is 'yes': there are then exciting pos-
sibilities for a new 'mono-economics'2, in which the
boundaries of development studies begin to dis-
solve. Perhaps the Third World really is no more
than a 'collective psychological delusion' Or does
globalisation now mean that we are all developing
countries?
The extent of PSE in the South needs no rehearsal
here. Widespread poverty persists in developing
countries, despite rapid income growth in some,
and rapid improvement of social indicators in
many (World Bank 1990, UNDP 1990, 1997):
according to World Bank data, 1.3 billion people
lived on less than US 1 per day in 1993, equiva-
lent to 30 per cent of the population of the devel-
oping world. Poverty within developing countries,
characterised by low income, but also by power-
lessness and vulnerability, is often reported as a
form of social exclusion (Chambers 1995; Shaffer
1996; ILO 1996; Gore and Figuereido 1997;
UNDP 1997). And the growing disparities between
rich and poor countries, associated with greater
heterogeneity in the developing world, can them-
selves be seen as a form of social exclusion on the
I am grateful to colleagues who provided comments on
the draft of this paper: Arjan de Haan, Stephen
Devereux, Walter Elkan, John Toye, Adrian Wood.
Responsibility is mine.
Z Hirschman (1981), cited by Lai (1983): 7
Toye (1987b): 5, citing the views of 'development
counter-revolutionaries'.
Z This is at 1985 purchasing power parity
international scale: Africa, in particular, is fre-
quently represented as a continent excluded from
the world economy (Berge et al. 1994).
What appears to be new is increasing poverty and
social exclusion in OECD countries, associated with
rising inequality, falling political participation, and
the rapid growth (allegedly) of a poorly-educated
and unemployed underclass. There is a growing lit-
erature (Silver 1994; Evans et al. 1995; Rodgers et
al. 1995; Walker and Walker (eds) 1997). Figure 1
provides information for the UK on inequality,
poverty and mortality, illustrating the growth of
poverty and inequality, and the marked association
between poverty, low class status, and high mortal-
ity Figure 2 provides comparative data on poverty
in the 1980s for the countries of the European
Union, showing an increase in poverty in 8 of 10
countries. There is much other evidence, from Europe
and North America, for example on differentials in
health status (Wilkinson 1996 and in this volume), or
food poverty and malnutrition (Riches (ed) 1997;
Kohler et al. (eds) 1997; Dowler in this volume).
The figures for rich countries need to be kept in
proportion, of course. Whereas poverty lines for
poor countries are usually fixed in absolute terms,
based on minimum needs, those for rich countries
are normally fixed in relative terms, at half average
income or similar. Thus, for developing countries,
the World Bank 1990 uses a figure of SUS 1 per day
per capita as a poverty line, calculated in 1985 pur-
chasing power parity prices. By contrast, in the UK,
a poverty line set at 50 per cent of average income
can mean around $US 17 per person per day, not
adjusted for purchasing power parity (Oppenheim
and Harker 1996: 33), clearly a very different fig-
ure. This is not to deny real hardship among the
poor in the North, but rather to make the additional
point that poverty is often understood in relative,
social terms: in Townsend's well-known wording,
as the 'lack loll the resources to obtain the types of
diet, participate in the activities and have the living
conditions and amenities which are customary, or at
least widely encouraged and/or approved, in the
societies to which they belong' (Townsend 1979,
italics added).
These ideas have become pervasive. As Dowler,
among others, makes clear in this volume, the
debate in the North is not just concerned with
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material well-being; it is equally focused on partici-
pation, autonomy and self-respect, classic parame-
ters of social exclusion. Indeed, Wilkinson makes
an explicit link between social exclusionlïnclusion
and material well-being. As he argues in this vol-
ume, relative deprivation has material conse-
quences: inequality is associated with higher
morbidity and mortality, irrespective of income
level. The causal path, he suggests, is psycho-social:
the powerlessness associated with inequality has
direct health effects.
2 Comparisons
We will come below to the question of whether dif-
ferences between North and South in the money
equivalent of incomes accruing to the poor invali-
date the search for convergence or connections.
Whether they do or not, there are suggestive com-
parisons to be made, deriving on the one hand from
differences in the discourse about PSE, and on the
other from differences in the orientation of pro-
grammes to reduce PSE.
Take the discourse first. As far as developing coun-
tries are concerned, there has been a well-publi-
cised dialectic between income-consumption
poverty and a wider human development perspec-
tive, incorporating features of social exclusion
(Shaffer 1996). The former has been associated with
the World Bank (1990), with its familiar three-
pronged strategy of labour-intensive growth,
human resource development, and publicly-pro-
vided safety nets. The latter has been associated
with UNDP (1990), which emphasises empower-
ment and participation, as well as income. In truth,
these two visions were never as far apart as some-
times claimed (Askwith 1994). Over time, they
have come closer together, with the Bank recognis-
ing the multi-dimensional nature of poverty
(Hanmer et al. 1996), and UNDP the importance of
growth (UNDP 1997). The common discourse has
come to incorporate other elements of well-being
and human development, particularly peace, good
governance and participation, as ends and not just
as means to the reduction of PSE. There has also
been a shift away from the notion of jobs', towards
the notïon of 'livelihood', with more attention to
self-employment, and to the diversity of poor peo-
ple's livelihood strategies (Davies 1996, Chambers
1997).
% 35
30
25
20
'5
10
o I I
I I
1979 1988-89
% of total population in poverty
children in poverty
1991-92
1500
1200
900
600
300
o
=1 I I I I I
li IV VI Lone
Sweden
England and Wales
4 5 ( 7 8 9 nchesi
tenth
% 80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
o
-li.)
-20 - poor st tenth
Source: 1994, Households Below Average Income:
A Statistical Analysis 1979-1991/2, London: HMSO
C: Poverty is rising: percentage below half
average (mean) income, adjusted for household
size, after housing costs
Source: 1994, Households Below Average Income:
A Statistical Analysis 1979-1991/2, London: HMSO
Figure 1: Poverty and inequality in the UK
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In developed countries, unemployment has been
seen as the main correlate of PSE, compounded by
factors such as age, race, gender, lone parenthood,
or migration status (Walker and Walker (eds)
1997). Education has been seen as the key to reduc-
ing unemployment; and reform of social security as
a route both to reduction of PSE and to building
stronger bridges from welfare to work. Most coun-
tries have adopted 'active labour market policies,
for example involving training (Robinson 1996).
And some have pioneered new forms of social pro-
gramme explicitly designed to increase the partici-
pation in society of the socially excluded: the
French programme, Revenu Minimum d'insertion
created in 1988, is a frequently-cited example, in
which benefits can be provided in return for partic-
ipation in community projects; more generally in
France, a multi-agency urban regeneration pro-
gramme, the Développement Social de Quartiers
(DSQ), is specifically intended to assist in the rein-
tegration of disadvantaged neighbourhoods
(Cannan 1997).
There are both similarities and differences in these
approaches. Education, skill-acquisition and
growth are common to both. Many developing
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countries also pursue active labour-market policies,
for example India, which has a programme of train-
ing youth for self-employment (TRYSEM). Similarly,
community development programmes emphasising
participation are found in both types of country
(see Gaventa, in this volume). The differences are
instructive, however. Are there not lessons for
developed countries in the developing country
emphasis on secure and sustainable livelihoods,
rather than jobs? And in the emphasis on the
labour-intensity of growth, with all that implies for
the incentive and regulatory framework and for tax
policy? Similarly, can developing countries learn
from social security reform in the North, particu-
larly the apparent unsustainability of fiscal cost and
the move to private insurance?
When it comes to the detail of programmes, there
are many comparisons to be made. Two examples
are the attractiveness of workfare and the design of
food interventions. Why is it that progressive ana-
lysts in the South regard work in return for welfare
as morally acceptable and economically productive
(Ravallion 1990; Von Braun et al. 1992), whereas
those in the North often see it as morally degrading
and economically useless (Robinson 1996)? Are
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there lessons that can be transferred from South to
North? For example, the Southern debate focuses
much more than the Northern on the longer term
benefits of employment schemes: public works are
valuable not just because they provide short-term
jobs, and thereby foster social inclusion, but also
because they create assets, like roads, forests, or irri-
gation ponds, that generate livelihoods and incomes
into the future. Unemployment or famine relief in
the North has certainly followed this route in the
past: think of the roads built during the potato
famine in Ireland. I-las the lesson been forgotten?
By the same token, policy initiatives in the North
about how to remedy food poverty seem sterile by
comparison with those in the South: overly preoc-
cupied with small-scale, local initiatives, nutrition
education and the like, too little concerned with
macro-economic issues, national food pricing, and
the geographical distribution of shops. The need
for a broader perspective is well-known - Dowler
makes the point eloquently here, and others have
done so too (e.g. Leather 1996). However, a recent
British review (Low Income Project Team 1996) was
specifically debarred from examining wider issues:
Leather (ibid) describes it as having been 'gagged.
This is a pity, for certainly, there are policies in the
Southern tool box that could be considered in the
North: subsidies on inferior commodities, supple-
mentary feeding programmes, food stamps, even
food hand-outs (World Bank 1986, Pinstrup-
Andersen 1988). It is worth making the point, too,
that analysis of food insecurity in the South has
attached great importance to the cultural and social
roles of food, emphasising autonomy, self-determi-
nation, cultural appropriateness, and other terms
redolent of the social exclusion debate5.
The point here is not to pretend that analysis and
policy for one country can be read off directly from
another, even within the broad groupings of North
and South. It is simply to demonstrate that oppor-
tunities are missed to compare and contrast. A
good, recent example was the World Food Summit,
held in November 1996 (FAO 1996), which con-
centrated almost entirely on third world hunger,
and missed precisely the opportunities suggested
here.
For a review of food security concepts, see Maxwell
(1996).
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3 Convergence
The North is rich, the South is poor. GNP per capïta
in the UK is over 40 times that of Ethiopia, even on
the basis of purchasing power parity (UNDP 1997).
The poverty line in the UK, as we have seen, is 17
times the poverty line established by the World
Bank for developing countries. How, then, can it be
possible to talk of convergence between North and
South?
The argument rests not on levels of living, so much
as on the economic, political and social characteris-
tics of different groups of countries; and on the
tools of analysis deployed to study them.
The argument about the differences between North
and South, both the features and tools of analysis,
occupies well-trodden and much-loved territory,
which goes to the heart of whether 'development
studies, or more often 'development economics' is
a legitimate area of professional endeavour. Do we
believe, with Seers (1963), Sen (1983), or Meier
(1989), that developing countries are qualitatively
different, and therefore worthy of an independent
discipline? Or do we follow Lal (1983), Krueger
(1986) and others, in arguing that differences are
merely quantitative, and should not preclude simi-
larities in theory or analytical method?
A starting point for the discussion is Dudley Seers'
classic 1963 paper The Limitations of the Special
Case, which effectively launched the discipline of
development economics. Seers helpfully provided a
checklist of 20 features, which distinguished a small
group of developed countries from others, and
marked them out as a 'special case': development
economics was concerned wïth the rest. The list is
reproduced in the Appendix. From the perspective
of the late 1990s, it has a distinctly dated feel.
Partly, this is because of growing heterogeneity
among developing countries, and the fact that many
have either graduated or are about to do so. It can
hardly be said of the Asian tigers, for example, or of
the middle-income countries of Latin America, that
they lack entrepreneurship, skilled professionals, or
a sector exporting manufactures. But more gener-
ally, there has been movement in both developed
and developing countries, which has brought them
closer together: free trade and deindustrialisation in
the North; population increase, urbanisation and
economic diversification in the South; these and
other factors have changed the world significantly
since 1963.
Take a few examples6. In 1960, manufacturing
accounted for around 30 per cent of GDP among
the high income economies, but for only 15 per
cent among low income economies. By the mid-
1990s, the figures had converged, falling to under a
quarter in high income economies, and rising to
around the same figure in low income economies -
and we should note here that the category of low
income economies excludes the newly industri-
alised countries (NICs) where manufacturing has
really taken off. Other changes follow from this
shift: greater similarity in the composition of
exports (75 per cent of India's exports are now
manufactures); a greater share of capital goods in
the imports of developed countries (now just under
40 per cent, the same figure as for developing coun-
tries); similarities in the level and composition of
investment (now higher in the North than the
South). Again, Seers's statement that rich countries
have no tendency to chronic trade deficits no longer
applies: high income economies had aggregate
trade deficits regularly after 1979, low income
economies had regular trade surpluses.
Other examples could be cited: the rise of literacy in
developing countries; their gradual shift away from
trade taxes to value-added tax and income tax; their
cultural homogenisation; and, on the other side, the
growing exposure of developed economies to the
vagaries of capital markets, their growing income
inequality, and their growing envy of others' living
standards. Of course, many developing countries,
particularly the poorest, remain predominantly
agrarian and dependent on exports of primary com-
modities. Even here, however, it is much harder to
argue than in 1963 (even if it could be argued then)
that there remain large amounts of unused land, or
that farmers are not responsive to price, or that
marketing of food is rare. Seers's list is really no
longer a good guide to what defines a developing
country.
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Have others done better? Seers himself had another
stab at the question in his writing on the European
periphery Here, he defined the problem as one of
structural change, for example the reduction of
regional inequalities (cited by Emmerij 1989). Sen
(1983) identified development problems in terms of
major strategic themes, such as capital accumula-
tion, industrialisation, unemployment, and plan-
ning, with the ultimate objective of increasing the
capabilities of poor people. In the 1980s, Meier
(1989:18), too, focused on structural problems
such as population growth, inequality, or lack of
political development. He laid particular emphasis
on managing the disequilibria associated with the
dynamics of structural change. bye (1987b) is
another who has addressed the question. While
emphasising the heterogeneity of developing coun-
tries, he nevertheless finds commonality in psycho-
logical and political factors, particularly the shared
experience of decolonisation.
All this is well and good, as far as it goes. But it
raises two problems. First, classification is obvi-
ously an endless game. Take any pair of societies or
countries, identify some differences between them,
isolate those which belong to the poorer country,
and call this the true territory of development. But
we could do this with Britain and Belgium, as easily
as with Britain and Belize; and anyway, the charac-
teristics change over time. Does the game bring us
any closer to a 'true' definition of a developing
country? I fear not, except, to paraphrase Ernest
Hemingway, that the difference between the poorer
countries and us is that they have less money
The second problem is that the list of features of
development studies will immediately be familiar
and seem relevant to many who work on so-called
developed countries. Do developed countries not
need to 'modernise'? Do they not face growing pains
associated with structural change in their
economies? Do they not struggle with market fail-
ure? If 'development studies', by induction, is what
students of development do, then many current
themes are relevant to both North and South:
restructuring the state; poverty reduction and liveli-
hood; political development and governance; gen-
der inequality; social capital; agency and
I am indebted to Edward Andersen for research World Bank's World Development Report, various years.
assistance on the data which follow. Data are from the
participation ... the list goes on - and of course
includes social exclusion
Of course, there are many particularities to the
analysis of development in particular places, and it
would be foolish to pretend that these do not mat-
ter: share-cropping, to take one example, is impor-
tant in Indian agriculture, but not in British.
Nevertheless, it does seem that the sharp bound-
aries between developed and developing countries
as groups are beginning to blur. In his later writing,
Seers himself recognised as much. In a Presidential
Address to the European Association of
Development Institutes in 1975, he talked about
development studies 'coming home' to underdevel-
oped Europe. But he also observed, in a comment
that resonates with the case I have been trying to
make, that 'attempting to deal with problems of the
Third World will end, if the history of economic
thought is any guide, by changing the attitude to
development in industrial economies, and therefore
the whole body of economic theory' (cited in Toye
198Va: 508).
Source: Lipton (1977)
Toye (1989) identifies the following features of
structuralism that became relevant to OECD countries in
the 1980s: structural bottlenecks, oervasive sources of
Figure 3: Ideologies and rural development
(1) Classical political economy (Adam Smith, Ricardo)
J. S. Mill Marx
(2) Neo-classical
(4) Theories of imperialism
(3) Theories
Lenin
(5) Soviet industrialisation debates
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4 Connections
Policy-makers need explanations before they can
intervene; and explanations usually involve theory
As the old saw has it, there is nothing so practical as
a good theory If PSE are current in both North and
South, and if there is at least some degree of con-
vergence between the two, then an intriguing possi-
bility arises: that common theories can be found
which will explain PSE across the North-South
divide.
My use of 'theories' in the plural is apposite, I hope.
Neo-classical neo-liberalism may be hegemonic, but
it is not universal. On the development side, at
least, the theoretical space is already full, and get-
ting fuller. Lipton (1977: 92) has produced one
map to the territory, in the context of rural devel-
opment. It is reproduced in Figure 3 and provides a
framework which relates neo-classical theory as
well as Marxist analysis back to the classical politi-
cal economy of Smith and Ricardo. We can add to
this, however. Hunt (1989) identifies six new para-
digms of development post-1940, which she
RuskinN
(7) Populism
(6) Stage theories
of capitalism
inefficiency in production, wage bargaining systems,
non-competitive pricing rules, supply side bottlenecks.
identifies as follows, with the key proponents in
brackets:
A paradigm of the expanding capitalist nucleus
(Lewis, Rostow, Ranis/Fei);
A structuralist paradigm (Furtado, Prebisch,
Seers);
A neo-Marxist paradigm (Baran, Gunder
Frank, Amin);
A dependency paradigm (Sunkel, Furtado,
Cardoso);
(y) A Maoist paradigm;
(vi) A basic needs paradigm (Singer, Streeten,
Stewart)
There's more. A further stream of thinking has been
concerned with the 'impasse' in development the-
ory and with possible new avenues. This territory is
mapped by Schuurman (1993). To Hunt's list, he
adds the Regulation School of Lipietz and Aglietta,
the actor-oriented approach of Long, and a school
of post-imperialism associated with Becker and
Sklar. He identifies diversity and inequality, univer-
salism and specificity determinism and volun-
tarism, as marking out 'the narrow path of
post-impasse development theory', and concludes
that
the point is not to strive for one grand and glo-
rious metatheory per se, but rather to stress that
a lot of ground has already been covered, but
that the plots remain rather isolated . . The
construction of a post-impasse development
theory on a non-reductionist and non-teleolog-
ical basis is the challenge of the 1990s.
(ibid: 32)
As an avowed post-modernist (Maxwell 1996), 1
share Schuurman's scepticism of meta-theory Two
or three points are worth making, however.
First, growing PSE in the North ought to change the
terms of debate, or what Schuurman, following
Buttel and McMichael, calls the 'explanandum', that
which needs to be explained. The heterogeneity of
the so-called Third World already puts obstacles in
the way of theories which try to explain the experi-
ence of under-development across the board; and
Schuurman and his collaborators find themselves
arguing over whether 'diversity' or 'inequality'
would be more appropriate as terms to describe the
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dïversity they observe. Whichever is chosen, diver-
sity should stretch to include the fact of poverty and
social exclusion in the North.
Second, it is clear that the existence of PSE in the
North helps to discriminate between the multitude
of development theories on offer. In particular, it
casts serious doubt on linear theories of progress
associated with modernisation theory and particu-
larly with what Lipton in Figure 3 describes as Stage
Theories.
Third, globalisation offers new challenges to theory
- and to the distinction between developed and
developing countries. Seers, again, spotted this,
pointing to 'forces at work within the international
economy which made a tripartite division of the
world increasingly misleading' (cited by Jolly 1989:
39). More recently UNDP have emphasised that the
winners and losers straddle the NorthSouth
divide:
With the expansion of trade and foreign invest-
ment, developing countries have seen the gaps
among themselves widen. Meanwhile, in many
industrial countries unemployment has soared
to levels not seen since the 1930s, and income
inequality to levels not recorded since the last
century. A rising tide of wealth is supposed to
lift all boats . . . the yachts and ocean liners are
indeed rising in response to new opportunities,
but the rafts and rowboats are taking on water
- and some are sinking fast (UNDP 1997: 82).
Globalisation is not in itself a theory or a paradigm,
but it does change the context within which theory
must work. In particular, it is associated with rapid
technical change, an apparent shift in unskilled jobs
from North to South, and a marked growth in the
size and reach of transnational corporations.
Different theories are propounded as to the motor
of globalisation. Some (e.g. Wood 1996a,b) cite
orthodox trade theory, and see the shift of jobs as
being explained by the comparative advantage of
poorer countries in the supply of unskilled labour.
Others cite technical change, particularly comput-
erisation and the fall in communication costs,
which enable production to be more flexible and to
take place further from the market (Economist
1996). Still others cite tendencies to accumulation
in the world economy (Murray in O'Brien et al.
f997). Probably, there is some truth in all of these:
they are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, this point can be generalised: eclecticism
could be the key to understanding poverty and
social exclusion in North and South. Poverty and
social exclusion are not themselves homogeneous
phenomena. The poverty experienced by a small-
scale pastoralist in semi-arid Tanzania is not of the
same character, and does not have the same causes,
as that experienced by a landless family in a cash-
cropping area of the same country, let alone that
experienced by people carrying similar labels in
other countries, or by those carrying different labels
altogether. Multiple realities need multiple theories
- across the NorthSouth boundary
5 Conclusion
I have argued that the increase in poverty and social
exclusion in the North offers new possibilities to
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learn lessons across the NorthSouth boundary;
that it actually blurs the boundary; and that it chal-
lenges theory. Where does this leave researchers and
policy-makers concerned with poverty and social
exclusion?
There is one route I think we should not take,
which is that each of us should try to merge all our
work into one, covering North and South. The
world is too big, and the intellectual complexity too
great. Instead, people who specialise on the North
or South will continue to do so, but should make
new efforts to learn from each other, to explore
common problems brought on by convergence, and
perhaps to develop new theory together. The best
place to start might be with specific topics, like
public works, food policy or participation - indeed,
with the meaning and measurement of terms like
'poverty' and 'social exclusion'. This will enable col-
laboration to be built inductively, from the
bottom-up.
Appendix: Characteristic features of the special case
I. Factors of Production
Labour Literate and mobile, mostly in employment; highly organised; racial, religious and linguistic differ-
ences not sufficiently important to break up the labour supply; substantial quantities of skilled and professional
workers.
Land. Most available land cultivated, and by private owners (or farmers with secure leaseholds) in plots of
economic size
Capital. All sectors heavily capitalised, with spare capacity; integrated and comprehensive systems of trans-
port and power.
Enterprise. A wide field from which entrepreneurs can be drawn, and a favourable climate for enterprise; firm
legal basis for corporations.
II. Sectors of the Economy
Agriculture. Wholly commercial, and flexible in response to price changes or technical advances; foreign own-
ership rare; extensive marketing network for foods.
Mining. Of limited size and in the hands of local firms.
Manufacturing. Diversified, with a large metal-using industry producing (inter alia) machinery and vehicles;
some areas of competition.
d. Overall. Manufacturing much larger than either agriculture or mining; natural resources adequately surveyed.
III. Public Finance
Revenue. Strong reliance on direct taxes relative to import or export duties; tax laws enforceable.
Expenditure. Includes big outlays on social security and agricultural subsidies, relatively little on public works.
IV Foreign Trade
Exports. Consist of several products for which there is a large internal market; and for which price and income
elasticities are fairly high; export prices determined by local costs and stable; exports sold to many countries.
Imports. Consist largely of primary products (some of which are also produced domestically) which come
from many countries, and for which the income elasticity of demand is not high.
Capital. Long-term capital flows and profit remittances of secondary importance.
V Households
Income. Distribution moderately equal (post-tax); very few living at subsistence leveL
Expenditure. Food not overwhelmingly important; standardisation and mass production possible, because of
equal distribution of income, national promotion and homogeneity of tastes; prestige of local manufactures high.
VI. Savings and Investment
Savings. Mobilised by a capital market, comprising a stock exchange, a bond market and an extensive nation-
ally owned banking system, with a central bank and a managed currency; personal savings significant.
Investment. High (probably over 20 per cent of G.D.P.); but import content low
VII. Dynamic Influences
Trade. No chronic tendency to deficit because of income elasticities (see above).
Population. Growth of population slow (less than 2 per cent a year), and urbanisation relatively moderate.
Aspirations. Envy of foreign living standards not high or spreading as a cause of discontent.
Source: Seers 1963
29
References
Askwith, M., 1994, 'Poverty reduction and sustain-
able human development: semantics or sub-
stance?', IDS Discussion Paper No 345,
Brighton: IDS
Berge, K., et al., 1994, 'Trade and development
strategy options for the poorest countries: a pre-
liminary investigation', IDS Working Paper No
12, Brighton: IDS
Cannan, C., 1997, 'The struggle against social
exclusion: urban social development in France',
IDS Bulletin Vol 28 No 2
Chambers, R., 1995, 'Poverty and livelihoods:
whose reality counts?', IDS Discussion Paper
No 347, Brighton: IDS
Chambers, R., 1997, Whose Reality Counts?
Putting the First Last, London: IT Publications
Commission on Social Justice, 1994, Social
Justice: Strategies for National Renewal,
Report of the Social Justice Commission,
London: Vintage
Davies, S., 1996, Adaptable Livelihoods: Coping
with Food Insecurity in the Malian Sahel,
London: Macmillan
Economist, 1996, 'The hitchhiker's guide to cyber-
nomics', Survey of the World Economy, The
Economist, 28 September
Emmerij, L., 1989, 'Has Europe fallen out of love
with the rest of the world?', IDS Bulletin Vol 20
No 3
Evans, M., Paugam, S. and Prelis, JA., 1995,
Chunnel Vision: Poverty, Social Exclusion
and the Debate on Social Welfare in France
and Britain, Welfare State Programme
FAO, 1996, Rome Declaration on World Food
Security and World Food Summit Plan of
Action, Rome: FAO
Gore, C., and Figeuiredo, J.B. (eds), 1997, 'Social
exclusion and anti-poverty policy: a debate',
Research Series No 110, Geneva: International
Institute for Labour Studies and United Nations
Development Programme
Hanmer, L., et al., 1996, Poverty in sub-Saharan
Africa: What Can We Learn from the World
Bank's Poverty Assessments?, The Hague:
Institute of Social Studies
Hirschman. A.O., 1981, Essays in Trespassing -
Economics to Politics to Beyond, Cambridge
Hunt, D., 1989, Economic Theories of
Development: An Analysis of Competing
30
Paradigms, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester
Wheatsheaf
ILO, 1996, Social Exclusion and Anti-poverty
Strategies: A Synthesis of Findings, Geneva:
ILO
Jolly, R., 1989, 'Dudley Seers (1920-1983): his
contribution to development perspectives, policy
and studies' IDS Bulletin Vol 20 No 3
Kohler, B. M., Feichtinger, E., Barlosius, E. and
Dowler E., (eds), 1997, Poverty and Food in
Welfare Societies, Berlin: Sigma
Krueger, A., 1986, 'Aid in the development
process', World Bank Research Observer,
January
Lal, D., 1983, 'The poverty of development eco-
nomics', Hobart Paperback 16, London:
Institute of Economic Affairs
Leather, 5., 1996, 'The making of modem malnu-
trition: an overview of food poverty in the UK',
The Caroline Walker Lecture 1996, London: The
Caroline Walker Trust
Lipton, M., 1977, Why Poor People Stay Poor:
Urban Bias in World Development, London:
Temple Smith
Low Income Project Team, 1996, Low Income,
Food, Nutrition and Health: Strategies for
Improvement, Report from the Low Income
Project Team to the Nutrition Task Force to
Health of the Nation, London: Department of
Health, March
Maxwell, S., 1996, 'Food security: a post-modern
perspective', Food Policy Vol 21 No 2
Meier, G., 1989, 'Do development economists mat-
ter', IDS Bulletin Vol 20 No 3
O'Brien, D, Wilkes, J., de Haan, A., Maxwell, S.,
1997, 'Poverty and social exclusion in North and
South: report on a workshop held at the Institute
of Development Studies, University of Sussex,
28-29 April 1997', IDS Working Paper No 55,
Brighton: IDS
Oppenheim, C., and Harker, L., 1996, Poverty:
The Facts, 3rd Edition, London: Child Poverty
Action Group
Pinstrup-Andersen, P., (ed.), 1988, Food
Subsidies in Developing Countries: Costs,
Benefits and Policy Options, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP
Ravallion, M., 1990, 'Reaching the poor through
rural public employment: a survey of theory and
evidence', Discussion Paper No 94, Washington
DC: World Bank
Riches, G (ed), 1997, First World Hunger: Food
Security and Welfare Politics, London:
Macmillan
Robinson, P, 1996, 'The role and limits of active
labour market policy', EU! Working Paper RSC
96/27, Florence: Robert Schuman Centre,
European University Institute, May
Rodgers, GB., Gore C., and Figueiredo,J.B., 1995,
Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality,
Responses, Contribution to the World Summit
for Social Development, Geneva: IlLS
Schuurman, EJ., 1993, 'Introduction: development
theory in the 1990s', in Schuurman, E J., 1993,
Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in
Development Theory, London and New York:
Zed Books
Seers, D., 1963, 'The Limitations of the special
case', Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of
Economics and Statistics Vol 25 No 2
Sen, A. K., 1983, 'Development: which way now?'
Economic Journal Vol 93, December
Shaffer, P, 1996, 'Beneath the poverty debate: some
issues', IDS Bulletin Vol 27 No 1
Silver, H., 1994, 'Social exclusion and social soli-
darity: three paradigms', Discussion Paper No
69, Geneva: International Institute of Labour
Studies
Streeten, P, 1989, 'Dudley Seers (1920-83): a per-
sonal appreciation', in IDS Bulletin Vol 20 No 3
Townsend, P, 1979, Poverty in the UK,
Harmondsworth: Penguin
Toye, J., 1987a, 'Development studies and change
in contemporary Britain', World Development
Vol 15 No 4, April
31
Toye, J., 1987b, Dilemmas of Development:
Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in
Development Theory and Policy, Oxford:
Blackwell
Toye, J., (cd.), 1989, 'Dudley Seers: his work and
influence', IDS Bulletin Vol 20 No 3
Toye, J., 1989, 'Nationalism and structuralism: two
themes in the work of Dudley Seers' in IDS
Bulletin Vol 20 No 3
UNDP, 1990, Human Development Report 1990,
New York: United Nations Development
Programme
UNDP, 1997, Human Development Report 1997,
New York: United Nations Development
Programme
Von Braun, J., Teklu, T., and Webb, P, 1992,
'Labour intensive public works for food security
in Africa: past experience and future potential',
International Labour Review 131 (1)
Walker, A., and Walker, C., (eds), 1997, Britain
Divided: The Growth of Social Exclusion in
the 1980s and 1990s, London: Child Poverty
Action Group
Wilkinson, R.G., 1996, Unhealthy Societies: The
Afflictions of Inequality, London: Routledge
Wood, A., 1996a, 'Has trade increased inequality?',
Economic Review Vol 13 No 4, April
Wood, A., 1996b, 'Openness and wage inequality
in developing countries' Insights No 20,
November
World Bank, 1986, Poverty and Hunger: Issues
and Options for Food Security in Developing
Countries, Washington DC: World Bank
World Bank, 1990, World Development Report
1990, Washington DC: World Bank
Volume 48 | Number 1A | October 2017
Transforming Development Knowledge
HAS UNIVERSAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
COME OF AGE?
Editor Richard Longhurst
Vol. 48 No. 1A October 2017: ‘Has Universal Development Come of Age?’
Contents
Introduction: Universal Development – Research and Practice
Richard Longhurst  Article first published October 2017, IDSB48.1A
Editorial: Britain: A Case for Development?
Richard Jolly and Robin Luckham Article first published December 1977, IDSB9.2
Back to the Ivory Tower? The Professionalisation of Development Studies and their 
Extension to Europe
Dudley Seers Article first published December 1977, IDSB9.2
Redistribution with Sloth – Britain’s Problem?
Richard Jolly Article first published December 1977, IDSB9.2
Keynes, Seers and Economic Development 
H.W. Singer Article first published July 1989, IDSB20.3
Poverty and Social Exclusion in North and South
Arjan de Haan and Simon Maxwell Article first published January 1998, IDSB29.1
Comparisons, Convergence and Connections: Development Studies in North and South
Simon Maxwell Article first published January 1998, IDSB29.1
Poverty, Participation and Social Exclusion in North and South
John Gaventa Article first published January 1998, IDSB29.1
Introduction: New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics of Institutionalised 
Participation
Andrea Cornwall Article first published April 2004, IDSB35.2
Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Issues from a Study of Public 
Participation in Two English Cities
Marian Barnes, Helen Sullivan, Andrew Knops and Janet Newman 
 Article first published April 2004, IDSB35.2
Development Research: Globalised, Connected and Accountable
Lawrence Haddad  Article first published March 2007, IDSB38.2
Gaventa Poverty, Participation and Social Exclusion in North and South 
DOI: 10.19088/1968-2017.143 bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Povert,
Partici ation
an ocial
Exclusion in
Nort an
out
John Gaventa
IDS Bulletin Vol 29 No 11998
50
I Introduction
The rapid growth and acceptance of the concept of
participation has been a key feature in develop-
ment in the 1990s, and is central to the evolving
discussion on social exclusion. While during the
1970s and 1980s, 'participation' was more the dis-
course of grassroots organisations or NGO, this
decade has seen the concept being embraced at the
institutional and governmental level. The World
Bank Working Group on Participation is seen as an
authoritative source on participation in develop-
ment. The Bank has launched 18 flagship partici-
pation projects internationally An Interagency
Group on Participation has been established to
promote participation amongst aid agencies. The
UNDP is incorporating participation as a critical
path for poverty alleviation. Encouraged by aid
organisations, national governments are being
urged to decentralise, and to democratise through
strengthening community participation and plan-
fling at the local and regional levels.
The institutionalisation of participation offers the
possibility of taking grassroots participation to a
larger scale, of being a powerful vehicle for social
inclusion, and for mobilising new energy and
resources for overcoming poverty The adoption of
policies on participation at high government levels
provides an opportunity to link efforts of participa-
tion. 'from below' with efforts to legitimate and
strengthen participation 'from above'.
Yet the dangers of misuse are also present. The
institutionalisation of participation at a policy level
can lead to co-optation of grassroots efforts,
bureaucratisation and standardisation of the
approach through topdown methods, and poor
quality experiences that will taint participatory
efforts in the future (Blackburn, forthcoming).
While policies in support of participation enjoy a
new currency, the approach has been around for a
long time. In particular, we can learn a great deal
about the use of participation to address poverty
and social exclusion by looking at how the concept
has been used in the North, where policies to pro-
mote participation for community development
and poverty alleviation have been tried for several
decades.
In this article, I will briefly discuss the links
between the concepts of participation and social
exclusion. Then, turning to the context of the
United States, I will present a short history of three
government programmes that have attempted to
use participation to address poverty and social
exclusion. Finally, I will conclude with themes
which emerge from this history and which may be
relevant for the South, as participation is increas-
ingly used as an institutionalised strategy for
addressing poverty
2 Participation and Social
Exclusion
Within the literature on participation, a distinction
is often made between participation as an end itself,
or as a means to an end. A similar distinction may
be helpful as we link the concept of participation to
that of social exclusion.
First, we can understand the lack of participation in
itself as a form of social exclusion. In his contribu-
tion to this volume, Arjan de Haan (1997) discusses
several definitions of social exclusion, including
social exclusion as 'the process through which indi-
viduals or groups are wholly or partially excluded
from full participation in the society within which
they live.' In this sense, participation or inclusion
is a goal to be achieved in and of itself, as a response
to the problem of exclusion. This definition of par-
ticipation is similar to that used, for instance, by
UNRISD in its work, which defined participation as
'the organised efforts to increase control over
resources and regulative institutions in given social
situations, on the part of groups and movements
from those hitherto excluded from such control'
(Stiefel and Wolfe 1994: 5, italics added).
Second, however, we often find in the literature that
participation is also a means of overcoming other
problems of exclusion. Participation is seen as a
vehicle to enable the excluded to act more effec-
tively to address the problems which they face.
Thus, the unemployed may be organised to partici-
pate in strategies for overcoming unemployment or
for job creation, youth organisations may be
encouraged to participate on issues affecting youth,
immigrants or minorities may develop participatory
strategies for addressing racism or cultural
exclusion, etc.
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In the first sense, participation may be seen as an
antidote to the problem of exclusion and is more an
end in itself. In the second sense, participation is
seen as a means of engaging the socially excluded in
broader solutions to the issues and problems in
their lives. In either sense, participation and social
exclusion are important concepts to discuss
together, in both the North and the South.
3 Poverty and Social Exclusion in
the North
While we often think of poverty in the 'South' and
wealth in the 'North', these distinctions are increas-
ingly misleading. While the North clearly is a place
of relative wealth, it also contains within it large-
scale poverty and increasing inequality. In the
United States, development is highly uneven. We
find areas within inner cities and vast rural areas
where levels of poverty, unemployment, relatively
poor education, illiteracy, lack of access to health
care, etc. provide similarities to certain parts of the
'South'. With growing inequality in industrialised
countries, the movement of jobs and industry to
newly industrialised regions of the South, increas-
ing issues of access to basic services such as health
care for the poor in many countries, and the glob-
alisation of goods, services and information, the
traditional distinctions between North and South
need to be re-examined. We must recognise that
there are 'Souths within the 'North,' just as there
may be 'Norths within the 'South' (Gavent2. 1991;
see also other articles in this volume).
The parallels, convergences and connections
between North and South (Maxwell 1997) are espe-
cially strong in the area of inequality, and its conse-
quences for socïal cohesion and participation (see,
for instance, the Wilkinson article in this volume).
While globally, the levels of inequality are know to
be increasing in the South and North, it is not often
realised that the level of income inequality in the
USA is higher than in many other countries, includ-
ing many in the South (Couto 1994; World Bank
1991). Moreover, for whatever reason, socio-eco-
nomic status (defined more broadly than income) is
also more likely to affect social and political partic-
ipation in the USA than in many other countries.
Over 25 years ago, Verba and Nie (1972) found, for
instance, that socio-economic status was a better
predictor of participation in the USA than in many
countries in the north, such as the UK,
Netherlands, and Germany, but also than in coun-
tries in the South such as Mexico and Nigeria. More
recently, Robert Putnam (1995) has written of the
decline of social capital and civic engagement in the
US, at the same time that the USA is promoting a
vibrant civil society as a condition for newly emerg-
ing democracies in other parts of the world.
So we face a paradox of participation in the North.
In countries that globally have the most, there is
high inequality between the haves and have-nots.
And, for the have-nots who might need to partici-
pate the most to change their socio-economic situ-
ations, there are low levels of participation. (Verba
and Nie: 150). It is perhaps for this reason that
social policy in the United States over the last 30
years has included a series of programmes that have
used participation - with differing meanings and
strategies - to address poverty and social exclusion.
These include:
Participation as Community Action - 1960's
Participation through Regional Planning and
Integration - 1970's and 1980's
Participation as Partnership and Collaboration -
1990s
3.1 Participation as community
action: the war on poverty
Tod ay for the first time in our history, we have
the power to strike away barriers to full partici-
pation in our society
Maximum feasible participation of the poor
President Johnson, 4 March 1964, while pre-
senting Wai on Poverty Legislation to Congress
In the 1960 presidential campaign, John Kennedy
brought the plight of the rural poor to the attention
of the nation. A book by Michael Harrington on the
hidden poor, The Other America, had captured his
attention, as well as that of others across the coun-
try Visiting the coal fields of Appalachia, Kennedy
was shocked at the conditions of rural poverty
which he witnessed. Urban areas, as well, were fac-
ing growing unrest. Following the election, President
Kennedy (and later, President Johnson) became the
architects of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
widely known as the War on Poverty legislation.
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A cornerstone of the Act was the community action
clause, which mandated that there should be 'max-
imum feasible participation of the poor' in anti-
poverty efforts. lt directed local communities to
designate public or private non-profit agencies as
grant receiving agencies, and to use those funds to
develop employment opportunities and improve
local living conditions. Community Action
Programmes (CAPs) were formed, involving poor
people and their organisations, often with the help
of young, educated organisers who had enlisted in
the War on Poverty efforts. Across the country in a
few short months, there was an outpouring of com-
munity mobilisation and action.
Such a blossoming of poor people's organisations
and voices, especially when supported by funds
from the federal government, also provoked an out-
cry from the local elites in city halls and county
councils. Conflicting interpretations over how
much participation was either 'maximum' or 'feasi-
ble' quickly emerged, producing ongoing struggles
over board composition and representation. Daniel
Moynihan, one of the framers of the legislation,
later referred to the CAP clause as 'Maximum
Feasible Misunderstanding,' arguing that the intent
was simply to encourage citizen participation, not
to turn over control of the programme to them, nor
to by-pass local political structures (Moynihan
1969; Gaventa, Morrissey and Edwards 1995).
By 1966, two years after passage of the historic leg-
islation, the federal government had beat a hasty
retreat. An amendment sponsored by Edith Green
of Oregon put funding for community action under
the authority of state or local governments, and
determined participation by the poor to mean one-
third representation of poor people themselves,
one-third from government, and one-third from
other business and civic sectors.
While brief, the skirmish with maximum feasible
participation of the poor in official government
anti-poverty programmes was a formative moment
for future anti-poverty efforts. The policy interven-
tion helped to galvanise the formation of new local
groups and leaders, who would continue to organ-
ise self-help and other non-governmental efforts for
the next two decades.
By the 1970s, the government had turned its
attention in urban areas to a 'Model Cities' pro-
gramme, concentrating on revitalisation through
locally elected government, with little strong citizen
involvement. In the rural areas, especially in
Appalachia, one of the largest areas of rural poverty
in the country, the strategy moved from commu-
nity action by the poor, to regional development,
achieved through integration into the national
economy, and led by a more professional planning
approach.
3.2 Participation as regional inte-
gration
For all practical purposes, most of the 14 million
poor in our poverty areas are on the outside of
the market economy . . . they are on the outside
looking in, and they need our help.
The People Left Behind, President's
Commission on Rural Poverty, 1967
In the 1960s, socio-economic maps of the United
States revealed enormous pockets of poverty in
rural areas, regions viewed as being 'socially
excluded' in the sense that they were outside the
nation's social and economic mainstream. Of these,
three regions stood out most clearly: the
Appalachian region, the largest, most densely pop-
ulated area of rural white poverty; the deep South,
which includes Mississippi, Alabama and the
Arkansas delta and is the largest area of rural black
poverty; and the Native American reservations in
the western United States (Gaventa and Lewis
1989).
In the Appalachian region, a special development
agency, the Appalachian Regional Commission
(ARC), was launched. Over the next 25 years, the
ARC, with aggregated expenditures exceeding $15
billion, became the nation's largest rural economic
development agency The commission invested
most of its funds on infrastructure - highways and
industrial parks - that it hoped would lure in out-
side industry, following a model parallel to the
'modernisation' approach in other parts of the
world. Through the development of regional infra-
structure, the commission believed, Appalachia
would 'take ofP and become 'integrated' into the
national economy, overcoming the regional exclu-
sion and poverty of previous decades.
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From the late 1960s to the late 1970s, the ARC
strategy seemed to work. Industries, often from the
industrialised northern USA, migrated South in
search of resources, cheaper labour, and a more
favourable business climate. The gains, however,
were short lived. The 1980s were marked by
decline for many residents, including a widening
gap between their income and that of other more
affluent parts of America. The crisis was no longer
of impoverished rural pockets of poverty 'on the
outside looking in,' it appeared much more to be of
the mainstream economy itself.
What had happened? One factor lies in an eco-
nomic restructuring that was national and interna-
tional in scope. During the 1970s and 1980s,
agricultural and industrial America was being trans-
formed into a service and finance economy Millions
of jobs were lost as plants shut down or moved,
many to overseas locations. Such economic restruc-
turing had particular impact on the rural poor, who
saw themselves underbid by newly industrialising
parts of the world, but were not able to compete for
new jobs or industries with the more affluent and
educated regions in their own country
By end of the 1980s, it was clear that the regional
integration solution to poverty was not working,
especially in the context of a changing global econ-
omy At the same time, during the 1970s and
1980s, community-based efforts at development,
many of which were spawned in the 1960s, had
continued to grow and to demonstrate results, at
least on a small scale (Gaventa, Smith and
Willingham 1993). As in other parts of the world,
attention began to turn to forming new partner-
ships between government and civil society, rather
than to traditional market mechanisms, as a path
for change.
3.3 Participation as partnership
and collaboration
The road to economic opportunity and commu-
nity development starts with broad participation
by all segments of the community. This may
include, among others, the political and govern-
mental leadership, community groups, health
and social service groups, environmental groups,
religious organisations, the private and non-
profit sectors, centres of learning and other
community institutions. The residents them-
selves, however; are the most important element
of revitalisation.
President's Community Empowerment Board,
1994
One of the hallmarks of the Clinton administration
has been the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise
Communities (EZJEC) programme, the most com-
prehensive federal programme of the 1 990s to focus
on relieving severe distress in rural and urban areas.
Launched in 1993, the programme provides $2.5
billion in tax incentives and $1 billion in block
grants to revitalise 95 distressed urban and rural
communities.
The principles of the EZ/EC programme are similar
to many which are now being articulated in inter-
national approaches to community development.
First, the programme builds on each community's
own vision for change, through a strategic planning
process that allows local residents to set their own
path to success. It gives significant new emphasis to
the role of citizen participation in the planning and
development process by promoting involvement
and partnerships among all sectors of a community
Second, it adopts a comprehensive approach to
development by linking the principles of economic
opportunity and sustainable community develop-
ment into a broad vision of change and
revitalisation.
While much can be learned from the implementa-
tion of this programme, two points pertaining to
participation stand out. First, as in the War on
Poverty, given a chance to participate in develop-
ment, people did so ïn enormous numbers. The
process began with strategic planning, in which
thousands of citizens at a grassroots level took an
active role in determining the vision, goals and
strategies for revitalisation of their communities.
Widely diverse groups were involved in the plan-
ning process, including women, minorities and
low-income people. In addition to racial, gender
and class diversity, the planning process
represented community-based organisations, gov-
ernment, private business, labour unions, educa-
tors, health care officials, media and other
community stakeholders.
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Second, however, while participation was high in
the beginning visioning process, it has been difficult
to maintain in the implementation process. After
encouraging local communities to go through a very
hurried planning process, with promises for quick
action, long delays then occurred as the govern-
ment agencies attempted to devise new ways to
process applications or allocate and disburse funds.
Then, once money began to flow, communities
often found the traditional power holders stepping
in to take charge, and serious conflicts emerging
over goals, governance and implementation, as in
the War on Poverty In other places, however, these
conflicts have been less pervasive and new initia-
tives have taken root very quickly, involving new
coalitions of civil society organisations, local
government and the private sector.
4 Key Themes for Development
What does this brief history of participation policy
in poverty programmes in the United States sug-
gest about the current debates on participation and
policy in international development? A number of
key themes emerge which are relevant and perhaps
instructive.
Participation policy matters
While in some quarters there may be scepticism
about attempts of government or large-scale agen-
cies to legislate or mandate participation, the expe-
rience in the United States is that participation
policy matters. Strong legislation in the War on
Poverty and in the latest Empowerment Zone pro-
gramme helped to legitimate and to galvanise large-
scale action at the grassroots level. Opportunities
for participation, when built into national policy,
made a difference in who participated locally. The
capacity, energy, and momentum created at the
grassroots often continued, even after the formal
policies changed or failed.
Who participates matters
Broadening the base of participation is not only
important in its own right, but it affects the devel-
opment agenda. When there was broader-based
participation in the 1960s and 1990s, we saw very
different definitions of what was important for
development than in the more topdown and mar-
ket oriented versions of the 1970s and 1980s.
Visions of development which emerged in the com-
munity-based planning process in the
Empowerment Zone Programme reflected much
broader concerns with issues of participation, capac-
ity building, cultural awareness, empowerment, etc.,
not only the more traditional agenda of economic
and infrastructure development. The varying
emphases on the development of economic, human
or social capital by differing groups often led to con-
flict about which goals were most important.
The definition of participation matters
Attempts to institutionalise participation have also
led to conceptual debates about what we actually
mean by participation. In 1969, a chief advisor for
the War on Poverty published a ladder of participa-
tion which ranged from non-participatory forms of
manipulation, to degrees of token participation, to
degrees of shared power, including partnership,
delegation, and control (Arnstein 1969). In the mid
1990s, similar typologies or scales are also being
used and developed. Pretty (1996), for instance,
examines levels of participation ranging, again,
from manipulation to self-mobilisation.
As the War on Poverty debates on what was meant
by 'maximum feasible participation' illustrated, it is
important to have as much clarity as possible on the
levels and types of participation intended. However,
we must also recognise that in its implementation,
participation is a dynamic process. Participation at
one point on the scale may lead to movement along
the scale. For instance, consultation processes, if
done well, may lead to demands and expectations
on the part of those consulted for a greater level of
participation. Similarly, consultation that is misused
can lead to manipulation and reinforce levels of pas-
sivity or cynicism in future attempts at
participation.
Participation and power
As participation moves 'up' the scale to include con-
cepts like citizen control over resources or self-
mobilisation of groups which have previously been
inactive, then we can expect it to encounter resis-
tance from the traditional power holders. There is
one school of thought which says that power is not
a zero sum game, that increased participation by
some groups does not diminish the power and par-
ticipation of others. However, if participation
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involves decision-making and control over scarce
resources, then the history of these programmes in
the USA suggests the opposite to be true - increased
participation by the have-nots will be perceived as
threatening to those who have traditionally been the
dominant decision-makers.
The history also suggests that simply mandating or
legislating participation from the top is not enough
to sustain it. Ongoing intervention is needed from
the top to help ensure its implementation, and to
help intermediary elites to understand or accept the
new participation. High-level 'champions' of par-
ticipation at the top of government institutions are
important to reinforce the participatory vision at the
local level, to help resolve conflicts, and, if neces-
sary, to intervene to enforce the new policies.
The importance of prior social capital and
organisational capacity
In both the War on Poverty and the Empowerment
Zone programmes, communities which were histor-
ically poor by measures of economic and human
capital, revealed strong resources of social capital in
the planning and visioning process. Given an
opportunity to participate with others, they were
able to do so, building upon networks, relation-
ships and levels of trust that may have been struc-
tured over decades. This was not uniformly true,
however. lt is perhaps self-evident that groups that
have a history of trust, and of working together, will
do better at working together in the future. Where
there is a history of conflict or 'vertical' social cap-
ital, participation in large-scale formal endeavours
is more difficult to accomplish or to sustain.
While 'social capital,' (defined by Putnam as trust,
reciprocity, and networks of support) is important
for participation, so, too, is the organisational
capacity of the grassroots or poor people. In the
Empowerment Zone Programme, large numbers of
people participated in the strategic visioning
process. However, it has been more difficult to sus-
tain participation in the implementation of the pro-
gramme. In communities where grassroots
organisations and leadership have been built in
10-20 years of prior development work, the poor
have been more successful not only at 'getting to the
table' but also in 'staying at the table.' With the help
of this organisational capacity, these communities
were more able to take advantage of the institu-
tional opportunities for participation when they
came along, to negotiate with government officials
over terms and implementation, to survive difficult
conflicts, and to mobilise resources when necessary
(Morrissey with Gaventa and Creed 1997).
This suggests another important lesson for policy
intervention: mandates for participation from
'above' must be linked with pre-existing capacities
for participation 'from below.' If there has not been
a prior history of local action and organisational
development, there will be fewer building blocks
for larger-scale participation to occur.
The importance of governmental or
institutional capacity
If the development of organisational capacity at the
grassroots community level is important for sus-
tained participation with institutions, then equally
important is the development of the capacity of
institutions and governments to work in a partici-
patory way with communities. A major obstacle in
the implementation of the EZIEC Programme has
been the conflict among the various levels of gov-
ernment, and turf conflicts within agencies respon-
sible for implementation of programmes. This has
led to delays, confused and often conflicting proce-
dures, and mixed signals and advice to the locali-
ties. Also important has been the lack of skills,
knowledge and attitudes amongst agency staff
about how to work in a more participatory fashion,
especially where goals and projects are set by the
community, rather than given to them by govern-
ment. New more flexible institutional procedures,
and new skills and attitudes on the part of the gov-
ernment staffs and officials are important for partic-
ipatory policies to work effectively at the
community level.
The importance of participatory
monitoring and evaluation of participation
As participation becomes more and more accepted,
it will also be important to determine ways to mon-
itor and measure whether 'quality' participation is
occurring, and with what results. What are the indi-
cators for success in participatory development?
This issue has at least two important inter-related
dimensions. On the one hand, as participation is
accepted in principle, we must evolve indicators
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and ways to know if it is in fact occurring in prac-
tice. However, while researchers have developed
earlier methods of monitoring and evaluating more
traditional forms of development, such as infra-
structure, job creation or education, the tools and
indicators do not exist when it comes to measuring
(potentially more fuzzy) concepts of participation,
empowerment, and capacity
The second dimension relates to the question of
'who measures?. Whose indicators of success are
used and who uses them? The rapid evolution of
PRA has taught us a great deal about the importance
of people's knowledge and has provided sets of tools
for using that knowledge in appraisal and imple-
mentation of projects. The next step is to involve
people centrally in evaluating their success and
impact. 'Who counts reality?' may prove as signifi-
cant as 'whose reality counts?' (Chambers 1996).
Participation may not be enough
Clearly, policies to promote participatory
approaches for dealing with poverty and social
exclusion are also affected by broader forces and
must be linked to other policies for change. Much
more work is needed to understand the relation-
ships of grassroots participation to other large issues
linked to globalisation of the economy, racial, eth-
nic and religious movements, the overhaul of social
welfare policies, governance and decentralisation
policies, to name a few.
5 Conclusion
This article has suggested that policies and experi-
ences with participation as a strategy for countering
poverty and social exclusion in the North may be
relevant to the current debates on how to institu-
tionalise participation in development in the South.
lt has argued that there are many parallels and
themes to be explored, and it will take much further
research to do so adequately
However, from this preliminary inquiry one lesson
is perhaps most clear. While many donors and aid
organisations in the North (such as AID in the
United States) are promoting strategies of participa-
tion abroad, they may do well to examine more crit-
ically the lessons which can be learned from similar
strategies at home. While democracy and
participation in the North have strong traditions,
the models and approaches used at home have also
taught us a great deal about challenges still to be
faced in implementing large-scale participatory
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1Introduction: New Democratic
Spaces? The Politics and
Dynamics of Institutionalised
Participation
Andrea Cornwall*
Across the world, as new democratic experiments
meet with and transformolder forms of governance,
political space for public engagement in governance
appears to be widening. A renewed concern with
rights, power and difference in debates about
participation in development has focused greater
attention on the institutions at the interface between
publics, providers and policy makers. Some see in
them exciting prospects for the practice of more
vibrant and deliberative democracy (Fung and
Wright 2003; Gaventa, forthcoming).Others raise
concerns about them as forms of co-option, and as
absorbing, neutralising and deflecting social energy
from other forms of political participation (Taylor
1998).The title of this Bulletin reflects some of their
ambiguities as arenas that may be neither new nor
democratic, but at the same time appear to hold
promise for renewing and deepening democracy.
Through a series of case studies from a range of
political and cultural contexts – Brazil, India,
Bangladesh, Mexico, SouthAfrica, England and the
United States ofAmerica, contributors to this Bulletin
explore the interfaces between different forms of
public engagement. Their studies engage with
questions about representation, inclusion and voice,
about the political efficacy of citizen engagement
as well as the viability of these new arenas as political
institutions.Read together, they serve to emphasise
the historical, cultural and political embeddedness
of the institutions and actors that constitute spaces
for participation.
1 Spaces for participation
Moves to extend opportunities for citizen
participation in governance are inspired and
underpinned by the view that to do so makes for
better citizens, better decisions and better
government (Mansbridge 1999; Warren 1992;
Gaventa, forthcoming). Some would cast themove
towards more direct forms of citizen engagement
in governance as a means of addressing the
“democratic deficit” by strengthening liberal
democratic institutions: urging politicians to listen
more to those who elect them and bureaucrats to
become more responsive to those they are meant
to serve. For others, it constitutes a more radical
reconfiguration of relationships and responsibilities,
one that extends beyond citizen–state interactions
to encompass complex alliances of actors and
networks across permeable institutional boundaries
and an expanded vision of the public domain (Fung
andWright 2003; Hajer andWagenaar 2003).
New arenas for public participation appear to
offer all this, andmore.One potentially useful way
of characterising these institutions is using the
concept of space (cf. Lefebvre 1991), a concept rich
withmetaphor as well as a literal descriptor of arenas
where people gather, which are bounded in time
as well as dimension. A space can be emptied or
filled, permeable or sealed; it can be an opening,
an invitation to speak or act. Spaces can also be
clamped shut, voided of meaning, or depopulated
as people turn their attention elsewhere. Thinking
about participation as a spatial practice highlights
the relations of power and constructions of
citizenship that permeate any site for public
engagement (Cornwall 2002).
Contributors to this Bulletinuse the term“spaces”
to evoke these dynamics, but also to refer more
concretely to two distinct kinds of arenas.One we
have come to call “invited spaces”, a label that serves
to convey the origin of many intermediary
1Intro35.2  10/03/04  03:13 pm Page 1
institutions as government-provided, whether in
response to popular demand, donor pressure or
shifts in policy (Brock et al. 2001). Some are more
transient in character:policy moments where public
space is opened up for deliberation or
communication, before being closed again as
authorities return tobusiness as usual.Other “invited
spaces” aremore durable, often taking the shape of
regularised institutions modelled on enduring
templates such as the welter of co-management
committees and user groups that have proliferated
in the wake of sector reforms (Manor, forthcoming).
A second set of spaces we have come to call
“popular spaces”, arenas in which people come
together at their own instigation – whether to protest
against government policies or the interventions
of foreign powers, to produce their own services
or for solidarity and mutual aid. “Popular spaces”
may be regularised, institutionalised in the formof
associations or groups; they may also be transient
expressions of public dissent, as passions about the
issues that bring people together wax and wane.
Boundaries between “invited” and “popular” spaces
are mutable, rather than fixed; “popular spaces”
can become institutionalised, with statutory
backing, and “invited spaces” may become sites for
the articulation of dissent, as well as for collaboration
and compromise.
Different spaces have different kinds of interfaces
with existing political institutions. Transient
consultative events have gained popularity with
governments, lenders and donors in recent years,
whether to take the pulse of public opinion or gather
“voices” to secure legitimacy for policies (Holmes
and Scoones 2000; Goetz andGaventa 2001).They
can, at times, work to undermine regularised
institutions, whether popular or invited; they can
also lend alternative avenues for voice, particularly
for dissent. Differences in durability matter, as we
come to see, when it comes to questions about who
participates, and related questions of accountability,
representativeness, democratic legitimacy and
viability as political institutions.
“Invited spaces” offer thepotential for reconfiguring
relations of rule, extending thepractice of democracy
beyond the sporadic use of the ballot box. But how
this potential is translated into actual changes in
governance is contingent on a range of factors.One
is the locus of their creation: conquered spaces (Marcus
Mello, pers. comm.), spaces that exist as a result of
successful demands,may be perceivedby would-be
participants quite differently to provided spaces that
are simply put in place at the behest of donors or
lenders.Another is the existing governance landscape
in anyparticular context, in which three “ingredients”
appear to be critical: ruling party disposition to
supporting popular participation; popular
mobilisation; and a sufficiently resourced, well
coordinated state bureaucracy (Heller 2001; Fung
andWright 2003; Gaventa, forthcoming). Further,
related, factors lie in the particularities of context.
These includehistories of governance andexperiences
of rule, whether those gained through popular
struggle or throughdecades ofbeing treated as passive
recipients of a paternalistic state. They also include
prevailing cultures of politics, whether in terms of
the ways in which everyday citizens relate to the
arena of thepolitical, themeanings and expectations
attached to the utterances of politicians or topromise
making by the powerful, or the cultural practices of
decisionmaking anddissent within any given space
for participation. These factors shape expectations,
relationships anddynamics at the interface with the
state, lendingdifferent meanings to apparently similar
“invited spaces”. It is with some of these differences
that the first section of this Bulletin is concerned.
2 The dynamics of participation in
“invited spaces”
Much is expected of arenas for participation. Yet,
as with other “participatory” institutions, the
preconditions for equitable participation and voice
are often lacking within them.How to involve those
who lack presence or voice in conventional political
arenas, the resources to engage, and a feeling of
belonging, ofmattering, of being able to contribute
or of having anything to gain, continues to present
an enduring challenge.The arenas with which we’re
concernedmay appear as innovations, but are often
fashioned out of existing forms through a process
of institutional bricolage, using whatever is at hand
and re-inscribing existing relationships, hierarchies
and rules of the game.
In some cases, “invited spaces” have been
transplanted onto institutional landscapes in which
entrenched relations of dependency, fear and
disprivilege undermine the possibility for the kind
of deliberative decisionmaking they are to foster. It
is in this kind of setting that SimeenMahmud’s study
is located.Focusing on co-management institutions,
community groups (CGs), created by donor-driven
health sector reform in Bangladesh, it illustrates the
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dissonance between ideals and reality. In principle,
these institutions are to provide the basis for new
partnerships between service providers, users and
local government. In practice, Mahmud shows how
poor people continue to look to the state as provider
and guarantor of rights, whilst experiencing their
own agency as limitedby the relations of dependency
within which they remain locked, as ‘“lesser” citizens
and “unequal” rights’.
Mahmud’s analysis points to a combination of
factors that conspire to limit the possibilities for
“ordinary people” to participate in these new
institutions. These are: prevalent interpretations of
“participation”,many of whichdonot providemuch
scope for the exercise of citizenship or recognition
of the knowledge and agency of poor or
marginalised people; the limited responsibilities
“community participants” are given within these
institutions, which remain restricted to changing
the behaviour of others like them rather than
holding the state to account; lack of information
about or understanding of the functioning of these
institutions or the health service in general; elite
capture; a lack of clarity about the purpose and
responsibilities of members of theCG; and deeply
held reluctance to question the actions of the state.
Lacking formal links to other governmental spaces,
remaining without official recognition by the
Ministry of Health, CGs appear to lack authority
as well as accountability.
Given that CGs are essentially a donor-imposed,
rather than an organic, institutional form, there are
wider lessons to be learnt about the cultural
dynamics that complicate the neat superimposition
of development blueprints. What did the people
Mahmud spoke with thinkmight make a difference
in this setting?For them, education andmobilisation
were seen as key to individual and collective
empowerment, and to gaining voice rather than
being silent or silenced by fear.Yet as long as officials
interpret “participation” in as narrow and
instrumental a sense as in this context, the scope
for engagement may remain limited. Without
constitutional guarantees or other mechanisms for
accountability, institutions like CGs lack political
viability and can undermine representative local
government, as Manor (forthcoming) argues.
What happens when these spaces are created as
part of local government? JohnWilliams’ account
of the city ofCapeTown’s Area CoordinatingTeams
(ACTs), set up in the late 1990s as a space for
communication, consensus-buildingandcoordination,
explores the dynamics among and between three
sets of actors who constitute the ACTs: public
officials, local councillors and community
organisations. The promise of these institutions is
considerable, Williams suggests. Officials and
councillors see the ACTs as ‘an ideal place for
interaction and synergy’, a forum for civic education
and for mobilisation to address shared concerns;
the very existence of such a space helps to narrow
the gap between officials and local people, and can
serve as an arena for transformation.
However, this promise remains largely
unrealised. Why? First, Williams identifies a lack
of political commitment, which is manifested in
irregular attendance from certain officials. Second,
he points to a lack of a sense of ownership of the
process amongst councillors, and fears about
involving “difficult” groups, such as gangs and
traditional leaders. Third, he highlights how issues
of representation – who speaks for whom, and how
claims to represent are made and negotiated –
emerge, working to undermine the legitimacy of
community organisations. Fourth, he suggests that
the non-binding nature of the issues discussed at
the ACTs lend the institution little accountability
for following through.
This case highlights the significance of links
between “invited” spaces and the politicalmachinery
of governance, illustrating how the dislocation of
ACTs from channels of influence renders themmere
consultative bodies with limited clout. Lacking the
means by which to enforce attendance by officials
and to hold the Council accountable for decisions
reached in meetings, procedural weakness
undermines their potential for democratising the
planning process.Williams’ study underscores the
significance of institutional design. It also illustrates
how provided-for institutions like these can become
other peoples’ spaces that no-one in particular feels
a sense of commitment to, and which remain inert,
vacated, lacking in potency.
Enabling legislation can be one tool for
strengthening the efficacy and scope of citizen
involvement, on ‘both sides of the equation’ (Goetz
andGaventa 2001). RanjitaMohanty’s article takes
a closer look at the invited spaces of forest
management, in the impoverished State of
Uttaranchal, a context in which the participation
of marginalised groups – in this case women, and
members of scheduled castes and tribes – is
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guaranteed by the constitution through the
reservation of seats in local bodies.Her conclusions,
like those ofWilliams, are not encouraging.
Joining Agarwal (1997) and others in exposing
the myths of participation that undergird
donor/lender enthusiasm for joint forest
management (JFM) schemes, Mohanty draws
attention to the emergent new forms of exclusion.
The promise of including women – the primary
forest users – was one of the rallying calls of JFM.
And through stipulations and procedures, women
have gained a place at the table. But today’s forest
management institutions have been fashioned out
of previous institutions put in place by the colonial
state, and remain imbued with traces of relations
of power and expectations from former times.
Cultural barriers, fear, dependency and lack of self-
confidence all conspire to make it difficult for
women to use their voice, and be heard. Where
women have gained the resources to participate, it
has been through the creation of separate spaces
within which they can build confidence and learn
leadership skills. Mohanty’s conclusions attest to
the more diffuse changes that are happening:
… even if the landscape of marginalisation is
not completely altered, new leadership is
emerging from marginalised sectors of society,
from women, from lower castes. By acquainting
people with the language of the state and through
engagement with state-led rules, JFM has taught
people the art of governance.
There is much in these studies to suggest that
participation, like citizenship, is something that is
learnt through practice.Whilemany invited spaces
remain harsh testing grounds for beginners, they
are part of a shifting institutional landscape in which
longer term changes in the way people perceive
and engage with governance may be taking root.
The next section turns to two countries in which
there has been a significant expansion of invited
spaces in recent years, to explore further some of
the issues that arise.
3 Engaging citizens? Issues of
Representation
At the tail end of the 1990s, “civil society
participation” was on every donor’s lips. But
something has happened in the last few years that
has brought a little more circumspection. Harder
questions are being asked about exactly whom “civil
society organisations” represent, on whose behalf
they speak and to whom they are accountable.One
of the characteristics of many of the spaces that
we’re concerned with here is that “public
involvement”may relate less to engaging the general
public-at-large in consultation or policy
deliberation, but rather the organisations that claim
to speak for and about them. The articles in this
section reflect on some of the questions this raises
about what “citizen voice” comes tomean, as about
the legitimacy derived from claims to have involved
“the public”.
Nowhere has there been greater expansion of
opportunities for citizenparticipation in institutions
createdby the state for deliberative governance than
in Brazil. Daring experiments in participatory
governance appear, in some quarters, to havemade
a significant difference to redistributive outcomes,
as well as to a sense of citizenship and political
community (Abers 1998; Avritzer 2003). What
happens, when all the enabling conditions for citizen
participation and influence appear tobe present and
yet the resultant institutions lackmuscle, asks Vera
Coelho?Her study of health councils in São Paulo,
Brazil’s biggest city, explores the question of how
such institutions can make a tangible difference to
publicdecisionmaking.Through a close examination
of thedynamics of participation within these “invited
spaces”, and of the rules of access and engagement,
Coelho comes to the conclusion that issues of
representation are essential precisely because they
serve to define these spaces as political institutions,
guaranteeing or undermining their legitimacy.
Coelho identifies two features of institutional
design that are of critical importance in lending
invited spaces such as councils themeans tobecome
more effective political institutions.First, she argues,
closer attention needs to be paid to the criteria for
organising political representation – a far from simple
issue when it is to complement, rather than
substitute, existing statutory authorities, and to
guarantee the presence of organised civil society
and groups traditionally excluded from access to
state services. Second, shehighlights the organisation
of procedures for discussion and decision making.
This, too, is complex, she argues, as the rules of
deliberation call for different dynamics from those
used within statutory institutions, where decisions
are taken according to acknowledged hierarchies.
Noting the often unhelpful role of the chairperson
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or executive secretary, Coelho’s study emphasises
the importance of enabling leadership, as well as
the potential use of participatory techniques in
facilitating more inclusive deliberation.
Complementing Coelho’s study of health
councils, Arnab Acharya, AdriánGurza Lavalle and
Peter Houtzager focus inmore depthon the question
of who – or, as in this case, what kind of organisations
– participate in these new democratic spaces in the
city of São Paulo and what factors increase their
propensity to participate. Comparing three kinds
of “invited spaces”, those of theparticipatorybudget,
the deliberative policy councils (of which health is
one kind) andother institutionalised forms of citizen
participation, their findings point to the significance
of three factors: affiliations with traditional
institutional actors – in this case, the rulingWorkers’
Party or the State; institutional design, such as their
legal mandate andprocedures for participation; and
the organisation’s form, specifically whether it serves
a representative, advocacy or service delivery
function. Challenging what they term the “civil
society perspective” on citizen participation, they
argue that the organisations which engage inBrazil’s
new democratic institutions need to be situated as
institutionally embedded actors.Todo so is to recognise
the connections that those who enter “invited spaces”
have with other spaces, and other actors.
Acharya et al.’s study challenges one of the key
presuppositions of the “civil society perspective”:
that it consists of autonomous actors who are able
to hold traditional political institutions to account.
Rather, they show dense linkages between “civil
society” participants, the ruling political party and
the government, via contracts to deliver services.
It is these ties, they argue, that are one of the best
predictors of participation in all three of the spaces
they studied. It would be easy to draw the
conclusion from this that the powers-that-be insure
themselves against contestation by packing “invited
spaces” with “their” people. But there is another
way in which these findings might be read. The
new politics of democracy has come to rely on
multiple arenas outside the formal “closed” spaces
of government for gaining legitimacy or securing
consent, whether through liberal or deliberative
democratic means. Consultation, even where it
only consists of the provision of information, has
become part of the very fabric of governance in
ways that were barely imaginable even a decade
ago. The density of these linkages may in itself
represent an increased propensity for participation,
manifesting itself in engagement inmultiple arenas.
In this context, questions about the basis on
which actors – whether individual or collective –
participate become ever more important to answer.
Angela Alonso and Valeriano Costa take up some
of these questions in their study of public hearings
for environmental licensing, Aplas, which adds a
further dimension to the studies of participation in
São Paulo in this Bulletin. Unlike the regularised
institutions described by Acharya et al., andCoelho,
Aplas is a transient space.Alonso andCosta’s study
looks in depth at who exactly participated in
deliberation in theAplas: who spoke, for how long,
and how often. They found that few of the “civil
society” contingent that were present were directly
affected social groups. Affected groups actually
occupied a fraction of discursive space, requesting
information rather than expressing opposition to
the scheme. It was left to other actors, environmental
organisations and social movements, to articulate
a position of dissent: one framed in terms that had
barely any resonance amongst the local population.
The public hearings became, in their terms,
‘ceremonial areas in which participation was
ritualised’. Intersections with other invited spaces
worked, at the same time, to compromise that of
the Aplas. Alonso and Costa describe how
government actors created other spaces into which
local elites were invited, which served to disarm any
potential local opposition and effectively empty the
“invited space” of the public hearing of its political
significance.Observing that the general public lacked
the knowledge, skills and expectations of being
taken seriously whichmight have enabled them to
participate, Alonso andCosta argue that institutions
of deliberative democracy suffer from the very
shortcomings that their advocates level against those
of traditional representative institutions.
The articles in this section point to some of the
paradoxes of participation at the heart of these “new
democratic spaces”. And they point to an area in
which much more research, and theorisation,
remains to be done.These arenas are often intended
as a means to change the nature of interactions
between those who provide services and resources,
and those who are entitled, consumeor benefit from
them. But quite how those on the receiving end of
policies are represented varies enormously, with
attendant implications for legitimacy, credibility and
accountability.Tensions between representatives of
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various kinds makematters more complicated still.
Elected officials might resent attempts to bypass
them where local government opens up public
consultation to the general public; self-selected
representatives may come to speak for others without
any accountability to, or even communication with,
them; those who are put forward to speak about any
given group can be taken to be speaking as, rather
than simply for, them – and be subjected to similar
forms of discrimination as a consequence, and so
on. As Coelho notes, traditional representative
democracy just doesn’t match what these new
institutions are seeking todo; and yet, in these newer
spaces, the rules of representation are often unclear
and may be improvised to suit the circumstance,
leaving a lot to be desired in terms of legitimacy and
undermining potential viability as political
institutions.
The fourth case in this section is from the UK,
again a context in which there has been considerable
innovation in recent years, whether in the form of
regularised bodies or transient exercises in opinion-
seeking or consultation. Marian Barnes, Helen
Sullivan, Andrew Knops and Janet Newman
highlight some of the complexities of deliberative
governance in two English cities. Looking across a
range of spaces for participation, their analysis
highlights the complexity of relations between those
who enter these arenas. Interlocking agendas, tactical
alliances and tensions between councillors,members
of the public and officers,make for a complicated
relational picture, as one example illustrates:
When councillors felt challenged by members
of the public, they took this out on officers; when
members of the public complained about lack
of resources going into their wards, councillors
supported this.Officers regarded councillors as
their audience, rather than the public, and this
frustrated officer accountability to the public.
Barnes et al. consider the tension between
different ‘opportunity structures for participation’,
identifying two forms: one that is open to the general
public and another that seeks “representation” by
enlisting representatives from existing groups and
organisations.They argue that these two tendencies
are overlaid in complex configurations in practice,
leading to further tensions and raising a host of
further questions about the nature of representation,
with important implications for legitimacy.Where
authorities set parameters for inclusion, groups can
choose either to comply or to create their own
structures. Indeed, Barnes et al. argue, spaces for
participationmay serve to create identities (cf.Hajer
2003); that is, rather than people entering these
spaces as members of pre-constituted groups, they
gain such identities only when they participate.
Attention needs to be given to the potential of these
new democratic spaces to produce new forms of
exclusion, they argue, as a result. Their analysis
resonates with many of the articles in this Bulletin
in suggesting that citizens also need their own spaces
in which they can develop alternative discourses
and approaches, some of whichmight best remain
at some distance from arenas which bring publics
and their representatives together with officials.
4 Intersections: contesting public
policy from “below”
What then, of those who seek to engage in
influencing public policy fromoutside these invited
spaces? The last section of this Bulletin considers
“popular spaces” – arenas within and from which
people are able to frame alternatives,mobilise, build
arguments and alliances and gain the confidence
to use their voice, and to act.
The first article in this section, by MarilynTaylor
and colleagues, focuses on some of the ambivalence
with which the voluntary and community sector
in England has come to view government-created
“invited spaces”. Citing a recent policy document
that proclaims, ‘the freedom of citizens can only be
truly realised if they are enabled to participate
constructively in the decisions that affect their lives’
(Blunkett 2003: 3), Taylor describes the proliferation
of new spaces for “third sector” involvement in
policy processes under the New Labour
administration, highlighting inherent tensions that
have been exposed in the process. First, she draws
attention to the tension between adesire for diversity
and the need for cohesion to win policy space,
exacerbated by government preference for the sector
to take a single position.
Secondly, she highlights the tension between
leadership and participation, and the broader issues
of representation and accountability that this raises.
Calling for realism about the numbers of people
who are likely to engage over time in these new
spaces, Taylor argues that more thought needs to
be given to different levels at which people are likely
to participate and to links between them. She points
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out, however, the contradictory reactions of
government funders who, on the one hand, accuse
voluntary organisations ‘of being “obsessed” by
process’ and on the other hand, ‘were the first to
complain if they thought that an organisation was
not representative’. Thirdly, she highlights the
tension between occupying invited spaces and
remaining on the outside, noting that ‘being invited
onto the inside of a policy community can take the
sting out of organisations that have been a thorn in
the government’s side’. Interestingly, the study found
that traditional lines were blurring as organisations
sought to balance taking up and turning down
invitations to participate.
Taylor’s article helps shed further light on the
interface between popular and invited spaces, and
on what happens to actors when they traverse the
borders between them. Mixed as outcomes have
been,her account gives cause for cautious optimism,
if only about the potential of newly opened spaces
that would be politically difficult to slam shut again.
On the one hand, it is these border crossings that
makes “representatives” representative; they enter
invited spaces on behalf of a given popular space,
bringing with them some of the legitimacy that is
sought by those doing the inviting, and taking from
it information and other resources sought by those
they left behind. But on the other hand, the process
of crossing the borders between these spaces, no
matter how permeable and contingent they are, also
works to change those involved and how they are
perceived by others.On the positive side, this may
serve tobuild and strengthen alliances across different
kinds of organisations, and make more permeable
still theborders between invited andpopular spaces.
However, those who enter invited spaces run the
riskofbeing regardedby those who choose to remain
outside them as havingbeen co-opted: ‘they are seen’,
Taylor notes, ‘to have sold out’.
Remaining outside the structures of the state
offers a position from which not only to critique
state policy, but also to imagine and enact
alternatives. Carlos Cortez Ruiz’s article describes
the case of the Zapatista movement’s creation of
spaces of resistance in Chiapas, as popular spaces
that remain in defiant separation from those of the
Mexican government.Counterposing the “invited
spaces” of the Mexican state with the “popular
spaces” of the Zapatista movement, Ruiz’s study
highlights the extent to which the political
implications of any given space depend in part on
the locus of its origins, as well as on its location
within a broader configuration of political
institutions. InChiapas, social movements are not
uniformly allied with either the Mexican State or
the Zapatistas, creating further complexities: they
occupy a spectrum of positions from that of
resistance, and the refusal of any resources at all
from the Mexican government, to collaboration
along the lines of their own strategic objectives, to
receptiveness to any government assistance going.
Identifying a range of factors that differentiate
what participation comes tomean in the “popular”
and “invited” spaces ofChiapas, Ruiz explores some
of the divergences in experiences in these different
sites.He discusses the extent to which participation
in “invited spaces” is framed by technocrats, whose
interventions produce and limit what is possible.
One interesting dimension of his account is in
highlighting the difference between the ‘rhythm of
participation’ in government-promoted spaces and
in the Zapatista-controlled spaces, which adds
another dimension to earlier discussion in this
introduction about duration and durability. Ruiz
suggests that in the autonomous municipalities,
there is a longer-term vision for participation as a
means of struggling for the guarantee of rights; in
contrast, in the arenas controlledby the government,
there is amuch more short-term and instrumental
view of participation.These are differences in kind,
rather than simply in degree, and are significant in
framing these different spaces and for what they
come to represent to indigenes of theChiapas region.
Just as the Zapatistas have become renowned
for their use of the new media, the transnational
campaign tactics of theTreatment ActionCampaign
(TAC) owe as much to the new political spaces
emerging with the growth of “network society”
(Castells 1997), as to the new strategies for political
engagement that TAC has developed at a national
level.The struggle for access to treatment for people
living withHIV andAIDS in SouthAfrica has made
headlines the world over. Steve Robins and Bettina
von Lieres’ contribution to this Bulletin tells a
fascinating tale of the conjunction of tactics to
contest, and prise open, political space inmultiple
arenas, and the new “spaces of citizenship” created
through the ingenuity of TAC activists. Activists
traversed conventional boundaries between the
institutions of the state and of public space, waging
mutually impinging battles in the courts and in the
streets simultaneously. Robins and von Lieres’
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analysis points to the significance of the ways in
which TAC activists came to animate – and activate
– these “new spaces”, from township clinics to the
courtrooms of South Africa, and through protests
that spilled beyond the streets of Cape Town to
reach the offices of pharmaceutical multinationals
in Europe andAmerica. It is, Robins and von Lieres
suggest, in the articulation of these different forms
of mobilisation that TAC’s significance lies; in the
joining together across different sites of
identifications between otherwise disparate
individuals, brought into concert in their pursuit
of an issue-in-common.
TAC serves, in many ways, as an example of the
new politics described by Hajer and Wagenaar
(2003). Issue-based, often composed of transient
interventions characterisedmore by their intensity
and spontaneity than their durability, one of the
principal characteristics of such political spaces is
their heterogeneity, and their ability to reach across
and hold together segments of society that might
otherwise have little in common, creating at the
same time the basis for new and different ways of
relatingbetween them. InTAC, blackmothers living
with HIV who are surviving on the margins of the
economy, and white middle class advocates, queer
activists and doctors, are drawn together in a
common struggle. Articulated in different
configurations in different sites, together they provide
a force to be reckoned with. By bringing together
experiential and expert knowledge, buttressing
normative claims framed in the language of human
rights with the language of evidence-basedmedicine,
TAC has become a formidable alliance.
The case ofTAC provides an interesting example
with which to think more about intersections
between different kinds of space, and for the
synergies between action in one sphere and in
another. In this case, the pursuit of policy change
through conventional routes is complemented by
active use by TAC of both kinds of “popular spaces”
identified earlier. Popular regularised spaces serve
to build and sustain the movement, providing a
base from which to act and in which to strategise;
and popular transient spaces, such as well-
publicised demonstrations, lend all-important
public space levers. In his contribution to the
Bulletin, Andy Mott explores the intersection of
these spaces further. Drawing on experience with
community organising and citizen monitoring in
theUnited States ofAmerica,Mott’s article describes
the terrain of struggle that is “democracy”, US-style,
and highlights the role of mass mobilisation in
claiming and winning political space for those who
are poor and discriminated against.
Situating grassroots social movements on the
American political landscape, Mott explores the
interplay between government moves to open
political space for citizen engagement in policy
processes and the kinds of alliances that formed as
a result, between legal services advocates and poor
people’s organisations, and between grassroots
activist groups and national campaigns.Mott argues
that as political space for policy influence began to
shrink with conservative forces winning ground
within government, poorer people sought to create
their own spaces from which to gain strength, and
field representatives to fight for greater involvement
in decisionmaking.Tactics used to win and expand
space range fromoppositional to alliance-building,
combining attempts to reform the “rules of the
game” with creating connections with other actors
and processes outside the space, so as to act more
effectively to lever open opportunities for influence.
As in the case of TAC, the kind of organising
Mott describes has involved work right at the
grassroots – going door-to-door to talk to people
about the issues concerning them and to encourage
them to get involved – and has linked this with
national-level campaigns around core issues that
affect people’s lives. Citizen monitoring is shown
to have been an especially effective way of using,
and extending, available political space and holding
government to account. An emerging emphasis
within Mott’s account is the centrality of popular
spaces – “own spaces” that are created anew, sought
and strengthened – as sites in which people can
work together to get on top of an issue and develop
strategies to have an effect in the public domain.
Mobilisation, and confidence and capacity
building in “popular spaces” thus provides a basis
for entry into “invited spaces”, one that can not only
equip those who traverse these spaces with the
resources needed to use their voice, but also the
legitimacy with which to speak – as representative
of constituencies who remain watchful, outside the
“invited space”, rather than as individuals. This
returns us to the questions of representation raised
earlier in this introduction, and to the broader issues
that our enquiry into spaces and places of
participation has raised about issues of voice,
inclusion and difference in these new arenas.
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5 Conclusion
Many of the institutions described in this Bulletin
are in their infancy; they are, in many respects,
democratic experiments in the making. As they
mature, the kind of changes that they promise in
political culture, in consciousness and in the quality
and depth of civic engagement, may yet become
more apparent. Yet even now it is clear that whilst
much of their potential as democratic institutions
remains to be realised, something is happening.
Fromdifferences in the framing of needs as demands
for rights, to changes in the way in which citizens
regard the process of governance and their own
competence as participants in it, small changes offer
the prospect of greater effects. People who have
never had anything to do with processes of rule are
being brought into arenas of governance and are
learning more about how they work: lessons that
may stand them in good stead in other arenas. In
some contexts, the difference this may make – to
people, to political processes, to the way in which
government and governance come to be thought
about – may be incremental, but it is not
inconsiderable. Even where institutionalised
participation has little or no policy efficacy, there
are tactics to be tried, alliances to be built; and what
participants bring into and take from these spaces
may have all kinds of possibilities for them as actors
in other spaces and,more broadly, for the practice
of democracy (cf.Warren 1992; Mansbridge 1999).
But there is clearly still a long way to go before
these kinds of “invited spaces” can become
genuinely inclusive and equitable institutions.Much
can be done by improving institutional design (Fung
2003), especially in the area of representativeness
and procedures for democratic decision making.
And yet in every case contextual factors come into
play, whether, for example, the influence of the
sanitarianmovement on those engaged in shaping
health policy in Brazil or a political culture of non-
bindingness in SouthAfrica. The sheer diversity of
institutions described in this Bulletin serves to
underscore the point that the one-size-fits-all
development rhetoric about governance and
institutions plays out in very different ways across
different cultural, social and political settings.
Not only do “invited spaces” need to be
understood as embedded in the particular cultural
understandings and political configurations that
constitute governance in any given context. It is
also crucial to situate them in institutional
landscapes as one amongst a host of other domains
of association into and out of which actors move,
carrying with them relationships, knowledge,
connections, resources, identities and identifications
(Cornwall 2002). Viewed in isolation, they may
appear more inviting – and certainly more
straightforward – than when they are set on this
more populous institutional terrain, where they
jostle for policy space with political parties, social
movements, religious organisations, kinship and
patronage networks, and so on. Development
agencies ignore the embedded and situated
character of these institutions at their peril.
Situating the spaces with which we have been
concerned here on this broader landscape, and
exploring the intersections and interfaces with other
political institutions, both those of the formal
bureaucracy and other kinds of arenas for citizen
engagement, transient or regularised, “invited” or
“popular”, raises ahost of further questions.To what
extent has the expansion of participation by
invitation worked to undermine the place of
traditional political institutions like voting and
protest, and is this in the interest of marginalised
groups or the more articulate and organised
professional classes? If the door is always open, what
happens to those who choose not to go in – do they
get discredited as troublemakers?And what are the
reciprocal effects of the enlargement of the public
space and the increasing permeability of boundaries
between state and non-state institutions?These are
questions that remain for future studies of thepolitics
of participation, to which this Bulletinhopes tomake
amodest contribution.
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* I would like to thank JohnGaventa and Zander Navarro
for their comments on an earlier draft of this introduction,
and Vera Schattan Coelho, Alex Shankland, Peter
Houtzager, Ranjita Mohanty, Bettina von Lieres, John
Williams andCarlos Ruiz Cortez for conversations arising
from our collective work as part of the Development
Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and
Accountability that have helped me shape some of the
ideas expressed here.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary interest in citizen engagement in
public policy stems from a concern with the
governance and quality of public service delivery,
with improving the legitimacy of decision making
and with articulating the claims of those previously
marginalised (Barnes and Bowl 2001; Newman
2001; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). This article
discusses recent research into the diversity of sites
and practices of public participation in two
contrasting English cities, Birmingham and
Liverpool.1 It explores the perspectives of citizens
and officials on participation and examines the
construction of “the public”, the negotiation of
legitimacy and how questions of difference and
diversity are managed in spaces for participation.
Our analysis reflects on issues of interaction and
institutional design within forums for public
involvement, the interaction between representative
and participative democracy in the public policy
field and how the tensions between representative
and participative democracy are reconciled, or not.
2 Citizenship and participation in
service delivery
Shifting notions of citizenship and the merits of
participation have informed successive attempts
by UK governments to involve the public in policy-
making over service delivery. In the 1970s, spatially
targetedCommunity Development Projects (CDP)
sought to involve citizens as empowered partners
in their dealings with the state, a programme which
ultimately failed to shift the prevailing balance of
power (Cockburn 1977).The 1980s saw a dramatic
shift in emphasis as Conservative governments
promoted the notion of the “citizen as consumer”.
This privatisation of the relationship between the
citizen and the state was supported by the
outsourcing of local services and the expansion of
private provision in key areas of public concern.
The public were encouraged to play an active role
in assessing service quality (through satisfaction
surveys and charter initiatives) and contributing
to service management (through participation in
school governing bodies and forms of tenant
management). The empowerment of citizen–
consumers was considered important in challenging
the dominant self-interest of ruling politicians and
professionals at the local level (Prior et al. 1995).
The inadequacy of the Conservatives’
individualised conceptualisation of citizens as
consumers led to an emphasis in the latter years of
the twentieth century on the responsibilities of
citizens to contribute to creating their own and
others’ welfare (Barnes and Prior 2000). This
position was developed under the New Labour
administration that took power in 1997 and is
reflected in their publicised priorities for reform.
These includedmeasures that sought to reconnect
the citizen to the state, revitalising the democratic
health of the nation and included efforts to involve
the public at all levels of government through
instruments such as referendums, citizens’ juries
and panels, youth councils, neighbourhood forums
and interactive websites.
New Labour sought to engage service users as
participants in measures to improve the
performance of public services, whether through
“Best Value” at local government level or the Patient
Advocacy and Liaison Services (PALs) in the health
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service, which was heralded as a voice for users in
service planning. Resources were targeted at
disadvantaged or socially excluded communities
through particular programmes contained within
theNational Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal
(SocialExclusionUnit 2001; seeTaylor this Bulletin).
The rapid increase in recent years in the volume
and range of non-electoral participation initiatives
used by local government has seen methods such
as public meetings now more likely to be used
alongside user-oriented mechanisms like focus
groups and more innovative approaches such as
interactive websites or citizens’ juries (Lowndes et
al. 1998; ODPM 2002). In 2001, 14million people
were estimated to have participated in these
exercises (ODPM 2002).
Public participation in public policy, however,
is not simply a response to government prompting
andpromotion but also emanates from autonomous
community action and social movements, from
claims for the authentic expression of lived
experiences, which have gone unheard or been
actively silenced (e.g. Barnes and Bowl 2001).
Sometimes couched in terms of creating
opportunities for more active citizenship (e.g.Barnes
1997; Lister 1997), the concern here is to create
opportunities for people excluded from decision
making to become empowered and to influence
decisions that affect their lives (Melucci 1996;
Touraine 2000; Fraser 1997).Our study sought to
assess the capacity of these new spaces for
participation in public policy (whether stimulated
by government or autonomous citizen action) to
contribute to democratic renewal and challenge
social exclusion.2 In particular, we sought to
understand better the kinds of fora that exist at the
local level, who participates in them, how issues of
difference and dissent are handled and how
participants engage with the ‘rules of engagement’
within these spaces.3
3 The range and types of
deliberative forums at the local
level
Our mapping of public participation in the two
cities provided evidence of a wide range of
initiatives.Themajority of reported initiatives could
be characterised as “invited spaces”, serving to
bridge the gap between the citizen and state. This
is not surprising given that most of our informants
were officials from the local government or health
sectors,many of whom were engaged in developing
these “invited spaces”.However, we also obtained
information about a small number of relatively
longstanding “popular spaces” through our
voluntary and community sector informants. It is
possible to characterise these initiatives in the
following ways although many of the reported
initiatives could be included in more than one of
the categories below:
n Initiatives to address cross-cutting issues such
as the Sustainability Forum in Birmingham
(environmental initiative established in response
to Local Agenda 21), Communities Against
Poverty in Liverpool and a wider range of
regeneration partnerships in both cities.
n Initiatives that focused on issues affecting a
specific population group/s including the Senior
Citizens’ Forums in both cities, the Lesbian and
Gay Forum in Liverpool, the Black andMinority
Ethnic Group Council and the Search Team
(disabled and other service users) in
Birmingham. These initiatives may be city-wide
or neighbourhood-based such as the initiative
to develop services for Asian young people as
part of an area-based regeneration programme
in Birmingham.
n Generic forums for involvement led by the local
authority but involving the public and partners
fromother sectors namely theLocal Involvement,
Local Action (LILA) initiative in Birmingham
and Area Committees in Liverpool.
n Advocacy initiatives stimulated by community
or voluntary action to improve services or secure
policy change, such as the Liverpool Mental
Health Consortium, Communities Against
Poverty and the Birmingham Women’s Advice
and Information Centre.
n Service-specific initiatives including Patients
Forums/Councils in hospitals in both cities, a
Women’s Information Network for maternity
services in Liverpool, Best Value consultations
by local government departments, tenant
participation initiatives relating to housing and
Primary Care Group involvement activities (in
both cities).
n Area-specific initiatives including Education
ActionZones (improving school attainment levels
in targeted areas) and Sure Start (working with
children aged 0–4) inboth cities, Neighbourhood
Services Pilots (a decentralisation scheme) and
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the West Everton Community Council (a
community-led organisation) in Liverpool and
the Family Support Strategy in Birmingham.
n Issue-specific initiatives such as the
redevelopment of a park in Birmingham and the
community action to prevent the closure of a
health centre in Liverpool.From our initial
mapping exercise, it was possible to identify
three key features of the reported local public
participation initiatives: a neighbourhood focus,
an intention to extend and enhance participative
democracy and the building of social capital.
4 The neighbourhood focus
Motivation for public participation could be found
from locality to supra-national level in both cities.
Evidence of a shift towards neighbourhood-based
activity was providedmost obviously by the “New
Deal for Communities” regeneration programmes
in both cities.This programme targeted activity and
resources at place-based communities of no more
than 8,000 people. The combination of policies
and programmes fromnational and supra-national
bodies also had a neighbourhood focus. Locally
generated policies and programmes supported this
neighbourhood momentum and the local
government organisations in both cities had devised
decentralisation programmes that aimed to devolve
decision making to sub-local level.
However, other dimensions to involvement cut
across this neighbourhood focus. In the National
Health Service (NHS), these related to specific
service sites, such as hospital or surgery patients’
councils, or types of health problem, such as mental
health or diabetes. Participation was also organised
around communities of identity, the strongest
example of which was a city-wide lesbian and gay
community police forum, although other examples
are outlined above. Finally, both cities paid attention
to super-ordinate issues that affected all
communities. For example, in one city, there was
a city-wide sustainability forum, while in another,
a “Communities Against Poverty” forum reflected
a concern with deprivation.
5 Extending and enhancing
participatory democracy
Participation initiatives in both cities were designed
to involve citizens in all stages of the policy process
from design to implementation and evaluation,
through three main modes of engagement:
1. Information giving, either as a means to wider
participation, or to raise awareness about the
nature of a particular service or function.
2. Consultation, an opportunity for the public to
express views about a particular issue within a
framework set by a service delivery organisation.
3. Dialogue, or deliberation, between organisations
and citizens, in which issues for discussion could
be introduced by both parties.
In most cases, a number of methods were
combined to extend and enhance participation.
Themost commonly employed was the small group,
normally as part of a combination of other
techniques. Other methods included visioning
events, focus groups and citizen research. Certain
circumstances called for very particular methods,
so teleconferencing was used for a group of cystic
fibrosis sufferers who could not meet face to face
because of the risk of cross infection. Social networks
in pubs and clubs had been used to access the views
of the lesbian and gay community.
6 Building social capital
There was evidence that building collective capacity
among specific communities informed the design
of someparticipation initiatives.This developmental
capacity had two emphases. The first concentrated
on building the capacity of groups and institutions
to relate to each other. Activity here was targeted
at improving the understanding between
communities and institutions of each others’ ways
of operating. Here Black and minority ethnic
communities were most frequently identified as
target groups as they were often perceived to be the
most marginalised from existing decision-making
processes.However, the issue also arose in relation
to the setting up of a new health organisation, a
primary care group, where key officials were
conscious that the reproduction of ‘the traditional
ways of doing things’ would not attract community
members to participate.
The second related to building individuals’
capacity within communities.Activities here tended
towards providing opportunities for individuals to
associate with each other as well as officials, to
exchange information and share personal
experiences and to build personal relationships
through the process of association and exchange,
for example, an initiative providing support for
carers was as much about developing a strong
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network amongst potentially isolated carers as it
was about accessing carers’ experiences to inform
future policy and service delivery decisions.
7 Who takes part and why?
Many of those involved had previous experience
of “activism” including within trades unions,
political parties, voluntary organisations, self-help
groups or community action. Some officials shared
similar histories with community members
illustrating the way in which the experiences of
different stakeholders frequently overlapped or
were held in common. Participants could be
considered to be motivated on a range of different
“commitments”, including:
n Commitment to an area, for example, young
people involved in a regeneration initiative saw
this as an opportunity to improve the area in
which they lived.
n A religious commitment that provided a value
base leading to social action to improve people’s
lives.
n A commitment to a cause about which people
could become very knowledgeable, for example,
amongst both citizens and officials involved in
an Agenda 21 initiative.
n An awareness of being a representative of “a
people”. For example, a Yemeni man who saw
his role as ensuring that the voices and
experiences of theYemeni population were heard
to improve the lives of older people.
n Lifelong commitment to causes, such as party
political, trade union,peace campaigns, women’s
groups, deriving frompolitical commitments or
professional backgrounds.
n Commitments originating in experiences of
difference, exclusion or disadvantage, including
poverty, disability, or differences related to
sexuality, gender or ethnicity.
To dismiss people demonstrating such
commitments as “self interested” is too simplistic
(see Young 2000).Nevertheless, it is important not
to ignore the potential for new forms of participation
to reproduce exclusions. This is a point we address
below.
Different “opportunity structures” for
participation are created by public bodies. Initial
survey data suggested two forms. The first
emphasised the desire for “openness” within a given
population group,most commonly, residents living
in a specific area (such as area committees); users
of a particular service (such as community care
services); or citizens sharing particular
characteristics (such as the lesbian and gay forum).
The second emphasised the idea of “representation”.
Here membership was created by eliciting
“representatives” from existing groups and
organisations, for example, the Minority Ethnic
Group Council (MEGC) established by an NHS
Trust, in which membership was formed by
invitation to ethnic community organisations.
More detailed analysis of the initiatives in our
case studies suggested that these two principles
were overlaid in quite complex ways. For example,
those forums constituted through the principle of
representation could bemore or less open in terms
of the field from which representation was sought.
In the MEGC, for example, only organisations
recognised by the local health trust were invited to
send representatives. There was, as one member
termed it, an ‘unofficial hierarchy structure’ of
representation.
Data suggested that the tension between
“openness” and “representation” was resolved
through the use of informal networks to extend
membership. This led to a number of difficulties.
In some forums, an imbalanced membership
resulted, with some groups significantly
underrepresented because an absence of networks
to existing membership created a barrier to
participation. Our detailed studies of individual
initiatives revealed different ways in which groups
dealt with the desire for membership to be “open”,
while ensuring that particular groups were
represented and a diversity of voices heard. Some
groups sought to resolve this by creating more
formally constituted decision-making groups within
an open membership. But this did not necessarily
resolve the difficulties because of the problems of
securing nominations for election or applications
for appointment.Our data suggested that problems
of securing both membership and office holding
are shaped by the interaction between institutional
context and individual motivations.
Questions of legitimacy informed the way in
which opportunity structures were created, the
forms of power and influence that operated within
forums and between forums and decision-making
bodies.Whatever the formal membership rules (see
below), informal claims to legitimacy tended to be
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based on the skills, knowledge and experience of
particular members and/or their claims to
“represent” a wider constituency. For example, in
locality based forums, knowledge of the locality
was highly valued. But while notions of “the general
public” or “local residents” were used by officials
and lay members to denote the absence of sectoral
interests, in practice many lay advisory members
were not “just residents”, some were professionals
viewed as having their own agendas.
“Representation” was a key discourse in claims
for legitimacy. Interviews highlighted the ways in
which “representation” and “representativeness”
informed official expectations about who should
be involved and how. But our studies showed that
citizens also drew on a range of notions of
representation to define their position within the
forums and to establish the legitimacy of their claims
by reference to external publics. For example, in a
service user’s forum individuals were invited to join
on the basis of (1) their capacity to represent service
users’ views by virtue of their own experience; (2)
their capacity to represent particular user groups,
for example disabled people; (3) their capacity to
represent other service users through contact with
them. The tensions between these different claims
were resolved in part by creating a distinction
between representation of people and representation
of issues.
Conflicting claims may underpin struggles for
legitimacy within and between forums. This was
evident in the youth conference study, where council
youth workers sought to impose an inclusive view
of the young people to be involved in planning the
conference, in the face of claims put forward by an
existing autonomous youth forum that they were
the legitimate representatives of local youth. This
study illustrates the tensions between officially
espoused adherence to recognising diversity and
deeply embedded assumptions about what
constitutes a legitimate community.Here an attempt
by city council workers to widen the range of groups
involved in planning the conference served to
question the legitimacy of the original forum to
speak on behalf of all local young people. The
forum’s legitimacy claim came not from a formal
process of election, nor from claims to be
representative of all young people in the area, but
from a shared history of action.
Autonomous groups can face problems as they
engage with institutional forums in which officials
claim the right to definemembership. Such groups
may then be faced with a choice about whether they
reconstitute themselves tomaintain the opportunity
for dialogue, or whether they assert their autonomy
by breaking away. For example, members of the
women’s advice centre were influential in forming
a women’s network to promote dialogue and shape
strategy away from the constraints of official forums;
a senior citizens forum was under threat as official
bodies created alternative structures where they
had more control over membership.
Struggles over legitimacy and control are
negotiated in the everyday processes through which
officials engage with groups. Our study has
highlighted the importance of studying themicro-
politics of engagement amongst forum members
and between forums and official bodies and we
have elaborated on this elsewhere (Barnes et al.
2003).
8 The process of deliberation:
particularity, difference and
dissent
It became apparent through our studies of individual
initiatives that the different purposes and origins
of each participation initiative will affect the nature
of exchange. It was also evident that there were
tensions between the institutional contexts within
which conditions of participation were framed and
the struggle for recognition amongst excluded
groups.We concluded that such forums can be seen
as the site for the development of new discourses
that are negotiated along the citizen/official
continuum, suggesting that deliberative forums are
sites in which identity is constituted rather than
expressed.
The social services user group illustrated tensions
concerning purpose that were evident in responses
to the nature of exchanges within the forum. The
purpose was described as enabling a voice for users
of social care services.Members contested whether
voice should be understood as individual advocacy,
personal testimony or collective action with specific
change objectives. Some spoke of the importance
of the forum as a site in which experiential
knowledge, expressed in personal accounts, could
be exchanged. Others saw this as inadequate as a
basis for achieving change and there was little
evidence of testimony informing more general
campaigns. Evidence suggested that the social
services department concerned was content to
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support the group as a forum, which could enable
access to useful experiential knowledge relevant to
“safe” issues (such as the design of identity cards
for Orange Badge holders), rather than encourage
more challenging responses on broader issues of
policy (including resource allocation).
This initiative study also illuminated the
complexity of diversity issues in deliberative forums.
It included different interestswithin the constitution
of the group (the range of community care “client”
groups), as well as different perspectives (see Young
2000). The forced resignation of a previous chair
on the grounds of racism had created self-
consciousness about language. One interviewee
suggested there had been a sophisticated debate
about how a sub-group ofminority ethnicmembers
should be described and how this would affect who
would identify with the group.Others were reluctant
to speak explicitly about this issue, indicating the
difficulty experienced in engaging with conflict along
these lines.The actual constitution of the group was
also affected by an earlier fracturing.Mental health
service users had “fallen out” with others. The
institutional location of the group within local
government rather than thehealth service alsomeant
that many of themost important issues for this group
could not be addressed in this context. In this
instance, the substance of deliberations was framed
by the institutional location of the forum. This in
turn marginalised issues of central importance to
some putative members.
One of the area committees illustrated the
tensions associated with bringing together
representative and participative democracy. The
purpose was to enhance democracy and devolve
decisionmaking.As committees of the council they
are subject to the rules and conditions that regulate
council conduct.Membership comprises councillors
from relevant wards, independent advisory
members from local communities or voluntary
organisations, representatives of key public
organisations and co-optedmembers.Only elected
councillors have voting rights.Any member of the
public can attend meetings. The substance of
dialogue was ‘small issues: rats, rubbish and road
safety’: issues of considerable importance in the
day-to-day lives of local residents. The council’s
failure to resolve these issues was one source of
frustration leading to angry exchanges. A sub-text
here was that attempts to engage onmore strategic
issues within the committee had been unsuccessful.
But the nature of exchanges reflected inter-
councillor and councillor/officer dynamics in other
contexts, exacerbated by tactical “alliancemaking”
with members of the public. Councillors always
had the first opportunity to speak and the capacity
of the public to contribute was limited by the failure
to distribute information in advance. Whilst lay
knowledge was valued for providing different
insights and a source of challenge, there was
evidence of councillors using their power to limit
debate. When councillors felt challenged by
members of the public they took this out on officers;
when members of the public complained about
lack of resources going into their wards councillors
supported this. Officers regarded councillors as
their audience, rather than the public and this
frustrated officer accountability to the public.
Deliberation within autonomous groups could
be very different. For example, in a senior citizens’
forum exchanges illustrated the significance of
Young’s concept of “greeting” as an important
element of deliberation: ‘Greeting, … names
communicative political gestures through which
those who have conflicts aim to solve problems,
recognize others as included in the discussion,
especially those with whom they differ in opinion,
interest, or social location’ (Young 2000: 61).There
were frequent references to the friendliness, respect,
tolerance and humour evident here. Before the
meetings there were jokes and anecdotes and after
formal business people stayed to share tea.
Participants felt this enabled strong views to be
expressed and disagreement to be negotiated
without falling out. The group exercised discipline
over members, but also offered support, for example
when an African member of the group had been
subjected to racist abuse at an annual general
meeting of the group.
9 The rules of engagement
An important aspect of our study was the dynamics
of the prevailing institutional and policy context
with reference to New Labour’s agenda for public
participation. Our analysis of the range of public
participation initiatives within each of the cities led
us to conclude that notwithstanding the dominance
of central government in theUK, local variation in
public participation is important and remains very
much in evidence.This local variation is stimulated
by the prevailing local context and the emergence
of multi-level governance that facilitates access to
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additional sites of decision making parallel to the
central state (Sullivan et al., forthcoming).
The formulation and application of rules within
new deliberative forums and how this is affected
by institutional context was an important
consideration for us in our examination of whether
and how the public could inform the rules of
deliberation and what difference this made. There
were four key points in the life of a public
participation initiative at which rules could be seen
to facilitate and/or constrain public participation.
9.1 Access rules
Access rules delimited participation in forums by
describing who the forum was intended to engage.
Those forums that aimed to be most open were
experienced as the most exclusive. This was the
case in the youth conference discussed above. This
suggested that in verydiverse communities inclusive
forums based on single identities such as age may
not be viable.
Organisations also influenced access through
the ways they promoted forums, for example
publicising their existence within known networks
or targeting service users whose interests “fitted”
with the organisations’ priorities. For example,
doctors reserved the right to vet new members of
the surgery patients’ group and theMEGC required
that members demonstrated their accountability
and representativeness before they were granted
access.
Many forums developed additional rules to
classify membership. In one local authority area
forum participation was open to all residents but
membership was restricted to elected councillors
and appointed “lay members”. Other forums
distinguished between ordinarymembers and those
elected or co-opted to officer roles. Access to the
positions was determined by election from amongst
the wider membership at an annual meeting for
example, or by agreement amongst the other officers
on the committee/steering group.
9.2 Agenda setting
Agenda setting was contested in forums where
citizens felt relatively powerless andmistrusting of
the sponsoring organisation. In the youth forum
where officials considered agenda setting to be
uncontentious, citizens experienced this as offering
limited opportunities for deliberation within an
officially determined framework.Elsewhere, agenda
setting was a formal process between officers of the
forum and respective officials. Issues got onto the
agenda by being raised at past meetings, being a
standing item or by request from the sponsoring
organisation. In autonomous forums agenda setting
was undertaken in a more collective way. For
example, in the women’s group agenda setting took
place annually at a weekend event that combined
business with social activities.
9.3 Rules and norms in deliberation
Institutions comprise rules (the formal expression
of regulation) and norms (the informal expression
of “appropriate” behaviour). Elsewhere (Sullivan
et al. forthcoming), we have illustrated how
dominant logics of appropriate behaviour interact
with formal rules to guide the conduct of both
citizens and officials in deliberative forums. The
evidence of our initiative studies suggested that
citizens were increasingly reluctant to play the role
expected of them by officials because of a loss of
trust in officials’ expertise.
While officials sought to impose rules of
deliberation, citizens often challenged this. For
example, in an area forum, one individual regularly
sought to take advantage of public question time
by refusing to stick to his one (allowed) question,
while in the youth forumone individual consistently
challenged officials’ motivations and credibility to
try and shift control into the hands of young people.
The consequences for each were different and
related to their power andposition within the forum.
The area forum individual was considered a
“committee anorak” and had little sympathy either
from the chair or other citizens. The young person
had considerable influence as he had a constituency
of young people who saw him as their leader. As
such he held the balance of power in the forum.
The purpose of rules was also contested. In
statutory sponsored forums citizens often argued
that rules existed to protect statutory bodies rather
than to support participation. This was disputed
by officials who believed that people ‘needed to
learn how to play by the rules’ if they were to
exercise influence. By contrast, in autonomous
forums rules were discussed in terms of how they
facilitated action rather than how they maintained
the position of one group over another.For example,
in a senior citizens’ forum the emphasis was upon
all members understanding the rules so as to
maximise participation.
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10 Institutions, dialogue and
outcomes
Few significant policy outcomes followed
deliberation within our study period. Sometimes
tension arising from the interplay of competing
rules and norms meant that citizens exited the
forum. Inmost cases citizens and officials continued
to work together despite limited progress.Citizens
thought small steps forward were to be expected
given the institutional constraints. Little victories,
like the acceptance of the forums’ right to be
consulted, were perceived as the first steps tomore
long-term change.However, for other forums their
impact on the statutory sector had lessened over
time as they had become “institutionalised” in their
relationship. Fundamental to the achievement of
different outcomes was the preparedness of statutory
bodies to make change and in the area forum
officials and citizens were increasingly aware of the
limited power to act granted to the forum by the
sponsoring agency.
Our research suggested that a key factor in
achieving meaningful dialogue was the nature of
rulemaking and the degree of involvement of citizen
participants at this point.Where citizens were part
of the rule making their allegiance to the rules
increased and considerable attention was given to
communicating rules and debating rule changes,
for example the Older People’s Forums. Where
citizens were not part of the rule making their
allegiance was limited and their engagement with
rule changes minimal, for example the local
authority area committees. This is significant as
without the wider interaction of agents with rules,
future institutional change (and hence more
meaningful dialogue) is unlikely.
11 Conclusion
By exploring participation from the perspectives of
both citizens and officials and by studying the
process of deliberation in a number of study sites,
we have highlighted the rich diversity and dynamic
and interactive nature of participation in England.
We are able to conclude that public participation
initiatives can be both facilitated and constrained
by their operation in a “developed” state context.
Our research has shown that the power, capacity
and resources available to the state can be
marshalled to support an agenda for change in such
a way as to secure the swift development of new
initiatives in a variety of arenas. However, the
inability (and reluctance) of many institutional
players to change the way in which they operate
can result in public participation initiatives that are
bound by rules and structures that fit officials’
expectations of how things should be done, but are
correspondingly alien to public participants. This
is compounded by the fact that very few state-
sponsored initiatives actually challenge the
prevailing power relationship between “the public”
and “the officials”, resulting in littlematerial change
to decision making, a “buying off” or deflection of
any citizen opposition and a demoralisation and
even alienation of once-committed citizen
participants.
Following on from this, our research has
confirmed that even within a “developed” state,
there remains a corresponding need for citizens to
develop free or “popular spaces” in which alternative
discourses and approaches can be developed. On
some occasions these “popular spaces”may combine
with state-sponsored bodies, while in other
circumstances “popular spaces”may retain an “arms
length” relationship with state institutions.However,
the capacity to develop an independent existence
is vitally important to the health of a democratic
society.
This study has alerted us to particular areas of
further investigation into deliberation and public
participation that could be usefully exploited in the
future. Data from this project has highlighted the
process outcomes of deliberative forums, that is,
their impact on institutional norms and the shaping
of new patterns of relationship between the public
sector and citizens/users.However, it has not been
possible to identify concrete links between public
participation in deliberative forums and specific
policy impacts.Assessing policy outcomes through
a longitudinal study of a cross section of public
participation initiatives such as those covered in
our study would fill this important gap in the
research evidence. A parallel project exploring
deliberation at different tiers of governance would
offer interesting insights into the relationship
between deliberative processes at different levels
of decision making. Together with further
comparative work across different political contexts,
with differently structured and developed state
systems, this could help promote greater
understandings of the political dynamics of
participation in practice.
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Notes
1. Birmingham (pop. 977,091) and Liverpool (pop.
439,476) were chosen for anumber of contrasting features,
which include: different political profiles (Birmingham
with a longstanding Labour administration in contrast
to Liverpool’s rather more turbulent political history
which has recently seen the Liberal Democrats wrest
power from Labour); differences in racial composition
at 20 per cent and 5 per cent Black and ethnicminority
populations, respectively; anddifferent ranks on an index
of deprivation in England, at 23rd and 3rd, respectively.
2. The first phase of the research involved surveying the
two cities to establish the range and types of deliberative
forums in existence.We received information about 71
examples of participation initiatives in Birmingham
and 30 in Liverpool, the smaller of the two cities. We
then conducted 17 detailed case studies across the two
cities, selected to address our research questions across
a range of types of initiative. In each of the 17 initiatives,
we undertookobservation and conducted semi-structured
interviews with both citizen and official participants.
3. The research was funded by the Economic and Social
Science Research Council as part of its ‘Democracy and
Participation Programme’.Our research project ‘Power,
Participation and Political Renewal’ was award No
L215252001.
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Does development research need reinventing? If it
does, why now and in what ways does it need to be
changed? These are the questions addressed by the
articles in this issue of the IDS Bulletin, many of which
were presented at IDS40, the fortieth anniversary
conference, in September 2006. They were also posed
by the 46 Roundtables held throughout the world in
2006, organised by IDS partners and alumni, which
preceded and helped frame the conference agenda.
Much is changing in ‘development’ and in the
political context in which we work. International
development issues are becoming more global;
inequality is rising across a whole host of dimensions
– both within and between countries; the capacity to
use and generate knowledge is increasing outside
the OECD countries; China’s emergence is shining a
new light on Western assumptions about how
development happens; there are new sources of
financial capital for development initiatives (the new
philanthropic foundations, the emerging countries);
information is more easily shared – at least for those
with fast internet connections – and is sourced from
more places; civil society is forming new
transnational alliances to challenge norms and power
relations (see Vera Schattan Coelho, page 98); the
very idea of what sustainable development means is
being profoundly questioned in terms of current
carbon consumption levels (see Wolfgang Sachs,
page 36); there is a heightened consciousness in the
West about living conditions in other countries; the
spheres of influence of the aid donors are shrinking –
although their influence within those spheres is
increasing; and the boundaries between domestic
and international policies are becoming increasingly
blurred as national identities are reconfigured and
the interdependence of nations intensifies. 
But do these changes mean that development
research needs to be reinvented? As John Humphrey
reminds us (page 14), development research has
constantly reinvented itself over the years. Certainly,
as Mike Edwards notes (page 40), ‘business as usual’
in development research is financially sustainable
given rising aid donor budgets. Yet for many of those
involved in the IDS40 activities there was a sense that
there is a need for development research to make a
conscious decision to change direction. In the West,
one’s fortieth birthday is known as a watershed year –
an ending of one phase of life and a beginning of
another. But as several of the Roundtable and
conference presenters reminded us, in many other
countries the fortieth birthday signals a very different
kind of transition as one draws closer to the end of
life expectancy. It is natural perhaps therefore to
reflect on how much has changed in the world since
IDS was founded in 1966 and to characterise the
above changes as some kind of fork in the road or
threshold for development and therefore for
development research. 
Taking into account the powerful symbolism of
fortieth birthdays, my own participation in (and
reading of the reports from all) the Roundtables
leads me to conclude that we really have reached a
significant place in defining what we want
development research to be. The Roundtables told
me that there is an increasing convergence of
concerns around international development but an
increasing divergence of opinion and experience
about how to address those concerns underpinned
by a context in which the accountability of external
development initiatives and development research
remains extremely weak. 
1 Convergence, divergence and accountability
On convergence, issues such as international
migration, the ebb and flow of identities around
religion, sexuality, ethnicity and nationhood; climate
change and energy use; the conflation of
Development Research: Globalised,
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development and security; and the emergence of
China as a global player were heard from all over the
world. People are increasingly worried about the
same transnational phenomena. Of course, the vastly
differing impact of these changes across the world
reflects the wide range of abilities to influence and
respond to them, increasing inequalities across and
between countries. As José Antonio Ocampo notes
(page 26), nine out of ten people live in countries in
which income inequality is increasing. Many of the
Roundtables felt that this increasing inequality was
unsustainable, particularly from a social cohesion
perspective. Wolfgang Sachs (page 36) makes the
more arresting point that unless outcomes begin to
converge – at a level of material wellbeing that is
much lower than that enjoyed in the West right now
– prosperity will continue to be the preserve of a
minority at the expense of a sustainable and sufficient
prosperity for all. Barbara Harriss-White (page 46)
also agrees that ‘catch up (with the West) is dead’. 
On divergence, it is not so much the current trend of
increasing differences in outcome that is striking (that
has been an ongoing debate for the last ten years at
least), but the realisation that there are many pathways
to ‘development’ and that the space to discuss these
pathways is opening up once again. As Adebayo
Olukoshi (page 20) suggests, it is becoming harder and
harder to sustain the argument that development is a
‘discussion about the other’ where ‘idealised versions of
the history of development in the West’ are used as a
metric ‘against which the experiences of the developing
countries were measured’. If European development
really is exceptional, as Sachs argues it is (being based on
colonies and carbon), then we do even more violence to
the idea of development by using the West as the
standard of measurement. The rise of China –
sometimes characterised as a unique form of capitalism,
sometimes as raw mercantilism – certainly does not
conform to this idealised history and makes many
Western commentators uncomfortable as a result. 
In his article Hubert Schmitz (page 51) argues that
China’s economic performance forces a reassessment
of the broad strands of Western thinking on
development which he characterises as: (1) ‘the West
is best’ (which he concludes is now discredited);
(2) ‘find your own way’ (in his opinion, a bolstered
view but problematic for international development
agencies); and (3) ‘the West is the problem’ and
(4) ‘putting the poor first’, both of which need
rethinking in light of China’s economic rise. The
widespread disillusionment that was expressed in the
Latin America Roundtables at the inability of the
neoliberal recipe to deliver growth was striking and
led to calls from the Roundtable participants for
governments in the region to neither break with nor
submit to globalisation but to create an environment
in which development strategies become infused
with national values, norms and institutions. As
Ocampo notes, international frameworks must play a
role in creating such policy space, although the likes
of Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa will
not wait for an invitation. 
On accountability, the Roundtables noted that the
development industry has much to say about the
responsibility of others, but little to say about its
own performance in this domain. Shalmali Guttal
(page 31) noted the development industry’s incredible
ability to shrug off failure. Roy Trivedy (page 100)
would have liked more discussion on what the aid
donors could do to improve accountability. Andy
Sumner’s review article (page 59) concludes that
development research has quite successfully ignored
ethics, despite dressing itself up in them when it is at
its proselytising worst. Perhaps we do not hear
much about the ethics of development and
development research because we think we have
little impact. Indeed, John Humphrey’s article
(page 14) does a good job of reminding us how three
of the major planks of international development –
gender equity, environmental stewardship and
structural adjustment – arose from research, social
movements and policies in the USA and Europe that
were essentially domestic in nature. Nick Benequista
and Ian Macauslan (page 86) note that the
development research community (including, alas,
the IDS40 process) routinely ignores the private
sector, another major player not often considered to
be within the charmed circle by many in
international development. Development initiatives,
including research, may or may not have a lot of
impact. Frankly we do not know because we don’t
spend enough time finding out. If we did, we would
be forced to be more reflective about our own
positionality as development specialists, especially
those of us based in the North. 
2 The implications for development research
So, what do these themes of convergence of
concerns, divergence of development pathways and
weak accountability of development actors mean for
development research?1
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First, we have to acknowledge that, as Barbara
Harriss-White puts it, development and
development research is in a state of flux. Are
development and development research increasingly
framed by the international aid agenda? If so, this
means doing research mainly in Africa and arguably
in South Asia. Or is development increasingly framed
by positive social change – wherever it occurs? If the
former, development studies will become a niche
area, with a built-in end-date. If the latter, it begs
the question, what is special about development
research? As Adebayo Olukoshi describes it, the past
40 years have marked the ‘end of the beginning’ for
development research. The question is what will the
next 40 years mark the beginning of? A waning of
development studies as we know it, or a rebirth? 
Mike Edwards (page 40) strongly argues for rebirth.
He urges the development research community to
avoid being bound by the definitions of geography
and economics that the aid industry adheres to and
to embrace the reality of common but differently
experienced patterns of global change. In my
overview of the Roundtables (page 1) I argue for a
multi-sited perspective on these patterns – for
instance, a rounded view on the interactions
between China and Africa must include perspectives
from China and Africa and cannot be solely reliant
on a partial view from Europe or North America.
This multi-sited or ‘360-degree’ view of an issue is
especially crucial if one believes, as I do, that where
one is spatially embedded has an enormous influence
on the way one frames an issue, the knowledge one
chooses to draw on and the conclusions one comes
to. The challenge is to globalise so-called ‘general’ or
‘global knowledge’ by engaging seriously with
Southern and Eastern researchers in a way that
respects their unique knowledge and perspectives on
global issues and also confronts asymmetries in the
resources to generate and mobilise knowledge.
Capacity development is one of the greatest of these
asymmetries – in terms of the ability of those in the
South to access, generate, share and promote
knowledge from the South. It is an asymmetry that
is much talked about and invested in but, as the
Roundtables and Hilary Standing and Peter Taylor’s
article note (page 79), little interrogated by the
donors or by the development research community. 
The implications of the diverging development
pathways perspective and the ‘find your own way’
argument laid out by Hubert Schmitz (page 51) is the
need to be able to learn across different
development stories. If there is more variation across
development pathways, let’s make sure we learn
across them. Adebayo Olukoshi refers to this as a
‘unified development discourse underpinned by solid
comparative methods’ and Mike Edwards calls them
‘symphonic poems’, which are ‘sufficiently
generalised but ‘sufficiently connected to myths and
memories, beliefs and ideologies, emotions and
aspirations’ – all symptoms of ‘the local’. He cites our
neglect of capacity development as an example of an
area that needs to be remedied through the creation
of new symphonic poems. 
So why don’t we see more comparative research
on, say, identity politics in Leeds, Lusaka, St Louis
and Lahore? Moreover, why don’t we see this
research being done by a team of researchers drawn
from the UK, Zambia, the USA and Pakistan?
Perhaps it is because, as Standing and Taylor put it
(page 79), development studies is ‘founded on the
very dichotomies that it seeks to overcome’. Extant
research funding flows, power structures and
patterns of credentialism reinforce this dichotomy
(Benequista and Macauslan). But as Olukoshi notes,
‘problems are not the monopoly of the South and
solutions are not the monopoly of the North’.
Examples of North–South comparative learning
abound: in New York City a variant of the Mexican
conditional cash transfer programme, Oportunidades,
is being introduced; Ségolène Royal, a leader in the
French Socialist Party, is championing participatory
democracy epitomised by participatory budgeting
from Brazil; the UK government is promoting a cash
transfer scheme to pregnant mothers so their
babies are not born malnourished, a scheme that is
common in Central America; and finally, the UK’s
Department of Local Government and
Communities is looking for ways in which citizens
can engage with government, learning from
experiences from Brazil, India and Nigeria. It is also
interesting to note that Hilary Benn, currently the
UK Secretary of State for International
Development, gave a seminar in February 2007 to a
parliamentary committee on ‘The Challenge of
Reducing Poverty: Comparing Developed and
Developing Countries’.
Some of this globalised comparative research is
already done at IDS and I hope we will soon be
doing more. Our experience to date is that such
globalised comparative research has made us much
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more sensitive to the issues of accountability, to the
power differentials between researchers and the
researched, and the ability of those researched to
hold researchers to account. The fact that we have
done this in our own backyard also gives us more
legitimacy when we do this work elsewhere. 
As I have already argued, external accountability is
weak in the development field, whether in policy,
practice or research. Andy Sumner (page 59) argues
that a test of our ethics as researchers is the ‘degree
to which the research process reorients, focuses, and
energises participants towards knowing reality in
order to transform it’. But my location in relation to
the place I conduct the research is a crucial modifier
of Sumner’s statement. If I conduct a piece of
research in the UK that is poorly designed and draws
faulty conclusions and is picked up by the media, I
will have to deal with embarrassed family, friends and
colleagues. If I make a mess of a piece of research in
Ghana, the consequences are more localised, further
from home and more easily brushed aside.
Accountability came up frequently at the conference.
It was central to the presentation from Bill Easterly
which was drawn from his latest book, White Man’s
Burden and to Andy Sumner’s article on ethics.
Easterly urges us to be aware of the limits of what
external actors can do in furthering development and
change. 
In research that is geared to be shared only inside the
academy, peer review offers some partial accountability.
But it is for work that is shared with the wider world,
and that seeks more directly and deliberately to
influence opinion, where accountability is weakest.
Should we even be trying to influence public opinion?
Edwards argues that we cannot contribute seriously to
change unless we do, but he warns about the
importance of maintaining rigour and independence
while legitimising a wider source of knowledge.
Humphrey and Harriss-White both also stress that
theory has to also be strengthened if we are going to
challenge short-lived political agendas, wherever they
come from (not just from aid donors). McKeown
would have liked to see more in the conference on the
gap between knowing and doing (although there is
plenty of discussion of this in the Roundtable reports,
see my overview, page 1). Harriss-White also lists the
dangers of a wide-eyed external focus: donor priorities
that shift more rapidly than researchers would like, and
researchers allowing the priorities of funders to unduly
influence their conclusions.
So, in a world where development is globalised, do
we need development research? Moreover, do we
need institutes of development research in the
North? I would argue that development research can
maintain its value-added, only if (a) it embraces
comparative work, negotiates multidisciplinarity, and
acknowledges its normative stance, and (b) it
embraces and reconciles multiple perspectives, is not
trapped by aid boundaries in terms of geography and
theory, allows the location(s) of the research to be
determined by the issue being explored, and works
on improving its accountability.
The challenge is to globalise our ‘general' knowledge
on development and to strengthen the capacity to
connect general and specific knowledge creation
processes. Success in one will reinforce the other.
What about Northern institutes of development
research? They will be needed for many reasons,
including to co-create ‘360 degree’ research on
global issues; to analyse domestic social change thus
contributing to comparative analyses; to analyse the
international effects of domestic policies and the
domestic effects of international policies (see
O’Brien’s note on the Canadian experience,
page 95); and to influence powerful actors in the aid
community. Do they have to change? As several of
the speakers at the IDS40 conference noted,
‘business as usual’ will not be punitive in a financial
sense, at least in the short run. 
IDS will certainly not be charting such a static course.
The IDS40 process – the Roundtables, the conference
and the conversations we had with peers and
partners throughout our anniversary year – has
influenced us deeply. We will be reflecting on our
relationships with the aid industry; about the scope
and nature of our comparative work; on how we can
facilitate the globalising of ‘general’ knowledge on
development; on how we can help connect general
and specific knowledges (see Nyakoojo’s note, page
93); on the way we work with partners and the
partners that we choose to work with; about how
we can be held more accountable; about our
approach to capacity development and theory
development; and about our role as change agents. I
don’t have the answers for you yet (or for the
questions posed by Roy Trivedy, page 100) as to what
the consequences of these reflections and
consultations will be for IDS, but I can assure you that
they will not result in business as usual. 
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Mike Edwards, half jokingly suggested that by 2046
IDS would have to rename itself the Institute for
Revolutionary Social Sciences. Whether or not
2046 sees us in that incarnation, our fortieth
birthday marked, for us, the end of the beginning
and the beginning of something new. We hope this
issue of the IDS Bulletin stimulates you, your
networks and your organisation to reflect in the
same way. 
Note
1 We are taken to task somewhat by Nick Benequista and
Ian Macauslan and by Mary McKeown for our lack of
focus on teaching. In my defence, I can only plead that
for me it is hard to separate out the functions of
research and graduate-level teaching. Clearly there are
many implications for the content of teaching and the
way it is conducted, but it seems to me these stem from
the why, what and the how of research. 
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